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Abstract
This thesis investigates the influence of retiree health and pension policies on the retirement
decisions of public sector employees. Chapter one documents the central role of eligibility for
subsidized retiree health insurance. Using administrative records obtained from the Penn-
sylvania State Employees Retirement System, the analysis finds that the well-documented
spike in the separation rate at the normal retirement age almost completely disappears in
the population of workers not yet eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance. A second
set of results exploits quasi-experimental variation in plan design to show that increasing
the service requirement for subsidized retiree health insurance stretches the distribution of
separations: early separations occur earlier and late separations occur later.
Chapter two presents a structural analysis of the retirement decision for the same em-
ployees. Existing models of the retirement decision treat eligibility as a fixed characteristic
of the worker rather than one that evolves over the career. This chapter estimates a model
of life-cycle labor supply and uses it to simulate labor supply behavior under different health
and pension policies. Changes in the eligibility requirements for subsidized retiree health
insurance induce dramatic changes in retirement timing that would be missed in models that
do not account for an employer's eligibility criteria.
Chapter three turns to the defined benefit pension plans common in the public sector.
These plans create complicated incentives in favor of continued work at some ages and in
favor of retirement at others. The strength of these incentives depends on many factors, such
as the age of initial employment and the number of years on the job. Because employees
differ along these dimensions, the value of the pension benefits earned over the course of
a career varies substantially-even among employees with the same total earnings. This
chapter investigates the incentive effects and distributional consequences of four stylized
plan designs. It derives simple formulas for the accrual rate of pension wealth and the
distribution of benefits under each of the plans and uses these formulas to gain insight into
the incentives and risks they create.
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Chapter 1
Retiree Health Insurance and Job
Separations: Evidence from
Pennsylvania State Employees
Abstract
This chapter documents the central role that eligibility for subsidized retiree health insurance
plays in retirement decisions. Using administrative records obtained from the Pennsylvania
State Employees' Retirement System, the analysis finds that the well-documented spike in
the separation rate at the normal retirement age almost completely disappears in the pop-
ulation of workers not yet eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance. Similarly, workers
eligible for subsidies before the normal retirement age separate at much greater rates than
comparable workers who are not eligible. A second set of results exploits quasi-experimental
variation in plan design to show that increasing the service requirement for subsidized retiree
health insurance stretches the distribution of separations: early separations occur earlier and
late separations occur later. However, younger employees respond exclusively by delaying
separation. Finally, simulations of alternative eligibility requirements for subsidies reveal
important financial links between the health and pension plans. Restricting eligibility before
the normal retirement age encourages continued work when pension accruals are highest. The
resulting increase in pension obligations partially offsets the savings obtained from reduced
health benefits.
This project would not have been possible without the invaluable assistance of the open records team
at the Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement System. I also thank Jim Poterba, Jon Gruber, Peter
Diamond, Isaiah Andrews, Aviva Aron-Dine, Dan Barron, Matt Fiedler, Sally Hudson, Adam Sacarny,
Joe Shapiro, Tyler Williams, seminar participants at MIT, and the open records staff at the Pennsylvania
Office of Administration. This research was supported by the National Institute on Aging, Grant Number
T32-AG0000186, and by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. All mistakes are my own.
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1.1 Introduction
State governments face unfunded liabilities of more than $600 billion arising from the retiree
health benefits they have promised to current and past employees (Pew Center on the States
(2012)). The assets currently set aside to pay for these benefits cover only five percent of
the accrued liability. Furthermore, struggling with reduced revenues and other spending
priorities, states are choosing not to make the contributions necessary to fully fund their
plans. In fiscal year 2010, Arizona was the only state to do so. Rather than increase taxes or
reduce spending on other programs, many states are choosing to continue on a pay-as-you-go
basis and cut future benefits.
Unlike pensions, retiree health benefits (RHB) have few legal protections and can be
modified for both current workers and retirees (Clark and Morrill (2010)). For this reason,
reductions in RHB offer the possibility of substantial short-term savings for cash-strapped
state governments. At the same time, any modifications to retiree health benefits imple-
mented for current workers will have important effects on the state workforce. Age and
service requirements in many plans create large financial incentives in favor of continued
work in the years immediately preceding eligibility. Completing the last year of service re-
quired can be worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to employees who intend to retire
immediately after doing so. After meeting the eligibility requirements, workers can keep
their health coverage whether or not they remain on the job. As a result, employees' ef-
fective compensation rate decreases sharply. Understanding the labor supply response to
these incentives is both interesting in its own right and critical to projecting the financial
implications of any potential changes in retiree health benefits.
To gain insight into the effect of retiree health benefits on labor supply behavior, this
chapter analyzes the experience of Pennsylvania state employees. Pennsylvania's retiree
health benefits come in two forms: guaranteed access to the state's pool for all annuitants
and highly subsidized insurance policies for annuitants meeting additional age and service
criteria. In the last decade, the state has introduced new fees, restricted plan choices,
and restricted eligibility for subsidized retiree health insurance. This analysis focuses on
Pennsylvania for two reasons. First, when the state restricted eligibility for subsidized retiree
health insurance (RHI), it grandfathered employees meeting certain age and service criteria
under the existing eligibility rules. This grandfathering provision created exogenous variation
12
in plan design that can be used to understand the role of eligibility for subsidized RHI in
employee separation decisions. Second, Pennsylvania's public records law provides extensive
access to the employment records maintained by the state pension system, allowing for
detailed analysis of the effect of the state's retirement benefits on employee behavior. Though
obtained for a population of Pennsylvania employees, this chapter's findings are relevant for
a much larger set of public sector employees. The structure of the eligibility requirements
for subsidized RHI in Pennsylvania is typical of one of the three common forms in which
retiree health benefits are provided to public sector employees in the U.S. 1
The primary data for the analysis is drawn from the member records of the Pennsylvania
State Employees' Retirement System (SERS) and was obtained via public records requests.
The extract contains quarterly earnings, annual hours, and key dates in the careers of more
than 200,000 individuals who worked for the state between 2000 and 2011. The period
captures 115,000 separations including nearly 70,000 retirements. The data is rich enough to
allow for the determination of an employee's eligibility for retiree health and pension benefits
on any date in the 12-year period with a high degree of accuracy.
The chapter first investigates the effect of eligibility for subsidized retiree health insurance
on the separation hazard. The eligibility rules for pension and health benefits partition the
age and service space into five distinct regions. Employees who separate in each region are
entitled to a different combination of benefits: no benefits, an early retirement pension with
self-paid health insurance, an early retirement pension with subsidized health insurance,
and so forth.2 I estimate the separation hazard for each combination of age and service
and examine changes in the hazard at the boundaries between the age and service regions
defining eligibility for different benefits.
The striking finding of this analysis is that while the widely-documented spike in the
separation hazard at the normal retirement age is clearly present in the aggregate data for
Pennsylvania state employees, it nearly disappears for the population that is not yet eligible
for subsidized retiree health insurance at the normal retirement age. Eligibility for subsidized
RHI at the normal retirement age during the years used in the hazard estimation required
'The three most common forms of retiree health benefits in the public sector are (i) access to the state's
pool with generous subsidies for the purchase of insurance if a retiree meets certain age and service criteria,
(ii) access to the state's pool with a per-year-of-service subsidy for the purchase of insurance, and (iii) access
to the state's pool with little or no premium assistance. Intermediate and hybrid forms also exist.
2 Throughout this chapter I refer to the insurance available to all annuitants regardless of age and service
as self-paid. However, the state contributes $5 per month toward the cost of this coverage.
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at least 15 years of service. For the cohort of employees reaching normal retirement age with
exactly 15 years of service, the probability of separation increases from 4 percent in the year
before eligibility to 26 percent in the first year of eligibility. 3 In contrast, for the cohort
of employees reaching the normal retirement age with 14 years of service-and therefore
ineligible for subsidized RHI-the separation probability is essentially unchanged. However,
one year later, when this second cohort of employees becomes eligible for subsidized RHI, it
jumps 31 percentage points.
The hazard analysis also reveals the importance of eligibility for subsidized RHI in moti-
vating early retirement. Employees in their late 50s begin separating in meaningful numbers
only after they become eligible for subsidized RHI. For example, the probability of separation
for employees becoming eligible for subsidized RHI at age 57 increases from 3 percent at 56
to 15 percent at 57. Furthermore, this increase in the hazard largely persists in the years
between eligibility for subsidized RHI and the normal retirement age. The effect of eligibility
for subsidized RHI on employees in their late 50s found in this analysis is far larger than
that found in previous studies. However, prior work has generally pooled all employees at
firms that offer retiree health insurance, regardless of current eligibility status, and compared
them with employees at firms that do not offer RHI. The data for Pennsylvania employees
shows that this can be quite misleading. Less than half of the state workforce is eligible for
subsidized RHI at any age before the normal retirement age.
The chapter next turns to the analysis of a quasi-experiment arising from an increase in
the service requirement for subsidized RHI. Effective July 1, 2008, the state increased the
service requirement for subsidized RHI at or after the normal retirement age from 15 to 20
years. A population of employees nearing eligibility was grandfathered under the existing
rules, thus allowing for sharp identification of the effect of the new eligibility rules using dis-
continuity methods. The more restrictive service requirement decreased the probability that
an employee on January 1, 2003 just short of the grandfathering threshold would separate
over the next nine years by 10 percentage points, from 73.4 percent to 63.8 percent.4
As the decision to separate is a choice of when, not if, the object of fundamental interest
is the distribution of separations over time. Using the same grandfathering variation, I es-
3To facilitate comparisons across age and service levels and comparisons with prior work, I report annual
separation probabilities rather than the instantaneous hazard.
4The analysis examines the population of employees on January 1, 2003 because the increased service
requirement was formalized in collective bargaining agreements beginning in 2003.
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timate the effect of the policy change on the distribution of separations for workers exactly
at the grandfathering threshold. I find that the increased service requirement stretches the
distribution of separations: early separations occur earlier and late separations occur later.
Facing a more stringent service requirement, some employees who would have worked un-
til eligibility before the reform decide that the benefits are not worth the additional years
of work required after the reform. These employees separate even sooner under the post-
reform eligibility rules than they would have under the pre-reform rules. At the same time,
other workers with identical characteristics decide that the value of the subsidies is large
enough that the additional work required is worth it. These employees work longer under
the post-reform rules than they would have under the pre-reform rules. The relative im-
portance of these two effects depends on the age and the binding eligibility requirement for
the affected workers in the pre-reform period. Older workers already eligible for a pension
respond primarily by accelerating separations while younger workers not yet eligible for any
pension benefits show no evidence of acceleration. In all age groups, some employees delay
separations, but the number of employees delaying separation is modest at older ages.
Finally, I adapt the hazard estimation procedure to simulate the effect of two additional
restrictions in eligibility for subsidized RHI on employee separations and on the value of
the state's health and pension obligations. I show that a five-year increase in the service
requirement for subsidized RHI before the normal retirement age would reduce the present
value of obligations by nearly $500 million, or 7 percent.5 However, as such a policy would
encourage additional work at exactly the ages when pension accruals are highest, I find
that it would also increase pension obligations by $100 million. That is, the increase in
pension liabilities associated with the restriction in eligibility for subsidized RHI would offset
about 20 percent of the reduction in retiree health liabilities. In contrast, for a restriction
in eligibility after the normal retirement age the pension plan provides additional savings.
Pension accruals at these ages are low and the additional employee contributions made by
the individuals who choose to work longer in response to the eligibility restriction more than
offset the increase in pension benefits.
'For reasons discussed in section seven, this calculation assumes a different discount rate than that used
in the state's valuations of its retiree health obligations. As a result, the estimates presented here would
not match official estimates of identical policies. In addition, the simulations performed in this chapter limit
attention to a subset of active employees on December 31, 2011. To the extent that a proposed policy affects
individuals not in this sample--including, but not limited to, retirees and hazardous duty employees-the
estimated financial impact would also differ.
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The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section two situates this analysis
in the existing literature on retiree health benefits. Section three details the retiree health
plan and pension plan covering Pennsylvania state employees and summarizes the financial
incentives the two plans create. Section four describes the member data. Section five presents
the hazard estimates, and section six presents the analysis of the quasi-experiment. Section
seven discusses the policy simulations. Section eight concludes.
1.2 Previous studies of retiree health benefits
This analysis advances our understanding of the role of retiree health and pension benefits in
the separation behavior of public sector employees. It is the first work to explore the impact
of subsidized RHI on separations with full knowledge of the eligibility rules for both health
and pension benefits. While the complicated work incentives created by defined benefit
pensions have been extensively studied, the analogous incentives created by retiree health
benefits have been largely ignored.' The studies that have attempted to investigate the effect
of RHI on separations accounting for the evolution of eligibility at, the individual level have
encountered severe data problems.7
Reduced form analses typically estimate models for the probability of separation or
retirement over one or two-year periods.8 Estimates for the effect of retiree health insurance
on the one-year probability of separation for individuals in their 50s range from two to six
percentage points (Karoly and Rogowski (1994), Blau and Gilleskie (2001), Marton and
Woodbury (2007)). Analyses that allow the effect to vary by age find little effect in the early
50s and large effects in the early 60s. The age at which studies first find a large effect varies.
6See, for example, Karoly and Rogowski (1994), Rust and Phelan (1997), Blau and Gilleskie (2001, 2008),
Robinson and Clark (2010), and French and Jones (2011), who treat retiree health insurance coverage as a
fixed characteristic of the worker. For a review of the literature on pensions and retirement see Lumsdaine
and Mitchell (1999).
7 Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) specify a theoretical model of retirement incorporating the eligibility
rules for retiree health insurance into the budget constraint, but lack data on the actual rules. Similarly,
Marton and Woodbury (2013) pursue a reduced form investigation of the role of RHI in determining sep-
arations explicitly motivated by dynamic concerns but only have data on firm decisions to offer RHI. In
contrast, Nyce et al. (2011) have data on the eligibility rules for most retiree health plans in their sample
but have only limited information on the eligibility rules for pension benefits and do not use either in their
estimation.
8Madrian (1994) takes a different approach, estimating censored regression specifications for the retire-
ment age. Her results suggest a 6-14 month reduction in the retirement age for individuals with retiree
health insurance.
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Nyce et al. (2011) find large effects at 62 and 63 while Blau and Gilleskie (2001) and Marton
and Woodbury (2013) find large effects beginning at age 60.9
Analyses with information on the relative generosity of different plans find effects concen-
trated among those plans offering larger subsidies. Blau and Gilleskie (2001) estimate that
the effect of RHI on the separation hazard is 2 percentage points when the employer and
the employee share the cost and 5 percentage points when the employer pays the full cost.
Similarly, Nyce et al. (2011) find that the effect at age 62 is 3.7 percentage points overall
and 5.9 percentage points when the employer subsidy exceeds 50 percent of the premium.
A parallel structural literature has estimated dynamic life-cycle models to better under-
stand the role of retirement benefits in separations. Of particular note is the analysis of
Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) who explicitly recognize the importance of the evolution of
eligibility for retiree health insurance over the career. However, lacking data on the eligibil-
ity rules, they assume that eligibility for RHI coincides with eligibility for early retirement.
They conclude that RHI increases the aggregate hazard by 2 percentage points at age 62 with
roughly one third of their sample covered. Rust and Phelan (1997) and French and Jones
(2011) investigate richer specifications incorporating models of medical expenditures and, in
the case of French and Jones, allowing for self-insurance through savings. However, both
analyses treat eligibility for retiree health insurance as a fixed characteristic of the worker.
In each study, the estimation assigns a crucial role in separation behavior to health coverage.
French and Jones estimate that the job exit rate at age 62 if all employees had retiree health
coverage would be 8.5 percentage points higher than if all employees had coverage tied to
their job.
This study also makes an important contribution in offering effects identified from quasi-
experimental variation in plan design. 10 Existing reduced form studies rely on the presence
of adequate controls to identify the causal effect of offer, may well be contaminated by the
dynamic selection problem raised in Diamond and Hausman (1984), and often impose strong
assumptions about the functional form of the separation hazard. 1 Structural studies depend
on the adequacy of the choices made in specifying the model.
9 The timing in Blau and Gilleskie (2001) could be sensitive to the choice of functional form in the
estimation, but the results of Nyce et al. (2011) and Marton and Woodbury (2013) should not be.
10Prior work on COBRA has made use of quasi-experimental variation as well (see, for example, Gruber
and Madrian (1995)).
1 1Madrian and Beaulieu (1998) use quasi-experimental variation in benefits, but not plan design, to inves-
tigate the role of Medicare benefits in retirement decisions.
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Implicitly, public sector employees are an important part of the sample in all of the cited
studies as they make up a disproportionate share of employees with retiree health benefits.
However, I am unaware of any empirical studies directly examining the labor market effects
of retiree health benefits in the public sector." Numerous authors have investigated the
effect of pensions on the labor supply of public school teachers including Brown (2013) for
teachers in California, Ni and Podgursky (2011) for teachers in Missouri, and Furgeson et
al. (2006) for teachers in Pennsylvania. Asch et al. (2005) consider the effect of pensions on
the separation behavior of civil service employees in the Department of Defense.
1.3 Institutions and financial incentives
The state of Pennsylvania offers health and pension benefits to its employees after they
retire. State employees are also covered by both Social Security and Medicare. This section
outlines the major provisions of the state's retirement programs as they existed between
2000 and 2011 and discusses the financial incentives the two programs create. 13 It limits
attention to the rules for general employees hired before January 1, 2011 and working at
agencies participating in the Retired Employees Health Plan (REHP)." The description in
this section is drawn primarily from the publications of the Pennsylvania Employees Benefit
Trust Fund (PEBTF), which administers the REHP, and the State Employees' Retirement
System (SERS), which administers the pension plan.
1.3.1 Retiree health benefits
Pennsylvania provides retirees access to group health insurance through the PEBTF. The
existence of a retiree health plan, the eligibility rules, and the employer and employee con-
1 2The financial challenges of public sector retiree health benefits have received extensive attention. See,
for example, Clark and Morrill (2010), which also includes a theoretical discussion of the potential impacts
on labor supply.
13The rules for the benefit programs are complex, differ across unions and over time, and almost always
have exceptions. This summary provides an overview of the most important rules, but ignores many details
and special cases.
"The restriction to general employees excludes from the sample, among others, corrections officers, state
police officers, judges, and legislators. Pension benefits for each of these populations are computed according
to a distinct set of rules. Legislation enacted in late 2010 made major changes in the pension benefits for
employees hired on or after January 1, 2011. The REHP is the largest (by enrollment) post-retirement
medical benefit plan for Pennsylvania state employees, but does not cover all employees covered by the
pension plan.
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tributions are specified in collective bargaining agreements. The details of coverage are
determined by the Fund's Board of Trustees.' 5
Retirees may choose from a menu of plans determined by their date of retirement, eli-
gibility for Medicare, and county of residence. For 2011, non-Medicare-eligible annuitants
in every Pennsylvania county could choose between an indemnity plan, an HMO, a PPO,
and a consumer-directed health plan (CDHP). These options vary somewhat from year to
year. In the early 2000s, PPO coverage was limited to a small number of counties, retirees
in many counties had a choice between two or three HMOs, and the CDHP was not offered.
The indemnity plan is available only to employees who retired before July 1, 2004 and the
CDHP only to those who retired on or after that date. Non-Medicare-eligible retirees living
out of state have access to an indemnity plan or PPO with appropriate geographic coverage.
Medicare-eligible retirees must enroll in Medicare and pay the Part B premiums. The REHP
provides supplemental medical and drug coverage.
Any retiree receiving a pension benefit from SERS may purchase coverage through the
REHP at full price less a $5 per month subsidy from the state. I refer to this case as self-paid
due to the nominal nature of the state's contribution. Retirees meeting additional age and
service criteria qualify for substantial subsidies from the state. Eligible employees retiring
before July 1, 2005 pay nothing for health insurance after retirement. Eligible employees
retiring between July 1, 2005 and June 30, 2007 make contributions equal to 1 percent of
final annual salary. Eligible employees retiring on or after July 1, 2007 make contributions
at the same rate as active employees, currently 3 percent.16 Retirees first hired on or after
August 1, 2003 must pay an additional cost if they choose a health plan other than the least
expensive plan or plans in their county of residence. The HMO and CDHP are typically
considered the least expensive plans in each county and the additional cost applies to those
who choose the PPO.
For employees retiring prior to July 1, 2008, eligibility for state subsidies required 15
years of service at or after the normal retirement age and 25 years of service before the
normal retirement age. For retirements effective on or after July 1, 2008, eligibility for state
"The PEBTF Board of Trustees consists of seven members designated by the Pennsylvania Secretary of
Administration and seven members designated by unions.
16 Contributions for retirees who retired on or after July 1, 2007 were reduced effective January 1, 2012.
Under the 2011-2015 labor contracts, the contribution rate falls to 1.5 percent once a retiree becomes eligible
for Medicare. In addition, the measure of earnings used to compute the contributions was changed from
final salary to the pension plan's definition of final average salary.
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subsidies at or after the normal retirement age requires 20 years of service. Employees were
grandfathered under the existing eligibility rules if they had accumulated at least 15 years
of service by June 30, 2008 or had accumulated 13 years of service and were within one year
of the normal retirement age.17 Service requirements are waived for members who retire
with a disability benefit. Figure 3.1 illustrates eligibility for the different benefits before
July 1, 2008 as a function of an employee's age and service at retirement. While any retiree
receiving a pension is eligible for self-paid coverage, very few retirees choose coverage on a
self-pay basis. In practice, most employees work until eligibility for subsidized RHI or do
not obtain health insurance coverage through the REHP after retirement. When a retiree
dies, a surviving spouse may continue coverage through the REHP but loses any subsidy for
which the state retiree was eligible.
To make this discussion more concrete, Table 3.1 summarizes the retirement benefits
available to a hypothetical male employee who joins the state workforce at age 33, assuming
the full career takes place under the policies in effect between 2005 and 2007. Each row in
the table presents the benefits to which the employee would be entitled if he separates at
the age shown in the left-most column. The calculations assume a fixed (in real dollars)
premium for the health plans both before and after eligibility for Medicare.18 In the first five
years of employment the individual would not be eligible for a pension and therefore could
not buy into the health plan. After five years of service, the individual is eligible for an early
retirement pension and thus could purchase coverage through the REHP at full price. After
25 years of service, the individual becomes eligible for subsidized RHI and pays only the 1
percent of final salary required contribution. The required contribution increases modestly
with each additional year of work as the employee's salary increases. The present value of
the subsidy for retiree health insurance is zero at all ages before eligibility.1 9 Upon reaching
eligibility the value jumps to $172,000. Thereafter, each additional year of work reduces the
value of the subsidy. Working longer reduces the expected length of retirement and thus the
expected number of years in which a subsidy would be received.
17Individuals could count service that they were eligible to purchase but had not yet purchased against
the requirements for grandfathering. Service purchases are discussed in the next section.
18 The table ignores the $5 per month contribution from the state for retirees electing self-paid health
insurance so as to avoid small but potentially confusing changes in the insurance premium as the individual
ages resulting from the declining real value of a $5 subsidy.
19 The details of this present value calculation are discussed in section 3.3.
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1.3.2 The pension plan
The state operates a traditional defined benefit pension plan using a final average salary
formula. The initial benefit is equal to the product of (i) an accrual factor, (ii) average
earnings in the three highest-earning years of the career, and (iii) years of service. For
retirements before July 1, 2001 the accrual factor was 2 percent. For retirements on or
after July 1, 2001 the accrual factor is 2.5 percent.20 Service is accumulated on an hourly
basis with one year of service defined as 1650 hours. However, no more than one year of
service can be earned in a single calendar year. Employees may purchase service credit
for military service, out-of-state public school teaching service, and prior state service for
which contributions were withdrawn or that was not covered by the pension system.21 The
initial pension benefit is limited to 100 percent of an employee's highest annual earnings.
The pension does not have automatic post-retirement cost of living adjustments, but the
state legislature has periodically implemented ad hoc adjustments. The most recent of these
increases was implemented in two stages in 2002 and 2003.
Members become eligible for a normal retirement benefit at the earlier of age 60 with at
least 3 years of service or any age with 35 years of service. Employees may retire with a
reduced benefit at any age once they have completed five years of service. These eligibility
requirements are illustrated along with those for retiree health benefits in Figure 3.1. Early
retirement benefits are computed according to the final average salary formula and reduced
by an actuarial adjustment using a four percent interest rate. The mortality tables used in
the adjustment depend on when the service was performed, the date of hire, and the date of
retirement.
Active members contribute 6.25 percent of salary to the pension system. 2 2 Members'
contributions accumulate interest at a rate of 4 percent. Employees can take a refund of
their accumulated contributions upon separation if they are not eligible for pension benefits.
Members may also choose to leave their accumulated contributions in the system should
they expect to return to state employment.
20Employees hired before July 1, 2001 had to elect into the new service class with the higher accrual rate,
which also involved paying higher employee contributions. Most members chose to do so.
21State employees who have previously worked as a public school employee in Pennsylvania have the option
of combining their service in the Public School Employees' Retirement System (PSERS) with their service
in the State Employees* Retirement System (SERS) and receiving a single pension benefit reflecting service
in either system.
22Employees who did not elect the new service class in 2001 pay only 5 percent.
21
The preceding discussion applies to the initial benefit if an employee elects a single
life annuity. Members may alternatively take a 100 percent joint and survivor annuity,
a 50 percent joint and survivor annuity, or construct a payout schedule of their choice
subject to approval by SERS. Individuals can also withdraw part or all of their accumulated
contributions at retirement as a lump sum. In all cases, the initial benefit is adjusted so that
these alternative payment options provide an actuarially equivalent benefit to the single life
annuity using a 4 percent interest rate.
Table 3.1 also provides a concrete example of the pension benefits available to a hypo-
thetical employee. Each row shows the pension benefit and the present value of the benefit
to which the employee would be entitled if he separates at the age shown in the left-most
column. All values assume immediate claiming of the pension benefit upon separation. In
the first five years of employment, the worker is not eligible for a pension." After five
years of service, the individual is entitled to an early retirement benefit, the value of which
increases smoothly with each additional year of work. At age 60, the individual becomes
eligible for normal retirement. The benefit continues to increase after that age, but at a
much slower rate. Similarly, the rate of increase in the present value of the benefit slows
dramatically. After accounting for the changing age at which the present value is computed,
each additional year of work is associated with an extremely modest increase in the value of
the benefit. Assuming a slower rate of salary growth or a higher discount rate would change
the modest increase into a modest decrease.
1.3.3 The financial incentives
Pennsylvania's retiree health and pension plans create large and varied financial incentives
for and against continued work. This section quantifies these incentives to provide context
for the behavioral analysis that follows.
The premium for health coverage varies across plans and over time. Figure 3.2 plots the
average cost of a policy for a married couple ineligible for Medicare and for a married couple
eligible for Medicare for the years 2002-2012. Costs increase over the decade, but growth
23The worker would be eligible for a refund of the accumulated contributions paid to the plan. These are
not shown in the table.
241 obtained the complete set of plan offerings and the premium for each plan for these years from the
Pennsylvania Office of Administration via public records requests. The cost for the couple ineligible for
Medicare is the average premium for multi-party policies. The cost for a Medicare-eligible couple is twice
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rates exhibit substantial year-to-year variation. In 2011, the average premium for retirees
ineligible for Medicare was $21,575; for Medicare-eligible retirees it was $10,327.
The subsequent analysis will focus on the effect of eligibility for subsidized retiree health
insurance. To summarize the value of the state subsidy, I compute the present value of the
difference between the full premium and the required retiree contribution for retirees eligible
for subsidies. 5 For a retiree of age t, this present value is given by
T
VHI (t) = E3s-t7r (s I t) {m (s) X HImarried (s) + (1 - m (s)) x HIsingle (s) - r (s) w}
S=t
where # is the discount factor, 7 (s I t) the probability of survival until age s from age t, m (s)
the probability of being married at age s, HImarried (s) the full premium for a multi-party
policy at age s, Hlsinge (s) the full premium for a single policy at age s, r (s) the retiree
contribution rate at age s, and w the final annual salary of the individual.2" I use a discount
rate of 6 percent, the RP-2000 mortality tables, and the scale BB mortality improvement
factors.27 I set m (s) equal to the share of individuals married at each age in the pooled
March CPS files for the years 2000 through 2011.28 Both survival probabilities and marital
probabilities differ by gender.
Figure 3.3 presents the value of the state subsidy for males at each age between 45 and
75 assuming retirement on January 1, 2006. These retirees pay 1 percent of final salary in
required contributions for health insurance. 29 As the value of the subsidy is simply a measure
of the portion of the premiums financed by the state in all years until death it decreases
the average cost of a single policy as most plans offered to the Medicare-eligible population are priced on an
individual basis.
25 1n general, the value of an insurance policy can exceed the expected value of covered services. However,
once eligible for a pension benefit of any kind, Pennsylvania state employees have guaranteed access to the
state's pool. As a result, the value of eligibility for subsidized RHI is only the difference between the full
premium and the required retiree contributions. This analysis will have nothing to say about the value of
access to the state's pool.
26Projected premiums assume growth of five percent for non-Medicare policies and 6 percent for Medicare
policies from a baseline level that best fits the observed premiums between 2002 and 2012. I do not model
the additional payments required for employees hired on or after August 1, 2003 who choose more generous
plans.
27The RP-2000 tables, developed by the Society of Actuaries, provide mortality probabilities for the year
2000 estimated from data on the mortality experience of uninsured pension plans in the years 1990 through
1994.
28I use m (s) rather than a mortality table because, through divorce and remarriage, spouses can be
replaced. Former spouses must be dropped from a retiree's health insurance policy after a divorce.
29The value of the subsidy for females differs slightly from that of males for two reasons: (i) females have
modestly lower mortality rates and (ii) females are much less likely to be married at older ages.
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smoothly with age. At age 65 the rate of decrease slows because Medicare eligibility reduces
the amount of coverage financed by the state and therefore the value of the corresponding
annual subsidy.30 For an individual who retires at age 45, the value of the state's subsidy is
nearly $350,000. For an individual who retires at age 60, the value is about $125,000. As
the premiums are not age-rated, the monetary value of the subsidy for younger retirees may
exceed the expected value of medical services received.
To summarize the incentive for continued work created by the retiree health plan, I
compute the present value of future subsidies to which an employee would be entitled if he
continued working until the age of initial eligibility for subsidized RHI. Under Pennsylva-
nia's rules for eligibility, this measure of incentives is identical to the peak value measure
of incentives proposed by Coile and Gruber (2007) for pensions. Figure 3.4 presents the
subsidy peak value as a function of age and service. Young individuals close to the eligibility
requirements have the highest value of potential future benefits, reaching $340,000 in the
lower-right region of the figure. These employees are not currently eligible for any benefits,
will become eligible in the near future, and upon becoming eligible could expect to collect
benefits for many years. As service decreases and age increases the value of potential fu-
ture benefits decreases. Employees must work longer before they become eligible and, once
eligible, would receive benefits for a smaller number of years.31
To compare the financial incentives arising from the health plan with those for the pension
plan I compute the pension peak value
T T
PV = max #"--t (s I t) b (s; ') - #/-3 (s I t) b (s; t) ,
S~t S=t
where the variables are defined as before with the addition of b (s; r) to denote the pension
benefit at age s conditional on retirement at age r. 32 The pension peak value measures the
additional pension wealth that can be earned by working from the current age until the age
that maximizes pension wealth. Figure 3.5 shows this value as a function of age and service
30The formula and figure assume no age difference between the employee and his spouse. If there is an
age difference it introduces an additional kink in the figure when the spouse crosses the eligibility threshold
for Medicare.
31Note that when age is the binding eligibility requirement, service has no effect on the value of potential
future benefits.
32For consistency with the measurement of incentives computed for the health plan, I adopt the convention
that peak value is zero after the peak (i.e. the age that maximizes the present value of benefits). Previous
analyses have also used the convention that peak value is equal to the annual accrual after the peak.
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on the same axes and using the same scale as Figure 3.4.
For the age and service regions shown, the pension peak value is highest for younger
employees with roughly 20 years of service. However, at $250,000, it is substantially smaller
than the largest subsidy peak value for this population of employees. The pension peak
value decreases as both age and service increase. In each case, the employee is now closer
to eligibility for normal retirement and the pension plan offers less potential wealth in the
years remaining. For all employees, the pension peak value decreases rapidly as the normal
retirement age approaches. For short service employees, however, it remains substantial even
after the normal retirement age. Because the pension benefit for short-service employees is
small, the increase in the value of the benefit resulting from additional service and a higher
salary is quite valuable even in the absence of an actuarial adjustment for delayed retirement.
Sharp reductions in the value of future benefits are apparent at vesting, which occurs at five
years before the normal retirement age and three years after. 33
Because retirees are eligible for either a generous state subsidy for retiree health insurance
or a negligible subsidy, the subsidy peak value is highest immediately before eligibility and
drops to zero immediately after. In contrast, as pension benefits accrue smoothly throughout
the career, the pension peak value decreases in advance of the normal retirement age.34 The
shaded regions in Figures 3.4 and 3.5 indicate age and service combinations at which the
subsidy peak value is positive and exceeds the pension peak value. The value of potential
future health benefits exceeds that of potential future pension benefits in the years shortly
before eligibility for subsidized RHI. The value of potential future pension benefits is larger
for individuals who have already become eligible for subsidized RHI but are not yet eligible
for normal retirement and for individuals who will need to work for many additional years
to become eligible for subsidized RHI.
33 The pension incentive computations assume no cost of living adjustments. In addition to increasing the
level of benefits, an automatic COLA can substantially reduce the incentive for continued work after the
normal retirement age in plans that base benefits on nominal salary at the end of the career.
3 1f the value of future benefits is instead measured as a markup on the present value of compensation
between the current age and the age that maximizes the present value of retirement wealth, there is a cliff
at the normal retirement age.
25
1.4 Member data
The data for this analysis is drawn from the member records maintained by the Pennsylvania
State Employees' Retirement System (SERS) and was obtained via public records requests.
The data cover all members who worked between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2011.35
The records include name, year of birth, sex, summary employment information prior to
2000, detailed information on all jobs held since 2000, a quarterly salary history since 1997,
annual hours since 2000, detailed information on the date and type of retirement, and various
additional fields relating to the administration of the pension system.
The raw data contains records for 213,190 individuals. I exclude from the sample people
who never work in the sample period, who retire before January 1, 2000, who have service
in special service classes, who have class A-3 or A-4 service, and who elect to combine
service in the state retirement system with service in the public school employees retirement
system. 3 ' Individuals in special service classes consist primarily of hazardous duty employees,
legislators, and judges. The pension benefits for these individuals follow distinct rules,
including earlier retirement ages and/or different accrual factors. Employees with class A-
3 or A-4 service are affected by the major pension legislation enacted in late 2010 and
also follow different eligibility and benefit rules. I further restrict the sample to employees
at agencies participating in the Retired Employees Health Plan (REHP).37 The remaining
sample consists of 158,785 individuals.
Figures 4.1-4.2 summarize the distribution of retirements between January 1, 2000 and
December 31, 2011 by age and by service, respectively. Retirements are clustered between
age 55 and age 62 with a clear mass at the normal retirement age. The number of retirements
increases rapidly in the early 50s, is roughly constant between 55 and 60, spikes at age 60,
remains somewhat elevated at 61 and 62, and then decreases rapidly. The distribution of
retirements by service is more dispersed. Retirements occur in significant quantities from five
years of service, the eligibility requirement for early retirement, through 36 years of service.
35The data also include individuals who worked prior to 2000 and had not retired by January 1, 2000, but
they are not used in the analysis.
361 also exclude a small number of individuals with missing or inconsistent data.
37Participation in the REHP is determined at the bargaining unit level for the State System of Higher
Education. However, the SERS member records do not indicate the bargaining unit. I include SSHE members
in the sample as sample size will be a binding constraint in the quasi-experimental analysis. Excluding SSHE
employees does not meaningfully affect any of the point estimates, but modestly increases standard errors
for some of the quasi-experimental results.
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A large number of retirements occurs at exactly 35 years of service, when individuals become
eligible for normal retirement at any age, and at 15 and 25 years of service, the two eligibility
thresholds for subsidized retiree health insurance. The number of retirements increases
somewhat after 30 years of service, which may reflect rounding, a persistent response to an
early retirement incentive at 30 years of service that was eliminated in 1999, or some other
reason.
The major limitation of the data available for this analysis is that it does not include
month and day of birth. Access to this information has been restricted due to concerns about
identity theft in the release of employee records. I treat all individuals as if their birthday
is on January 1 in the analysis of section five and I exclude individuals from the analysis of
section six in cases where more detailed date of birth information is required.
1.5 Nonparametric hazard estimation
This section documents the relationship between the eligibility rules for retiree health and
pension benefits and the separation behavior of Pennsylvania state employees. I estimate the
empirical separation hazard in the age and service space that determines eligibility for the
different retirement benefits and examine changes in the hazard at the boundaries between
regions of eligibility for different benefits.
1.5.1 Empirical implementation
Define T as the duration (in days) of a single employment spell. The separation hazard is
then
h(t)= lim Pr (t < T < t + At \ T > t)At-+ At
the rate at which employees separate at time t conditional on employment until t. I estimate
the empirical hazard at each combination of age and service (both measured in whole years)
as
di (a, s)
j (t' (a, s) - ti (a, s))
where di (a, s) indicates separation by individual i at age and service combination (a, s) ,
and t' (a, s) - ti (a, s) is the number of days individual i is employed at age and service
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combination (a, s) .38 The age and service space in which the hazard is estimated is also the
space in which eligibility for the various retirement benefits is determined. Recall Figure 3.1.
Each region identifies a set of age and service combinations at which employees are eligible
for a particular package of benefits: an early retirement pension with self-paid retiree health
insurance, an early retirement pension with subsidized RHI, a normal retirement pension
with subsidized RHI, and so forth. The fine grid over the entire age and service space in
the figure indicates the cells for which the hazard is estimated. I interpret changes in the
hazard at the boundaries between regions as the effect of changes in eligibility status.39 To
facilitate comparisons across age and service levels, allow for easier interpretation of the
findings, and maintain comparability with the existing literature, I report the estimation
results in the form of annual separation probabilities." The annual separation probability
at age and service combination (a, s) is defined as
Pas = 1 - e-365.2 5 a
A key advantage of this reduced form approach is that it imposes no restrictions on the
interaction between health and pension benefits in determining separation behavior. In
addition, the empirical hazard estimation has a close relationship with the methods employed
in actuarial experience studies performed for pension plans, thus providing results potentially
of interest to a broader community.
Separation may occur for reasons other than traditional retirement, including departure
for a different full or part-time job, death, and disability. Since the structure of retirement
benefits affects both the timing and the classification of separations, studying total separa-
38This intuitive specification of the hazard can be motivated as the maximum likelihood estimate
of the piecewise constant hazard h (t) = Ak, where k indexes non-overlapping regions in the domain.
The likelihood for this hazard specification is L = ]]J fJ A*()e-Ak(t'(k)-(k)) and the MLE is a -
Ei di (k) / Ei (t' (k) - ti (k)). I report robust standard errors clustered at the individual level.
39Retirement benefits may affect decisions about when and whether to take jobs with different employers.
Interpretation of the separation probabilities could be confounded if individuals attempt to get a job with the
state at a particular time based on their knowledge of the detailed rules for the state's retirement benefits. In
such cases, while the hazard would still provide information about the effect of the state's retirement benefits
on employee behavior, it would not be the effect of the benefits on the timing of separations by otherwise
similar people, but rather their effect on the composition of the workforce in the first place. However, a
tabulation of the age at first hire for new employees suggests this is not a problem. The distribution is
smooth and the number of hires remains high into the 50s.
40 Note that individuals will only spend a full year at a particular combination of age and service if their
service increments on January 1, the assumed date of birth.
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tions is most appropriate for examination of the impact of benefits on labor market outcomes.
However, this aggregation necessarily prevents the analysis of substitution between different
types of separations that may be motivated by the benefit programs. In particular, as ap-
proved disability retirements waive the service requirement for subsidized RHI, employees
who are not yet eligible for subsidized RHI may attempt to classify a voluntary separation
as a disability retirement in order to obtain health benefits. In addition, unlike studies that
consider exit from the labor force or reported retirement status, this analysis will include
individuals who continue to work after leaving state employment.
To avoid contamination from the restriction in eligibility for subsidized RHI analyzed in
section six, I use only a subset of the worker-days observed in the data. I limit the sample
to worker-days between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2002, worker-days for employees
grandfathered under the pre-2008 eligibility rules for subsidized RHI regardless of date, and
worker-days when the employee is under age 60 regardless of date.'" I also require that a
separation last for at least 180 days as many employment spells with the state have short
gaps and may include scheduled returns.
1.5.2 Estimation results
The hazard estimation reveals several striking facts about employee behavior. First, the
widely-documented spike in the separation hazard at the normal retirement age (NRA)
nearly disappears in the subpopulation of employees who reach the NRA before eligibility
for subsidized RHI. Instead, a late-career spike in the separation hazard occurs at the age
of eligibility for whichever benefit is reached last, a normal retirement pension or subsidized
retiree health insurance. Second, even though the pension plan offers a partial lump-sum
4
'The increase in the service requirement for subsidized RHI analyzed in section six was formalized in
new collective bargaining agreements beginning in 2003, exempted a population of grandfathered employees,
and appears to have had minimal effects before the normal retirement age. The three sample restrictions
follow from these three observations. The hazard results are highly robust across alternative sample selection
criteria. While the estimation sample for the separation hazard excludes worker-days subject to this eligibility
restriction, other changes in labor contracts and retirement benefits affecting workers in the sample could
have affected the results. In particular, policy changes might be a disproportionately important factor
in motivating separations that occur away from the eligibility thresholds. In a robustness analysis not
included in the chapter, I estimate separation hazards in all months and excluding months associated with
the expiration of labor contracts and changes in retirement benefits. More than one-fifth of all retirements
in the 12-year period occur in the six affected months. The results indicate that, while these changes have
important effects on the level of the separation hazard, they do not affect the nature of the changes in the
separation hazard near the eligibility thresholds.
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option at retirement that allows individuals to accelerate consumption, there remains an
interaction with the Social Security early retirement age: employees becoming eligible for
subsidized retiree health insurance before age 62 separate at a substantially lower rate than
those becoming eligible at or after age 62. Finally, eligibility for subsidized RHI has a
quantitatively important effect on separations before the normal retirement age beginning
in the mid 50s.
Figure 5.1 plots the separation probabilities for cohorts of employees approaching normal
retirement age with varying levels of service. Each line shows the separation probabilities for
a particular cohort of employees as they advance through the career. Employees who reach
normal retirement age with 15, 16, or 17 years of service-enough to be eligible for subsidized
RHI-follow very similar separation patterns. Each cohort shows a dramatic increase in the
probability of separation exactly at age 60. In contrast, employees who reach age 60 before
becoming eligible for subsidized RHI are unaffected by eligibility for normal retirement.
Separation probabilities for these cohorts remain flat until eligibility for subsidized RHI, at
which point they jump sharply. Table 5.1 presents the change in the separation probability
for each cohort at eligibility for normal retirement, at eligibility for subsidized retiree health
insurance, and by age. For employees with exactly 15 years of service at the NRA, the
probability of separation increases by 22 percentage points, from 4 percent at 59 to 26
percent at 60. For the cohorts with 16 and 17 years of service the increases are 24 and 26
percentage points respectively. However, for employees who reach the NRA with only 14
years of service the separation probability decreases by 1 percentage point, from 4.6 percent
at 59 to 3.7 percent at 60. (The decrease is not statistically significant.) Similarly, the
probability of separation increases by 2 percentage points for employees reaching the NRA
with 12 or 13 years of service. In all cases where eligibility for subsidized RHI occurs after
the normal retirement age, a dramatic increase in the separation probability occurs at that
time.
Additionally, even though retirees may accelerate consumption by taking a partial lump
sum at retirement, there still appears to be an interaction with the Social Security early
retirement age. Figure 5.2 presents separation probabilities for six cohorts becoming eligible
for subsidized RHI at or after the normal retirement age. For cohorts becoming eligible at age
60 and 61, the separation probability increases by about 30 percentage points at the point of
initial eligibility and then remains elevated after eligibility. In contrast, for cohorts becoming
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eligible for subsidized RHI at or after age 62, the increase in the separation probability is
larger-about 50 percentage points-and falls sharply in the year after eligibility.
Eligibility for subsidized RHI also increases separations before the normal retirement age.
Figure 5.3 presents the separation probabilities by age for cohorts of employees becoming
eligible for subsidized RHI in their late 50s. The separation probability increases sharply
for all cohorts at exactly the point of eligibility for subsidized RHI. Table 5.2 presents the
estimated change in these probabilities at eligibility for subsidized retiree health insurance
and by age. For the cohort becoming eligible at age 56, the separation probability increases
by 8 percentage points, from 2 percent at 55 to 10 percent at 56. For the cohort becoming
eligible at age 58, the probability increases by 15 percentage points. The effects are large at all
ages and increase with age. Results in the early 50s (not shown) are smaller, suggesting that
remaining on the job is sufficiently attractive at younger ages that eligibility for subsidized
RHI alone is insufficient to motivate many separations.
For employees in their late 50s, the increase in the separation probability at the point of
eligibility for subsidized RHI largely persists until the normal retirement age. If the eligibility
threshold served only to select out of the workforce individuals with the lowest attachment,
the probability should rise at eligibility and fall subsequently. While there is a drop in the
hazard after eligibility, it is only partial. The difference between the probability at any post-
eligibility age and the probability prior to eligibility remains economically and statistically
significant. This suggests that the effect of eligibility before the normal retirement age is not
exclusively about selection out of the workforce. This contrasts with behavior after eligibility
for Social Security, in which case the hazard drops sharply in the year after eligibility. The
small number of people still working at these older ages are likely quite different from those
who have already separated.
The results to this point have focused on the impact of becoming eligible for subsidized
retiree health insurance. They have established the crucial role of eligibility for subsidized
RHI in determining separations, particularly when it occurs after eligibility for normal retire-
ment. However, eligibility for normal retirement also plays a role in the separation decisions
of workers who become eligible for subsidized RHI first. Figure 5.4 follows the cohorts shown
in Figure 5.3 until age 60, at which point the employees in these cohorts become eligible for
normal retirement. The effect of the staggered eligibility thresholds for subsidized RHI is
clear. Employees begin exiting in quantity as soon as they become eligible for subsidized
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RHI. However, many also remain on the job until the normal retirement age. Taken as a
whole, this analysis suggests the intuitive conclusion that the separation hazard spikes most
dramatically at the age of eligibility for whichever benefit is reached last.
1.5.3 Comparison with prior work
In contrast with previous studies of retiree health insurance, this analysis offers no control
group that will never become eligible for RHI. Instead, it examines the change in behavior
when employees at a firm that offers subsidized retiree health insurance first become eligible
for it. That is, this chapter focuses attention on the dynamics of individual eligibility for
retiree health insurance rather than the impact of firm offer decisions. To highlight the
importance of the distinction between eligibility and offer, Figure 5.5 plots the share of
employees eligible for subsidized RHI by age. Employees first become eligible for subsidized
RHI in the early 40s, and the share eligible increases steadily through the mid 50s. As long-
service employees begin to retire in the late 50s, the fraction of the workforce eligible for
subsidized RHI actually falls. It then jumps up discretely at age 60, when many employees
become eligible for subsidized RHI simultaneously, before varying modestly at older ages.
At most, roughly 60 percent of active employees are eligible for subsidized retiree health
insurance. Before the normal retirement age, the largest fraction of eligible workers occurs
at age 55, when 41 percent are eligible.
Analyses that use firm-level variation obtain an estimate of the effect of working for
an employer that offers retiree health benefits. To compare the effects found here to the
existing estimates, I approximate the effect of Pennsylvania's decision to offer benefits on
the separation probability at any age as the product of the effect of becoming eligible at that
age and the fraction of the workforce eligible. Table 5.3 shows the effect of becoming eligible
at each age, the fraction eligible at each age, and the corresponding estimate of the effect of
firm offer at each age. The effect ranges from 3-6 percentage points in the late 50s and from
17-24 percentage points in the early 60s. The effects in the 50s are in line with those found
in prior reduced form work while those in the 60s are larger.4 2
The extremely large separation probabilities found in this analysis for individuals becom-
ing eligible for subsidized RHI at or after age 62 suggest that the aggregate hazard for older
4 2Accounting for the decrease in the probability of separation after the first year of eligibility for cohorts
becoming eligible in their 60s moderates these effects, but they remain larger than those found previously.
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employees may provide little information about the effect of RHI on labor supply. Instead, it
may primarily contain information about the distribution of tenure in the workforce relative
to the eligibility rules for retiree health benefits.
This analysis also offers a potential reconciliation of discrepancies between previous stud-
ies in the estimated effect of RHI on separations at different ages. Prior reduced form studies
of RHI frequently control for pensions only roughly through the use of dummy variables for
offer, type, and other features of the plan or with linear terms for the number of years un-
til eligibility. Implicitly, these studies are imposing strong separability assumptions on the
effect of pensions and retiree health benefits. This analysis suggests that such an approach
may be inappropriate. Eligibility for normal retirement is an input into the effect of RHI on
separations. Structural analyses can overcome this problem, as they will generate interde-
pendence between health and pension benefits through the implicit computation of financial
incentives, provided the analysis maintains sufficient accuracy in the plan rules in the esti-
mation. Studies that find large effects of RHI at ages 60-61 and those that find large effects
at ages 62-63 may be investigating the effect of RHI in populations with different pension
characteristics and inadequately accounting for that fact.
1.6 The employment response to a change in plan rules
In 2008, the state of Pennsylvania increased the service requirement for subsidized retiree
health insurance at or after the normal retirement age from 15 years to 20 years. Employees
who had accumulated 15 years of service or who were within one year of retirement and
had accumulated 13 years of service by June 30, 2008 were grandfathered under the existing
rules. The variation in eligibility rules generated by the grandfathering provision identifies
the causal effect of the increased service requirement on employees at the grandfathering
threshold. The analysis of the last section investigated changes in behavior associated with
changes in eligibility status; the analysis of this section examines changes in behavior result-
ing from changes in plan rules.
I first estimate the effect of the change in eligibility rules on the probability of employment
through the end of 2011 using standard methods for regression discontinuity designs. I then
estimate employment survival functions for workers at the grandfathering threshold under
the pre and post-reform eligibility criteria, interpreting the difference between them as the
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effect of the reform on the distribution of separations.
1.6.1 The effect on employment through 2011
Empirical strategy
An employee's grandfathering status was determined by her accumulated service on June
30, 2008. However, the increased service requirement for subsidized retiree health insurance
effective on that date was formalized in collective bargaining agreements beginning in 2003.
To capture all potential responses to the change in the state's eligibility criteria, including
those that occurred in advance of the grandfathering date, I analyze the eligibility restriction
as a quasi-experiment performed on the population of state employees at the end of 2002.
Figure 6.1 illustrates the grandfathering requirements as a function of age and service on
June 30, 2008. Any individual with at least 15 years of service was grandfathered under the
existing eligibility rules. Employees age 59 or older with at least 13 years of service were also
grandfathered. Because the service requirement for grandfathering depends on age and the
member data contain only year of birth, I discard all individuals who turn 59 in 2008 as it is
impossible to determine their grandfathering status with certainty. I limit attention to full-
time employees on December 31, 2002 and project service forward from that date until June
30, 2008 assuming a full-time work schedule.43 Using the projected service, I compute the
additional service needed to meet the grandfathering requirements for each individual. This
measure of additional service provides the continuous assignment variable for a regression
discontinuity design. Graphically, the additional service needed is the horizontal distance
between an individual's accumulated service and the age-specific grandfathering requirement
shown in Figure 6.1. Employees whose projected service exceeds the age-specific grandfa-
thering requirement are not affected by the increased service requirement for subsidized RHI.
All other employees are subject to the new, more restrictive service requirement.
Despite the restriction to full-time employees, it remains possible that individuals could
manipulate their grandfathering status and the financial incentive to do so is large." Since
4 3For purposes of the sample restriction I define full time as at least 1900 hours. A full-time schedule for
most state employees is 1950 hours per year (52 weeks at 37.5 hours per week). Service that an employee
was eligible to purchase on June 30, 2008 could be counted against the grandfathering requirements even if
the employee had not yet purchased it. To account for this option, I add to the projected service any service
purchased between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2011 for periods of employment before June 30, 2008.
44The more restrictive service requirement reduced the subsidy peak value for employees 51 and older at
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employees can earn no more than one year of service in a single calendar year, manipulating
service would require working extra hours in the first half of 2008 so as to accrue service
in excess of the projected amount before the June 30th deadline. Extra work in the years
2003 through 2007 would not result in any additional service credit beyond that which would
already be earned on a full-time schedule. Because the running variable is computed using
ex ante values, I test for manipulation by examining hours in 2008 as an outcome in the
same regression discontinuity design. The evidence does not suggest any unusual overtime
behavior. In addition, the member records can be used to determine whether an employee is
receiving subsidies at retirement. If individuals manipulate service, there should be evidence
of retirees claiming benefits for which they would not be eligible based on the ex ante values.
There is no evidence to support this concern. 45
To formalize the estimation strategy, let 5i (0) and Si (1) denote employment status on
January 1, 2012 when untreated (grandfathered) and treated (not grandfathered), respec-
tively, and let Xi denote the additional service needed to meet the grandfathering require-
ments. Treatment status, W, is a deterministic function of Xi, W = 1 (Xi > 0). I estimate
specifications of the form
Si = fo (xi) + fi (wizi) + Wir + z # + Ei,
where Si is the observed employment status, fo and fi are polynomial functions, and zi
is a vector of covariates. 6 With standard continuity assumptions for RD designs, T, the
coefficient on wi, is the effect of the increased service requirement. The plausibility of the
required continuity assumption relies on the inability of employees to manipulate service at
the end of 2002 and the absence of differential selection into the state labor force by date of
hire on factors correlated with the desired retirement date.4 7 (The previous discussion re-
the end of 2002 who just missed the grandfathering requirements by 25 percent, from $92,000 to $67,000.
45 Even if individuals manipulate their treatment status, because I use pre-announcement values to compute
the running variable, the estimates would retain an intent to treat interpretation. However, the data is sparse
enough that, were this a concern, estimation would be difficult.
46 Because wiT is included as a separate term for clarity, the function fi has no constant term.
47New labor contracts in 2007 increased retiree health premiums for retirements after July 1, 2007. This
change led to a surge in retirements ahead of that date among the population eligible for subsidized RHI
at that time. While not invalidating the identifying assumption, this mass of separations could introduce
a discontinuity in the survival probability away from the grandfathering threshold (individuals near the
threshold were not eligible to retire with benefits prior to the deadline). This discontinuity could badly bias
results using larger bandwidths. The simplest way to avoid this problem is to use a bandwidth small enough
that no eligible individuals are included. Alternatively, and plausibly, if the excess retirements were shifted
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garding employees' inability to manipulate grandfathering status conditional on the running
variable supports treating the reform as a sharp RD rather than a fuzzy RD, but not the
regression discontinuity design itself.) As the increase in the eligibility requirements was not
announced until after the end of 2002, there is no reason to expect intentional manipulation
of the running variable at that time. In addition, the discontinuity test of McCrary (2008)
does not reject the null of no discontinuity at the grandfathering threshold. Together, these
observations suggest the continuity assumption underlying the RD design is reasonable.
I exclude from the sample employees who retire before January 1, 2003, even if they
subsequently return to work. I also limit attention to individuals who were born before
1952. Younger individuals near the grandfathering threshold will not be eligible to retire
with subsidized RHI until 2012 at the earliest and data is available only through the end of
2011.
Results
Figure 6.2 presents the results for the basic RD specification. The scatter plot shows the
average probability of continuous employment from December 31, 2002 through December
31, 2011 in bins with width equal to half a year of service. Overlaid on the scatter plot is
a piecewise linear fit of the employment probability as a function of the additional service
needed to meet the grandfathering requirements. As would be expected, the survival prob-
ability increases as service decreases. Clearly visible in the plot is the sharp break in the
survival probability at the grandfathering threshold. The estimated increase in the prob-
ability of employment through 2011 as a result of the increased service requirement for a
member at the threshold is 10 percentage points, from a pre-reform level of 26.6 percent to
a post-reform level of 36.2 percent.
Table 6.1 shows the estimated treatment effect for a variety of polynomial orders and
bandwidths, using a rectangular kernel. Estimates range from 9 to 12 percent across a variety
of reasonable specifications. Estimates using low bandwidths and high orders are noisy and
visual inspection of the results shows them to be overfitting the data. The Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth is approximately 6.2 and yields a point estimate
of 9.9. Inclusion of additional covariates, such as age, sex, employing agency, and salary, has
forward in time by no more than 4.5 years, the survival probability may not have a discontinuity in spite of
the earlier rush into retirement. The results presented in the next section are stable across bandwidths and
do not suggest a discontinuity in the survival probability.
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no effect on the estimated treatment effect. While the covariates do not affect the estimated
causal effect, the full set of age dummies is highly significant as age has an important direct
effect on the survival probability.
1.6.2 The effect on the distribution of separations
Empirical strategy
The object of ultimate interest is the effect of the increased service requirement for subsi-
dized retiree health insurance on the distribution of separations. To gain insight into this
effect, I estimate employment survival functions for individuals employed at the end of 2002
under the pre and post-reform eligibility rules. Let T (0) and T (1) denote the number of
days after January 1, 2003 that an employee separates when untreated (grandfathered/pre-
reform) and treated (not grandfathered/post-reform), respectively. As before, let Xi denote
the additional service needed to meet the grandfathering requirements and Wi the treatment
status, Wi = 1 (Xi > 0). Note that Xi is time invariant. Let S denote the survival func-
tion associated with the joint distribution of T and X. Using this notation, the employment
survival function for an employee at the grandfathering threshold under the pre-reform eligi-
bility criteria is ST(o)lx (t I x = 0) and for an employee at the grandfathering threshold under
the post-reform eligibility criteria the survival function is ST(1)Ix (t I x = 0). I interpret the
difference ST(1)lx (t I x = 0) - ST(o)Ix (t I x = 0) as the causal effect of the reform.
To estimate the employment survival functions, I use the nonparametric techniques of
Beran (1981) and Dabrowska (1987). Beran and Dabrowska study an extension of the
Kaplan-Meier product limit estimator of the conditional survival function for use in envi-
ronments with continuous covariates and possible right-censoring. To develop intuition, first
consider a setting without censoring. The estimator for the conditional survival function
under treatment status j at x = 0 for a sample of n observations is
0= 1 1 (T (j) = t) K (xi)) .0-105Tuj)lx (t |10) = 11 - n 1 (Ti (j >t) K (xi) 3- ,1
where K (-) is a kernel function and 1 (T (j) = s) identifies separations at time s. Intuitively,
the product limit estimate of the employment survival function at time t is the product of
the survival probability at every time before t at which an employee separated. Assuming
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a rectangular kernel, this product reduces to the empirical survival probability at time t for
the population within the support of the kernel. Introducing censoring simply necessitates
a correction for the changing number of people at risk when individuals are censored before
separation.
As with any discontinuity design, only one outcome, T (0) or T (1), is observed for each
observation depending on the treatment status. Estimation of the post-reform (treated)
survival function relies on data for non-grandfathered employees and estimation of the pre-
reform (untreated) survival function relies on data for grandfathered employees.
I estimate employment survival functions separately for three groups: employees age 51-
52 at the end of 2002, employees age 54-59 at the end of 2002, and employees age 60 and older
at the end of 2002.4' As documented in section five, separation probabilities are strongly
influenced by the set of retirement benefits for which employees are eligible. That eligibility
in turn depends on age and service. Because employees in each of the three age groups cross
eligibility thresholds on different dates, survival functions estimated for the entire sample
are difficult to interpret. By splitting the sample and estimating separate survival functions
for each group, I obtain results that can be interpreted more easily.
Under the pre-reform eligibility criteria, employees at the grandfathering threshold in the
51-52 year-old population become eligible for subsidized RHI on their 60th birthday, some
time in 2010 or 2011. Under the post-reform criteria they become eligible on July 1, 2013.
In the 54-59 year-old population employees at the grandfathering threshold become eligible
for subsidized RHI on July 1, 2010 pre-reform and July 1, 2015 post-reform. Employees at
the grandfathering threshold in the oldest population likewise become eligible for subsidized
RHI on July 1, 2010 pre-reform and July 1, 2015 post-reform. However, these employees
are already eligible for normal retirement at the end of 2002 and thus may be differentially
selected in their taste for retiree health insurance.
Finally, when estimating the employment survival function at time t for a population in
which employees at the grandfathering threshold at time t are not eligible for subsidized RHI,
I ignore separations by employees who have already become eligible. I do this by artificially
censoring employees when they first meet the eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI.
After employees at the grandfathering threshold become eligible for subsidized RHI I again
48 lndividuals who are 53 at the end of 2002 are not used in the estimation as they turn 59 in 2008 and
therefore the year of birth alone is insufficient to determine the grandfathering status precisely.
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use all available data in the estimation.
Figure 6.3 offers a visual representation of the censoring scheme. Suppose the goal is to
estimate the pre-reform survival function, ST(o)lx(t I x = 0). This estimation relies on data
for grandfathered (untreated) employees, who populate the bottom half of the figure. The
dashed lines indicate the range of data that would be used to estimate the survival function
assuming a rectangular kernel and a bandwidth of two. The gray region identifies employees
who have accumulated sufficient service to be eligible for subsidized RHI if they retire.49 The
censoring is essential because, at any time before July 2010, the survival function of interest
reflects the behavior of an employee who is not yet eligible for subsidized RHI, but, between
July 2008 and July 2010, individuals who have already become eligible for subsidized RHI
are included in the support of the kernel. Since employees separate at a high rate once they
become eligible for subsidized RHI, including these workers in the estimation would introduce
substantial bias. I therefore censor employees when they become eligible for subsidized RHI
(i.e. when they enter the gray region of the figure). Consequently, only data for individuals
with the same eligibility status for subsidized RHI as the hypothetical individual for whom
the survival function is being estimated will be used. The extension of the Kaplan-Meier
estimator for use with censored data is
( =1 1 (T (j) = t, Ci (j) = 0) K (xi) .5T(j)|X (t |10) = fl 1 E "= 1 (T (j) > t) K (xi) 3 = 0, 1,
where T (j) now records the shorter of the time until individual i's employment spell is cen-
sored or the time until she separates and Ci (j) equals one if the employment spell observed
for individual i is censored and zero otherwise. The other terms remain as before.5 0
I estimate the survival functions using the sample developed for the regression discontinu-
ity analysis in the last section. The baseline results use a rectangular kernel and a bandwidth
of two. I bootstrap standard errors.
4 9 For simplicity, the figure abstracts from the potential for uneven accumulation of service within a calendar
year.
50 1n light of the theoretical results establishing that local linear regression reduces bias in the estimation of
treatment effects in an RD design, it would be preferable to implement analogous methods for the estimation
of the survival functions in this section. However, the analog of the censoring strategy used in the survival
estimation is a bandwidth restriction in RD estimation. In practice, imposing the required bandwidth
restriction results in sample sizes that are too small to obtain useful results prior to the date of pre-reform
eligibility for subsidized RHI for grandfathered employees. Results computed for dates after pre-reform
eligibility are consistent with the results presented in the next section.
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Results
In all three age groups, the post-reform distribution of separations reflects different combi-
nations of two responses: accelerated separations and delayed separations. Employees who
accelerate their separations likely worked or expected to work until eligibility for subsidized
RHI under the pre-reform criteria. However, after accounting for the additional work required
to become eligible as a result of the reform, the promised subsidies are no longer sufficient to
make continued work with the state their most attractive option. Employees who respond to
the reform in this fashion decrease the post-reform employment survival function in advance
of the pre-reform eligibility date. Workers who delay their separations likely left at or after
meeting the eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI under the pre-reform criteria. As a
result of the increased service requirement, these individuals now find continued employment
with the state more attractive than any other option. Workers who respond in this fashion
increase the post-reform employment survival function after the pre-reform eligibility date.
Figure 6.4 presents the estimated employment survival functions ST(o)ix=o and ST()Ix=o
for employees at the grandfathering threshold age 51-52 at the end of 2002. Under the
pre-reform eligibility rules, these employees become eligible for subsidized RHI on their 60th
birthday, some time in 2010 or 2011. Under the post-reform rules, they become eligible for
subsidized RHI on July 1, 2013. The survival curves track each other closely through early
2010. In the latter half of 2010 the curves begin to separate, and they diverge sharply at
the end of June 2011. By the end of the period, employees under the post-reform rules are
significantly more likely to remain the job. On June 30, 2011, the date just before which
both curves drop sharply, the labor contracts covering a large fraction of the state workforce
expired.51
Figure 6.5 presents the estimated survival functions for employees at the grandfathering
threshold age 54-59 at the end of 2002. Under the pre-reform eligibility rules, these employees
become eligible for subsidized RHI on July 1, 2010. Under the post-reform rules, they become
eligible on July 1, 2015. The estimated survival functions for the two policy regimes are
similar through early 2007. However, beginning in July 2007, post-reform employees are less
likely to remain on the job. On July 1, 2010, the date at which pre-reform employees become
"iA mass of separations occurs in advance of the date on which labor contracts expire in 2003, 2007, and
2011. In 2007, there is a clear, contract-driven reason for the separations. In other years, the reason is not
so obvious. However, the possibility of changes could be sufficient to increase separations.
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eligible for subsidized R HI, the relative employment probabilities reverse.52 After this point,
post-reform employees are more likely to remain on the job. As with employees age 51-52 at
the end of 2002, the effect of expiring labor contracts at the end of June 2011 is visible in
the figure.
Finally, Figure 6.6 presents the results for employees at the grandfathering threshold
age 60 and older at the end of 2002. These employees become eligible for subsidized RHI
on the same dates as the 54-59 year-old employees, but were eligible for normal retirement
at the end of 2002 when the sample was selected. As with the 54-59 year-old sample,
the survival functions track each other closely through early 2007. Again, beginning in July
2007, post-reform employees are less likely to remain on the job. However, in this population,
when the pre-reform employees become eligible for subsidized RHI, the pre and post-reform
employment probabilities converge. In July 2010, there is no significant difference between
the two employment probabilities. But, by the end of 2011, the post-reform employees are
somewhat more likely to remain on the job.
The relative importance of acceleration and delay differs across the three age groups
examined. In the 51-52 year-old sample there is no evidence of accelerated separations.
In the population 60 and older, acceleration is far more prevalent than delay. The largest
population of affected employees, those age 54-59 at the end of 2002, contains both employees
who accelerate separation and those who delay. Through the combination of accelerated and
delayed separations, the mass of separations immediately after the pre-reform eligibility date
in the 54-59 and 60 and older populations disappears as a result of the reform.
These findings parallel previous results regarding the labor supply response to kinked
and notched compensation schedules.53 Kinks occur when the compensation rate (i.e. the
effective wage) changes discontinuously. Notches occur when total accrued compensation
(i.e. the value of all past and future payments due to the worker) changes discontinuously.
Late in the career, the retirement benefits for Pennsylvania state employees create both a
kink, at eligibility for normal retirement, and a notch, at eligibility for subsidized RHI.5 As
"
2The sharp drop at this date results from the relaxation of the artificial censoring on July 1, 2010. This
estimate should be viewed as an approximation to the underlying function which is likely steeply sloped at
the point of eligibility, but not vertical as shown in the figure.
53Saez (2010) examines kinks in the U.S. income tax, Kleven and Waseem (2012) kinks and notches in the
Pakistani income tax, Brown (2013) kinks in the defined benefit pension plan covering public school teachers
in California, and Manoli and Weber (2011) notches in Austrian severance pay.
54Workers who turn 60 with 15-24 years of service become eligible for both normal retirement and subsi-
dized retiree health insurance on their 60th birthday. Otherwise, the two eligibility events occur on different
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just discussed, the notch associated with eligibility for subsidized RHI reduces separations
in the years before eligibility and increases separations immediately after eligibility. When
Pennsylvania increased the service requirement for subsidized RHI in 2008, it held fixed the
location of the pension kink and moved the RHI notch later in an employee's career. (For
all affected employees, the RHI notch occurs at or after eligibility for normal retirement.)
This shift both eliminated the compression of the distribution of separations near the notch's
original location and made work until older ages more attractive. The result was a stretching
of the distribution of separations.
While the observed response reflects a stretching of the distribution, near the notch's new
location the reform likely compresses the distribution. Unfortunately, as individuals whose
eligibility was delayed by the reform will not become eligible for subsidized RHI until July
1, 2013 at the earliest, the data required to validate this conjecture does not yet exist.
Table 6.2 reports the effect of the increased service requirement on the employment
probability at three dates for five bandwidths. The effects shown in the table are generally
robust to the choice of bandwidth. However, there is some sensitivity to the bandwidth in
the oldest population after the pre-reform eligibility date for subsidized RHI.
The estimated employment survival curves show the importance of the policy change for
the distribution of separations. Unfortunately, the estimated effect on mean weeks worked
over the five-year period is imprecise. For the entire population, the point estimate is an
increase of 3.5 weeks with a standard error of 8 weeks. Though noisy, the estimate can reject
large responses to the increased service requirement. Since the analysis focuses exclusively
on populations that are affected by the policy change, a large response might have been
expected.
An important limitation of the results in this section is that they are strictly valid only for
employees at the grandfathering threshold. This population consists of older workers with
either 13 or 15 years of service on June 30, 2008. While the estimates may be approximately
valid for similar workers in other contexts, benefit restrictions that affect longer-tenured
career employees could have quite different effects. In particular, since career employees are
often eligible to retire with a full pension benefit at younger ages, the loss of retiree health
benefits would be a substantially greater financial hit. Likewise, if career employees are more
likely to be the source of health insurance for an entire family, separating without retiree
dates.
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health benefits and with the intention of relying on a spouse's insurance may be a less viable
option.
1.7 The effect of RHI eligibility restrictions on
liabilities
States facing large unfunded liabilities for promised retiree health benefits may look to benefit
cuts for current employees as a way of reducing expenditures. This section applies the insights
of the preceding analysis to estimate the impact of further restrictions in the eligibility
requirements for subsidized retiree health insurance on the value of Pennsylvania's health
and pension obligations.
1.7.1 Methodology
The estimates of sections five and six provide local evidence on the behavioral response to
Pennsylvania's retiree health plan. Section five considers behavior near the current eligibility
thresholds and section six studies behavior near the grandfathering threshold associated with
the eligibility restriction implemented in 2008. Determining plausible separation patterns for
the entire population under alternative eligibility rules requires some form of extrapolation. I
adapt the hazard estimation procedure of section five to obtain an estimate of the number of
total separations under alternative policy regimes. I estimate active member deaths using the
actuarial assumptions from the most recent SERS experience study, and I compute an age-
specific disability hazard assuming individuals are at risk if they are ineligible for a normal
retirement pension, subsidized retiree health insurance, or both.55 Voluntary separations
are computed as the difference between the total number of separations estimated from the
hazard model and the number of death and disability retirements.
55Because superannuation and disability retirement provide the same pension benefit once an employee' is
eligible for normal retirement, the 2006-2010 SERS experience study (Hay Group (2011b)) does not develop
rates of disability after eligibility for normal retirement. However, since disability retirement waives the
service requirement for subsidized retiree health insurance, this analysis requires rates of disability even
after eligibility for normal retirement.
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I model total separations using the reduced form hazard specification
h (t) = #1 (threshold+1) (age > 60) x #2 (threshold+2) (age > 60)
x {-y,, (service < 5) + -y,, (service > 5) + Ys (subsidy-eligible, age > 50)} ,
where threshold+j indicates that the eligibility threshold for subsidized RHI occurs i years
in the future, the Ya, are age-service effects, and -y, is an indicator for age alone. 56 The
separation hazard of section five allowed for different values of the hazard at each combination
of age and service (more than 700 cells for the population between 50 and 70). This more
restrictive specification of the separation hazard only allows equivalent freedom in the first
five years of service, when separations are high and vary substantially by both age and
service, and for individuals eligible for subsidized RHI after age 50. It assumes an identical
hazard for all individuals of the same age with more than five years of service and either
ineligible for subsidized RHI or under age 50 (except in the two years before eligibility
for subsidized RHI). Doing so makes clear the basic nature of the extrapolation that will be
used to simulate behavior under alternative eligibility criteria. Individuals who lose eligibility
under the alternative policies will be assumed to separate at the same rate as do individuals
of the same age who are ineligible for subsidized RHI under the current policies. However,
to account for the fact that very few individuals separate in the years immediately preceding
eligibility for subsidized RHI, I introduce the proportional scaling factors 31 and 32. These
scaling factors provide additional flexibility in the hazard for employees age 60 and older
and nearing eligibility for subsidized RHI. I estimate the hazard model using the sample of
worker-days covered by the pre-2008 eligibility rules described in section five.
I simulate separation patterns under the current eligibility policies and under alternative
policies in four steps. First, using the fitted values, I compute the probability of separation
under the pre-2008 eligibility rules at every future age for each employee. I then redefine the
explanatory variables based on the eligibility rules for the policy of interest and recompute
the separation probabilities at each age. However, these recomputed probabilities are used
only for ages at which employees are not yet eligible for subsidized RHI. Since a more
restrictive eligibility requirement does not change the level of retirement benefits available
56I collapse all ages greater than 70, all service levels greater than 40, and all service levels greater than
20 at or after age 65 to avoid problems arising from small samples when using the fitted values to perform
simulations.
44
to an employee once she meets the new requirement, I assume that the distribution of
separations after eligibility is unaffected by the policy. That is, in the third step, I set
the probability of separation at each age after an employee becomes eligible for subsidized
RHI equal to its value before the restriction (using the pre-2008 probabilities). Finally,
I determine the probability of separation for the age at which an employee first becomes
eligible for subsidized RHI such that the employment probability in the year after eligibility
matches that before the restriction (again using the pre-2008 probabilities). Effectively, this
last step assumes that any net increase in employment at the new eligibility threshold as a
result of the eligibility restriction is eliminated by an increase in separations immediately
after the threshold.5 7
I follow this procedure to simulate separations under the current eligibility rules and under
each alternative policy. I assume each alternative policy was implemented on December
31, 2011 with no advance notice. Using the simulated separation probabilities, I compute
the present value of benefits, the present value of required retiree contributions for health
insurance, and the present value of employee pension contributions.5 8 Appendix A describes
the full set of assumptions used to value the health and pension obligations.
1.7.2 Simulation results
Table 7.1 reports the present value of benefits, receipts, and net obligations for the health and
pension plans under current policy and under two alternative policy regimes as of December
31, 2011 using a discount rate of six percent. 59 The reported values reflect benefits for active
57Because the probability that a non-grandfathered employee not yet eligible for subsidized RHI remains
on the job at the end of 2011 increased for certain employees as a result of the state's 2008 eligibility restric-
tion, this computation will slightly overstate the pre-2008 employment probabilities. Since the employment
probabilities after eligibility under the current and alternative policies are set to match these pre-2008 prob-
abilities, they will show a modestly delayed distribution of separations. This concern affects only a very
small number of employees and should have only a minor impact on the results. It will have no effect on
the estimated financial impact for the restriction in eligibility before the NRA as these individuals were
unaffected by the eligibility restriction imposed in 2008.
58There is an unavoidable asymmetry in that future employee contributions to the pension plan and
required retiree contributions for health insurance are included in the analysis, but past contributions are
not. Including future receipts is necessary because changes in eligibility policies will affect both the benefits
paid out and the contributions made by employees and retirees. Note, also, that this analysis does not
consider the budgetary impact of changing employment patterns on salaries and health benefits for active
employees.
59The 2011 actuarial valuation of the pension plan uses a 7.5 percent discount rate while the 2011 actuarial
valuation of the REHP uses a discount rate of 4.75 percent (Hay Group (2012, 2011a)). It is crucial to use
the same discount rate for both plans in this analysis as otherwise shifting a dollar of expenditures on the
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members with no class A-3 or A-4 service working at agencies participating in the REHP.60
Currently, the state provides subsidized retiree health insurance to retirees with 20 years
of service at or after the normal retirement age and to retirees with 25 years of service at
any age. The first alternative policy restricts eligibility before the normal retirement age to
retirees with 30 years of service. The second restriction requires 25 years of service regardless
of the age at retirement.
Under the baseline policies, the present value of future health benefits is $6.8 billion. As
the present value of required contributions is less than $60 million, the present value of the
net obligations is also roughly $6.8 billion. The present value of future pension benefits is
$19.7 billion. The present value of employee contributions is $1.8 billion, and the present
value of the net obligations is $17.9 billion.6 1
I first simulate the impact of restricting eligibility for subsidized RHI before the normal
retirement age to employees with at least 30 years of service. Restricting eligibility in this way
would decrease the present value of future health benefits by $500 million, or approximately
7 percent. It would also decrease future retiree contributions for health insurance, however,
the financial impact of this effect is small. At the same time, by encouraging additional work
before the normal retirement age, this more restrictive service requirement would increase
pension benefits by $115 million and employee contributions by $15 million. Combined, these
two effects would increase the net obligations for the pension plan by about $100 million.
The increase in pension obligations would offset approximately 20 percent of the savings
from reduced health benefits. As is typical for final average salary plans, pension accruals
for Pennsylvania state employees are high in the years immediately preceding eligibility
for normal retirement. Restricting access to health benefits before eligibility for normal
retirement encourages continued work in exactly these years. The result is an increase in
same future date between the two plans would generate a spurious increase or decrease in costs. The baseline
analysis uses a discount rate of six percent, intermediate between the rate used for pension plans and health
plans. I also present results for one alternative policy using 4 and 8 percent discount rates and discuss the
relationship between the discount rate and the results.
6 Recall that Pennsylvania enacted significant pension legislation in late 2010. This legislation created the
A-3 and A-4 service classes. The normal retirement age for these classes is greater and the level of benefits
lower than for the comparable existing classes. With some exceptions, employees hired on or after January
1, 2011 earn service in class A-3 or A-4 while those hired before January 1, 2011 earn service in other classes.
6 1 These results differ from those reported in the 2011 actuarial valuations for the health and pension plans
for several reasons. Most importantly, this analysis uses the same discount rate for both benefit programs,
reports results only for active employees and only for employees participating in both plans, and develops a
different set of assumptions about future retirement patterns.
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costs for the pension system.
The second alternative policy I consider imposes a service requirement of 25 years re-
gardless of an employee's age at retirement. This restriction has no effect on eligibility for
subsidized RHI before eligibility for normal retirement, but increases the service require-
ment after normal retirement. Cutting benefits in this manner decreases the present value
of future health benefits by $850 million, or approximately 12 percent. While it has a small
positive effect on pension benefits, the increase in employee pension contributions is even
larger, resulting in net savings for the plan. In this case the pension offset is -4 percent.
Because the pension plan does not have an automatic COLA, pension accruals after eligibil-
ity for normal retirement are low but remain positive for many workers. Pension plans that
feature automatic COLAs typically have strongly negative accrual rates after eligibility for
normal retirement. In such plans, the additional savings for the pension plan resulting from
an eligibility restriction that encourages additional work after normal retirement could be
substantial.
Table 7.2 presents the estimated pension offset for the first eligibility restriction using
discount rates of 4, 6, and 8 percent. The value of the offset depends on the discount rate
chosen, and, in particular, a higher discount rate decreases the offset from the pension plan.
The eligibility restriction saves money by reducing expenditures on medical benefits in the
years before the normal retirement age. The pension offset arises from the increased pension
benefits paid to workers who decide to remain on the job when they lose eligibility. Since
these increased pension payments necessarily occur after the forgone health benefits would
have been received, they will be more heavily discounted. As a result, increasing the discount
rate will reduce the importance of the increase in pension benefits relative to the reduction
in health benefits and thus the size of the offset.
The results of sections five and six document the significant effects that eligibility for
subsidized RHI has on labor supply behavior. The simulation results presented in this
section show that, through these labor supply effects, the increase or decrease in costs for
the health plan resulting from a change in benefits can be either partially offset or magnified
by an associated change in costs for pension plans covering the affected workers.
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1.8 Conclusion
This chapter uses the experience of Pennsylvania state employees to gain insight into the ef-
fects of retiree health benefits on late-career separations. I find that the widely-documented
spike in the separation hazard at the normal retirement age disappears when individuals
reach eligibility for normal retirement before becoming eligible for subsidized retiree health
insurance. Instead, the separation hazard for these employees spikes only after they have
become eligible for both benefits. Then, exploiting quasi-experimental variation in the eli-
gibility rules for subsidized retiree health insurance, I show that the imposition of a more
restrictive service requirement stretches the distribution of separations. Early separations
occur earlier and late separations occur later. Facing more stringent eligibility requirements
for subsidized RHI, some individuals who would have stayed until eligibility under the ex-
isting policies give up, while others remain on the job longer hoping to become eligible for
benefits in the future.
Motivated by these behavioral findings, I simulate the impact of two further restrictions
in the eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI on the state workforce and on the present
value of the state's health and pension obligations. While pension benefits have substan-
tial legal protections, cuts in retiree health benefits can affect current employees and offer
the possibility of meaningful short-term savings for cash-strapped state and local govern-
ments. The simulations reveal a close relationship between the two programs. If eligibility
restrictions for retiree health benefits encourage additional work before the normal retire-
ment age-when pension accruals are high-the resulting increase in pension obligations
offsets a portion of the savings derived from the reduction in health benefits. In contrast,
if the eligibility restrictions encourage additional work when pension accruals are negative,
the pension plan can magnify the savings.
These results can inform the development of future reforms to public sector retirement
benefits. In particular, when designing changes to retiree health programs intended to reduce
expenditures, it is important to keep in mind the rate at which the affected workers accrue
pension benefits. If the reforms encourage continued work when accruals are high, greater
reductions in health benefits will be required to achieve a given savings target. Similarly,
when considering changes in pension benefits, knowledge of the eligibility rules for retiree
health benefits is essential. If a large fraction of workers at the normal retirement age are
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not yet eligible for retiree health benefits, increases in the normal retirement age may have
a smaller effect on the average retirement age than expected.
Moving forward, research on the labor market effects of retiree health benefits can extend
these results in two important directions. First, in focusing on the eligibility requirements
for a plan that offers either negligible or generous subsidies for RHI, this analysis has little to
say about plans that offer a partial subsidy for each year of work completed. However, not
only is an understanding of the behavioral response to such plans directly relevant to policy,
studying them could also provide evidence on employees' valuation of a marginal dollar
in subsidies for retiree health insurance. That valuation could then be used to examine
whether public sector employers are achieving the right balance between health and pension
benefits or should reallocate resources between the two. Second, while previous work has
established the important role of health status in retirement behavior, the data available for
this analysis does not include any medical information. In order to understand the effect
of changes in retiree health benefits on state budgets and well-being, knowledge of health
status is essential. If the employees who delay separation in response to increased eligibility
requirements are healthier than average, the restriction will save more money than a forecast
using average health expenditures would predict. Alternatively, if the individuals who delay
separation are those in relatively worse health, the eligibility restrictions will save less money
than a forecast using average expenditures would predict.
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L.A Actuarial appendix
The valuation of heath and pension benefits in section seven requires numerous demographic
and economic assumptions. I start from the assumptions described in the Hay Group's
most recent experience study for the State Employees' Retirement System as modified and
extended in the actuarial reports for each benefit plan.6 2 I deviate from the assumptions
used in these reports for two major reasons: (i) to put the valuations on equal footing (e.g.
using the same interest rate for both health and pension obligations) and (ii) to enable
a consistent analysis of employee behavior under alternative policy regimes. This section
outlines the assumptions used either by reference to the Hay Group reports or with a short
description of the methodology.
Population: Active general employees on December 31, 2011 at an agency participating in
the Retired Employees Health Plan and covered by the State Employees' Retirement System.
Excludes members with class A-3 or A-4 service.
Mortality after separation
Nondisabled annuitants, beneficiaries, and survivors. Cohort mortality con-
structed from the RP-2000 mortality tables for healthy annuitants using scale BB
mortality improvements. Employee tables used to construct mortality rates before 50
with smoothing applied between 40 and 50 (males) and between 46 and 50 (females).
Disabled annuitants. Cohort mortality constructed from the RP-2000 mortality
tables for disabled annuitants and scale BB mortality improvements.
Mortality before separation: Hay Group recommended assumptions for active member
mortality rates with no adjustment for mortality improvements (Table A-2 in Hay Group
(2011b)).
Rates of disability: Age-specific probabilities defined as 1 - e-365.25A, where A, is the
observed disability hazard for individuals at age a eligible for disability retirement and not
eligible for a normal retirement benefit, subsidized retiree health insurance, or both. 3
Claiming behavior: Employees claim benefits immediately after separation. Individuals
eligible for early retirement take early retirement. Individuals not eligible for early or normal
retirement benefits take a refund of accumulated deductions.
Retirement options: 33 percent of members take the maximum single life annuity, 41
6 2 See Hay Group (2011b).
6 3This specification implicitly assumes exogenous disability retirements that are diverted to superannu-
ation retirement after eligibility for both normal retirement and subsidized retiree health insurance and to
withdrawal before eligibility for disability retirement.
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take the single life annuity with present value guarantee, 13 percent take a 50 percent joint
and survivor annuity, and 13 percent take a 100 percent joint and survivor annuity. 85
percent of members choosing each option elect a withdrawal of accumulated deductions and
all individuals electing a withdrawal withdraw the maximum.
Pension beneficiaries: Beneficiaries are of the opposite sex and females are two years
younger than males.
Marital status for retiree health benefits: Marital status at each age (sex-distinct)
tabulated from the pooled March CPS files for the years 2000 through 2011.
Career salary schedule: Hay Group recommended assumptions (Table A-1 in Hay Group
(2011b)).
Medical expenditures: Per capita claims costs in 2010 and projected growth rates as
reported in Hay Group (2011a).64
Actuarial equivalence: All actuarial equivalence calculations use the GAM 83 unisex
mortality tables (i.e. the calculations ignore the alternative mortality tables available to
members with service prior to August 1983).
Maximum career length: All members remaining on the job are assumed to retire at age
78, upon reaching 50 years of service, or in 2052, whichever occurs first.
Provisions not valued: The valuation does not include Social Security Integration (SSI)
benefits available to employees hired on or before March 1, 1974. It reflects credit for
service already purchased, but assumes no additional service purchases by existing employees.
Death benefits do not include supplemental benefits payable when the retirement benefit is
limited to 100 percent of the highest salary. The analysis ignores the additional required
contributions for members hired on or after August 1, 2003 who choose health plans other
than the least expensive plan in their geographic region.
64 Note that the analysis of section two used a forecast of premiums to determine the value of the subsidy
for a single individual. This reflects the fact that for a single individual that premium is the price that
would be required for self-paid retiree health insurance. In contrast, the valuation uses expected medical
expenditures as it seeks to compute the costs for the state.
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Figure 3.1. Eligibility Requirements for Health and Pension Benefits,
Retirements Between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2008
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Normal retirement
Subsidized RHI
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Early retirement
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Early retirement
Subsidized RHI
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Service
Note: Eligibility rules for general employees with class AA service. Effective July 1, 2008, the service
requirement for subsidized retiree health insurance at or after the normal retirement age increased from 15
years to 20 years, excluding certain grandfathered employees.
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Table 3.1. Pension Benefit and Retiree Health Premiums by Age of Separation
for a Hypothetical Male Beginning State Employment at Age 33
(Inflation-Adjusted Dollars, Assuming 2005-2007 Policies for the Full Career)
Age Service Wage Pension Present Value Insurance Insurance
Benefit of Pension Premium Premium(pre-65) (post-64)
0 35,000 0
1 37,208 0
2 38,996 0
3 40,674 0
4 42,323 0
5 43,932 1,442
6 45,492 1,890
7 47,085 2,405
8 48,710 2,993
9 50,367 3,665
10 52,029 4,432
11 53,695 5,305
12 55,359 6,296
13 57,020 7,417
14 58,673 8,681
15 60,316 10,105
16 61,943 11,706
17 63,553 13,502
18 65,141 15,514
19 66,703 17,766
20 68,236 20,283
21 69,735 23,093
22 71,198 26,228
23 72,620 29,725
24 73,997 33,621
25 45,32 3791
26 76,604 42,795
28 79,029 50,806
29 80,251 53,468
30 81,491 56,175
31 82,751 58,945
32 84,030 61,787
0 Ineligible Ineligible
0 Ineligible Ineligible
0 Ineligible Ineligible
0 Ineligible Ineligible
0 Ineligible Ineligible
22,125 16d00 8Aoo
28,837 16,000 8,000
36,456 16,000 8,000
45,073 16,000 8,000
54,801 16,000 8,000
65,783 16,000 8,000
78,141 16,000 8,000
92,004 16,000 8,000
107,505 16,000 8,000
124,806 16,000 8,000
144,082 16,000 8,000
165,531 16,000 8,000
189,374 16,000 8,000
215,862 16,000 8,000
245,114 16,000 8,000
277,337 16,000 8,000
312,750 16,000 8,000
351,587 16,000 8,000
394,106 16,000 8,000
440,611 16,000 8,000
491,371 20 720
546,720 733 733
630,924 757 757
653,909 769 769
676,060 781 781
697,480 793 793
718,170 805 805
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
172,198
163,209
153,47
144,405
134,567
124,417
113,940
107,446
Eligibility for early retirement-
and self-paid RHI
Eligibility for subsidizedgHlt
Eligibility for nrmalfretremen
Note: The calculations assume fixed (in real dollars) premiums for the health plans and a single policy regime in order to better
illustrate the basic structure of the eligibility rules. Premiums without any state subsidy are assumed to be $16,000 before
Medicare eligibility and $8,000 after Medicare eligibility. This presentation ignores the $5 per month state payment available to
retirees not eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance. Pension benefits assume class AA service and a normal retirement
age of 60. The required retiree contribution for health insurance is 1% of final salary. Prior to eligibility for an early retirement
benefit, members are entitled to a refund of their accumulated contributions to the pension plan credited with four percent
interest. The value of this refund is not shown. Pension benefits assume immediate claiming at the time of separation. Present
value calculations assume a discount rate of six percent, male mortality according to the RP-2000 tables for healthy annuitants,
scale BB mortality improvement, and a birth date of January 1, 1965. Inflation and wage growth follow the recommended
assumptions of the 2006-2010 SERS experience study.
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Figure 3.2. Average Family Health Insurance Premium Before Subsidies
for Policies Offered Through the Retired Employees Health Plan, 2002-2012
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Note: Simple average premium for all plans offered to in-state retirees by year. The non-Medicare average is computed from
data on multi-party policies. The Medicare-eligible average is computed from data on single policies and multiplied by two.
Figure 3.3. Present Value of State Health Insurance Subsidy by Age at Retirement
for Retirements Effective January 1, 2006
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Note: The state subsidy is the difference between the full premium for the health insurance plan and the required retiree
contributions. Retirements effective January 1, 2006 required retiree contributions equal to 1 percent of final salary. Projected
premiums assume growth of 5 percent for non-Medicare policies and 6 percent for Medicare policies from a baseline level that
best fits the observed premiums between 2002 and 2012. Present value calculations assume a discount rate of six percent,
male mortality according to the RP-2000 tables for healthy annuitants, and scale BB mortality improvement. Required retiree
contributions assume a $50,000 salary.
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Figure 3.4. Health Insurance Subsidy Peak Value
by Age and Service on January 1, 2006,
Assuming Continuation of 2006 Policies
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Note: The health insurance subsidy is the difference between the full premium for the health insurance plan and the required
retiree contributions. The peak value is the present value assuming retirement on the earliest date at which the employee
is eligible for subsidized RHI less the present value assuming immediate retirement. Shaded regions indicate age and service
combinations at which the subsidy peak value is positive and exceeds the pension peak value. Retirements effective January
1, 2006 require retiree contributions equal to 1 percent of final salary. Projected premiums assume growth of 5 percent for
non-Medicare policies and 6 percent for Medicare policies from a baseline level that best fits the observed premiums between
2002 and 2012. Present value calculations assume a discount rate of six percent, male mortality according to the RP-2000 tables
for healthy annuitants, and scale BB mortality improvement. Required contributions assume a $50,000 salary in 2005 and 4.5
percent annual salary growth.
Figure 3.5. Pension Peak Value
by Age and Service on January 1, 2006
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Note: The pension peak value is the difference between the present value of benefits assuming retirement at the future age
that maximizes the value of benefits and the present value of pension benefits assuming immediate retirement. Shaded regions
indicate age and service combinations at which the subsidy peak value is positive and exceeds the pension peak value. Present
value calculations assume a discount rate of six percent, male mortality according to the RP-2000 tables for healthy annuitants,
and scale BB mortality improvement. Pension computations assume class AA service and a normal retirement age of 60, a$50,000 salary in 2005, and 4.5 percent salary growth. This presentation ignores the value of disability and death benefits.
Small positive values for employees under 50 with more than 30 years of service are suppressed for clarity and to allow for
labeling.
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Figure 4.1. Retirements by Age, 2000-2011
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Note: Number of death, disability, and superannuation retirements between January 1,
2000 and December 31, 2011. Employees who retire more than once are only counted
at their first retirement. Sample consists of general employees with no service in class
A-3 or A-4 who worked at some point in the 12-year period, never retired before 2000,
and never elected to combine service as a public school employee in Pennsylvania with
service as a state employee for purposes of pension benefits.
Figure 4.2 Retirements by Quarter Year of Service, 2000-2011
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Note: Number of death, disability, and superannuation retirements between January 1,
2000 and December 31, 2011. Employees who retire more than once are only counted
at their first retirement. Sample consists of general employees with no service in class
A-3 or A-4 who worked at some point in the 12-year period, never retired before 2000,
and never elected to combine service as a public school employee in Pennsylvania with
service as a state employee for purposes of pension benefits.
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Figure 5.1. Effect of Eligibility for Normal Retirement
With and Without Eligibility for Subsidized Retiree Health Insurance
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55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Age
Service at age 60
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Note: Separation probabilities defined as 1 - e-365.25A- where Aas is the empirical hazard at age a and
service s. The empirical hazard is the total number of separations at age a and service s divided by the
total number of worker-days employed at age a and service s. Values for the cohort with s6O years of service
at age 60 taken from the set of age and service combinations such that s - (a - 60) = S60. The sample is
restricted to active general employees who (i) have never retired, (ii) have never elected to determine pension
benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania, and (iii)
have no service in class A-3 or A-4. The estimation uses only worker-days prior to 2003, worker-days for
employees grandfathered under the pre-2008 eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI regardless of date,
and worker-days when the employee is younger than 60 regardless of date.
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Table 5.1. Separation Probabilities
for Cohorts with 12-17 Years of Service at Age 60
Cohorts (Defined by Service at Age 60)
12 13 14 15 16 17
Change in Separation Probability at
eligibility for normal 0.018 0.024 -0.009 0.224 0.242 0.261
retirement (0.017) (0.014) (0.012) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
eligibility for
subsidized RHI
0.519 0.473 0.314 0.224 0.242 0.261
(0.035) (0.028) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Separation Probability at age
58
59
60
61
62
63
0.054 0.046 0.045 0.041 0.043 0.046
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
0.044 0.032 0.046 0 0.038 0.030
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) ) (0.008) (0.007)
0.062 0.056 264 6.279 0.291
(0.015) (0.012) 021) (0 021) (0.022)
0.070 05 0.255 0.251 0.223
(0.016) (0 2 (0023 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
0.060 0.5 0.307 0.338 0.370 0.411
(0.014) (0.25) (0.025) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029)
09 0.350 0.286 0.321 0.319 0.391
( -032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.036)
Note: Separation probabilities defined as 1 - e- 36 5 .25 A, where Aas is the empirical hazard at age a and service
s. The empirical hazard is the total number of separations at age a and service s divided by the total number
of worker-days employed at age a and service s. Values for the cohort with sro years of service at age 60 taken
from the set of age and service combinations such that s - (a - 60) = s60. Shaded cells indicate the year prior to
and the first year of eligibility for subsidized retiree health insurance. The sample is restricted to active general
employees who (i) have never retired, (ii) have never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as
a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania, and (iii) have no service in class A-3 or A-4.
The estimation uses only worker-days prior to 2003, worker-days for employees grandfathered under the pre-2008
eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI regardless of date, and worker-days when the employee is younger than
60 regardless of date.
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Figure 5.2. Effect of
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Note: Separation probabilities defined as 1 - e- 365.25A_- where Aas is the empirical hazard at age a and
service s. The empirical hazard is the total number of separations at age a and service s divided by the
total number of worker-days employed at age a and service s. Values for the cohort with s60 years of service
at age 60 taken from the set of age and service combinations such that s - (a - 60) = S60. The sample is
restricted to active general employees who (i) have never retired, (ii) have never elected to determine pension
benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania, and (iii)
have no service in class A-3 or A-4. The estimation uses only worker-days prior to 2003, worker-days for
employees grandfathered under the pre-2008 eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI regardless of date,
and worker-days when the employee is younger than 60 regardless of date.
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Figure 5.3. Effect of
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Eligibility for Subsidized Retiree Health Insurance
Before Normal Retirement
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Note: Separation probabilities defined as 1 - e- 365 .25A, where Aas is the empirical hazard rate at age a
and service s. The empirical hazard is the total number of separations at age a and service s divided by the
total number of worker-days employed at age a and service s. Values for the cohort becoming eligible for
subsidized RHI at age arhi taken from the set of age and service combinations such that s - (a - arhi) = 25.
The sample is restricted to active general employees who (i) have never retired, (ii) have never elected
to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in
Pennsylvania, and (iii) have no service in class A-3 or A-4. The estimation uses only worker-days prior to
2003, worker-days for employees grandfathered under the pre-2008 eligibility requirements for subsidized
RHI regardless of date, and worker-days when the employee is younger than 60 regardless of date.
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Table 5.2. Separation Probabilities
for Cohorts Becoming Eligible for Subsidized Retiree Health Insurance
Before Normal Retirement
Cohorts (Defined by Age of Eligibility for Sub. RHI)
56 57 58 59
Change in Separation Probability at
eligibility for
subsidized RHI
0.084
(0.012)
0.122
(0.014)
0.033
(0.006)
0.091
(0.011)
0.081
(0.011)
0.116
(0.013)
0.097
(0.011)
0.125
(0.013)
0.152
(0.015)
0.169
(0.017)
0.024 0.020
(0.005) (0.005)
0.034 0.028
(0.007) (0.006)
0.022@ 0.021
(. 5 (0.005)
0.143
(0.015)
Note: Separation probabilities defined as 1 - e-365.25A_ where Aas is the empirical hazard at age
a and service s. The empirical hazard is the total number of separations at age a and service s
divided by the total number of worker-days employed at age a and service s. Values for the cohort
becoming eligible for subsidized RHI at age arah taken from the set of age and service combinations
such that s - (a - arhi) = 25. Shaded cells indicate the year prior to and the first year of eligibility
for subsidized retiree health insurance. The sample is restricted to active general employees who (i)
have never retired, (ii) have never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state
employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania, and (iii) have no service in class A-3 or
A-4. The estimation uses only worker-days prior to 2003, worker-days for employees grandfathered
under the pre-2008 eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI regardless of date, and worker-days
when the employee is younger than 60 regardless of date.
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Figure 5.4. Effect of Eligibility for Normal Retirement
After Eligibility for Subsidized Retiree Health Insurance
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Note: Separation probabilities defined as 1 - e- 365.25An- where Aas is the empirical hazard at age a and
service s. The empirical hazard is the total number of separations at age a and service s divided by the
total number of worker-days employed at age a and service s. Values for the cohort becoming eligible for
subsidized RHI at age arhi taken from the set of age and service combinations such that s - (a - arhi) = 25.
The sample is restricted to active general employees who (i) have never retired, (ii) have never elected
to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in
Pennsylvania, and (iii) have no service in class A-3 or A-4. The estimation uses only worker-days prior to
2003, worker-days for employees grandfathered under the pre-2008 eligibility requirements for subsidized
RHI regardless of date, and worker-days when the employee is younger than 60 regardless of date.
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Figure 5.5. Fraction of Active Employees Eligible for
Subsidized Retiree Health Insurance by Age
N
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Note: Count of employees eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance by age on January 1 of each year between 2000 and
2008 divided by the total number of employees by age on January 1 of each year. Sample consists of active general employees
who (i) have never retired and (ii) have never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and
as a public school employee in Pennsylvania.
Table 5.3. Approximate Effect of
Age
56
57
58
59
61
62
63
64
Effect of
Eligibility
0.084
0.122
0.152
0.169
0.314
0.473
0.519
0.520
RHB Offer on
Fraction
Eligible
0.405
0.394
0.381
0.362
0.544
0.510
0.462
0.438
Separation Probabilities
Effect of
Offer
0.034
0.048
0.058
0.061
0.171
0.241
0.239
0.228
66
Note: The effect of eligibility is the change in the separation probability upon becoming
eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance as shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. The fraction of
employees eligible is the count of eligible employees divided by the total number of employees
as shown in Figure 5.5. The approximate effect of offer is the product of the effect of eligibility
and the fraction eligible.
Figure 6.1. Required Age and Service on June 30, 2008 for Grandfathering
Under the Existing Eligibility Requirements for Subsidized RHI
Not grandfathered
105
Grandfathered
--------- --
Dscard
2015
Service
Note: Members were grandfathered under the existing eligibility rules for subsidized retiree health insurance
if, as of June 30, 2008, they had accumulated at least 15 years of service or were at least 59 and had
accumulated at least 13 years of service. Service that an individual was eligible to purchase but had not
yet purchased could be counted against the requirements. Because the available data do not include each
employee's exact date of birth, all employees who were age 59 in 2008 are discarded for purposes of the
quasi-experimental analysis as it is not possible to determine their grandfathering status precisely.
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Figure 6.2. Effect of the Increased Service Requirement for Subsidized RHI
on the Probability of Continuous Employment From December 31, 2002
Through December 31, 2011, Workers 51 and Older
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Additional service needed to meet grandfathering requirements
Note: Scatter plot of the average probability of continuous employment in half-year bins overlaid with
a piecewise linear fit of the same probability as a function of the additional service needed to meet the
grandfathering requirements. Additional service needed to meet the grandfathering requirements defined as
the difference between the age-specific service requirement and projected service on June 30, 2008. Projected
service includes all service purchases for service prior to July 2008 regardless of the date of purchase.
Estimation sample consists of active general employees of the state of Pennsylvania at the end of 2002
who (i) worked at least 1900 hours in both 2001 and 2002; (ii) had never retired; (iii) had never elected
to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in
Pennsylvania; and (iv) were born before 1949, in 1950, or in 1951.
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Table 6.1. Effect of the Increased Service Requirement for Subsidized RHI
on the Probability of Continuous Employment From December 31, 2002
Through December 31, 2011, Workers 51 and Older
Polynomial
Order
Bandwidth (Rectangular Kernel)
2 4 6 8 10
0 0.120 0.174 0.198 0.220 0.234
(0.023) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
1 0.136 0.092 0.097 0.090 0.096
(0.047) (0.033) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026)
2 0.172 0.105 0.101 0.116 0.109
(0.072) (0.050) (0.043) (0.041) (0.040)
3 0.032 0.193 0.118 0.102 0.110
(0.098) (0.067) (0.058) (0.055) (0.053)
Note: Estimate of the effect of the increased service requirement derived from linear re-
gression discontinuity specification. The rectangular kernel is defined as K(u) = 0.5/h x
1{IJul < h}, where h is the indicated bandwidth. All specifications are limited to employees
with less than five years of additional service needed to meet the grandfathering require-
ments (i.e. bandwidths greater than five add additional observations on only one side of the
discontinuity). Additional service needed to meet the grandfathering requirements defined
as the difference between the age-specific service requirement and projected service on June
30, 2008. Projected service includes all service purchases for service prior to July 2008
regardless of the date of purchase. Estimation sample consists of active general employees
of the state of Pennsylvania at the end of 2002 who (i) worked at least 1900 hours in both
2001 and 2002; (ii) had never retired; (iii) had never elected to determine pension benefits
jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania; and
(iv) were born before 1949, in 1950, or in 1951.
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Figure 6.3. The Censoring Strategy
Used to Estimate Pre-Reform Employment Survival Functions
on Dates Prior to July 1, 2010,
Schematic for Workers Age 60 and Older
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Note: Data on grandfathered employees is used to estimate the pre-reform employment survival function at
the grandfathering threshold. Directly computing the survival function using data on all employees within
h years of the threshold-the baseline estimation bandwidth h = 2 is shown in the figure-would include
individuals who separate after becoming eligible for subsidized RHI (i.e. inside the shaded region) even when
the individual at the grandfathering threshold has not yet become eligible. Because workers separate rapidly
after becoming eligible, such an approach would lead to a badly biased estimate of the desired function. To
obtain a better estimate on dates at which the marginal employee is not yet eligible for subsidized RHI, each
employee is censored when he or she becomes eligible. For dates on or after which the marginal employee
has become eligible, the estimation uses all available data for each individual (not shown in the figure). For
simplicity, the figure abstracts from the potential for uneven accumulation of service within a calendar year.
70
Figure 6.4. Employment Survival Functions
Under the Pre and Post-Reform Eligibility Rules for Subsidized RHI,
Workers Age 51-52 on December 31, 2002
Projected to Exactly Meet the Grandfathering Requirements in 2008
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- - - - - Pre-reform: eligibility between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2011
Post-reform: eligibility on July 1, 2013
I-4 Test of (pointwise) equality rejects at 5%
Note: Product-limit estimates of the employment survival functions at the grandfathering threshold. The
pre-reform estimates use data for grandfathered employees and the post-reform estimates use data for non-
grandfathered employees. In both cases, the estimates are computed using a rectangular kernel, defined as
K(u) = 0.5/h x 1{Iul ; h}, and a bandwidth h = 2. Additional service needed to meet the grandfathering
requirements defined as the difference between the age-specific service requirement and projected service on
June 30, 2008. Projected service includes all service purchases for service prior to July 2008 regardless of
the date of purchase. Estimation sample consists of active general employees of the state of Pennsylvania at
the end of 2002 who (i) worked at least 1900 hours in both 2001 and 2002; (ii) had never retired; (iii) had
never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school
employee in Pennsylvania; and (iv) were born before 1949, in 1950, or in 1951.
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Figure 6.5. Employment Survival Functions
Pre and Post-Reform Eligibility Rules for Subsidized RHI,
Workers Age 54-59 on December 31, 2002
Projected to Exactly Meet the Grandfathering Requirements in 2008
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- - - - - Pre-reform: eligibility on July 1, 2010
Post-reform: eligibility on July 1, 2015
1-i Test of (pointwise) equality rejects at 5%
Note: Product-limit estimates of the employment survival functions at the grandfathering threshold. The
pre-reform estimates use data for grandfathered employees and the post-reform estimates use data for non-
grandfathered employees. In both cases, the estimates are computed using a rectangular kernel, defined as
K(u) = 0.5/h x 1{|11 < h}, and a bandwidth h = 2. For estimation of the pre-reform survival function prior
to July 1, 2010 grandfathered employees are censored immediately prior to eligibility for subsidized RHI.
For estimation on or after July 1, 2010 the full sample of employees is used. Additional service needed to
meet the grandfathering requirements defined as the difference between the age-specific service requirement
and projected service on June 30, 2008. Projected service includes all service purchases for service prior to
July 2008 regardless of the date of purchase. Estimation sample consists of active general employees of the
state of Pennsylvania at the end of 2002 who (i) worked at least 1900 hours in both 2001 and 2002; (ii) had
never retired; (iii) had never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee
and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania; and (iv) were born before 1949, in 1950, or in 1951.
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Figure 6.6. Employment Survival Functions
Under the Pre and Post-Reform Eligibility Rules for Subsidized RHI,
Workers Age 60 and Older on December 31, 2002
Projected to Exactly Meet the Grandfathering Requirements in 2008
1 -
.6
.4
.2-
0-
H
7/2003 7/2005 7/2007 7/2009
Date
7/2011
- - - - - Pre-reform: eligibility on July 1, 2010
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i-4 Test of (pointwise) equality rejects at 5%
Note: Product-limit estimates of the employment survival functions at the grandfathering threshold. The
pre-reform estimates use data for grandfathered employees and the post-reform estimates use data for non-
grandfathered employees. In both cases, the estimates are computed using a rectangular kernel, defined as
K(u) = 0.5/h x 1{Ilu < h}, and a bandwidth h = 2. For estimation of the pre-reform survival function prior
to July 1, 2010 grandfathered employees are censored immediately prior to eligibility for subsidized RHI.
For estimation on or after July 1, 2010 the full sample of employees is used. Additional service needed to
meet the grandfathering requirements defined as the difference between the age-specific service requirement
and projected service on June 30, 2008. Projected service includes all service purchases for service prior to
July 2008 regardless of the date of purchase. Estimation sample consists of active general employees of the
state of Pennsylvania at the end of 2002 who (i) worked at least 1900 hours in both 2001 and 2002; (ii) had
never retired; (iii) had never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee
and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania; and (iv) were born before 1949, in 1950, or in 1951.
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Table 6.2. Effect of the Increased Service Requirement for Subsidized RHI
on the Employment Survival Probability on Select Dates,
Workers Age 51 and Older on December 31, 2002
Projected to Exactly Meet the Grandfathering Requirements in 2008
Date Bandwidth (Rectangular Kernel)
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Age 51-52: Eligible for Sub. RHI Jan. 1, 2010 - Dec. 31, 2011
July 1, 2009
July 1, 2010
July 1, 2011
0.033
(0.052)
0.026
(0.058)
0.124
(0.063)
0.010
(0.040)
-0.006
(0.043)
0.084
(0.051)
0.015
(0.033)
0.013
(0.037)
0.105
(0.043)
0.000
(0.031)
0.004
(0.035)
0.108
(0.040)
-0.009
(0.029)
0.002
(0.032)
0.102
(0.037)
Age 54-59: Eligible for Sub. RHI on July 1, 2010, Ineligible for NR on December 31, 2002
July 1, 2009
July 1, 2010
July 1, 2011
-0.019
(0.055)
0.127
(0.055)
0.144
(0.048)
-0.055
(0.042)
0.138
(0.044)
0.158
(0.040)
-0.075
(0.035)
0.123
(0.036)
0.153
(0.033)
-0.096
(0.034)
0.126
(0.032)
0.146
(0.030)
-0.099
(0.032)
0.142
(0.030)
0.152
(0.027)
Age 60 and older: Eligible for Sub. RHI on July 1, 2010, Eligible for NR on December 31, 2002
July 1, 2009 -0.131 -0.102 -0.091 -0.087 -0.076
(0.060) (0.049) (0.042) (0.039) (0.036
July 1, 2010 -0.078 -0.044 -0.020 0.032 0.065
(0.053) (0.043) (0.036) (0.034) (0.030
July 1, 2011 0.028 0.041 0.058 0.094 0.118
(0.043) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027)
Note: Difference between the product-limit estimates of the post-reform employment survival function and the pre-
reform employment survival function for the specified population. Shaded cells indicate baseline estimates as shown
in the figures. The pre-reform estimates use data for grandfathered employees and the post-reform estimates use data
for non-grandfathered employees. In both cases, the estimates are computed using a rectangular kernel, defined as
K(u) = 0.5/h x 1{Iul < h}, and a bandwidth h = 2. For estimation of the pre-reform survival function in the two
populations age 54 and older prior to July 1, 2010, grandfathered employees are censored immediately prior to eligibility
for subsidized RHI. For estimation on or after July 1, 2010 the full sample of employees is used. Additional service
needed to meet the grandfathering requirements defined as the difference between the age-specific service requirement
and projected service on June 30, 2008. Projected service includes all service purchases for service prior to July 2008
regardless of the date of purchase. Estimation sample consists of active general employees of the state of Pennsylvania at
the end of 2002 who (i) worked at least 1900 hours in both 2001 and 2002; (ii) had never retired; (iii) had never elected
to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania;
and (iv) were born before 1949, in 1950, or in 1951.
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Table 7.1. Present Value of Health and Pension Plan Obligations
for Active General Employees on December 31, 2011
Under Current Eligibility Rules for Subsidized RHI
and Under Two Alternative Policies,
Six Percent Discount Rate
Eligibility Requirements for Subsidized
Present Value Retiree Health Insurance (age/service)
(millions of dollars)
Health Plan
60/20, 60/20,
any/25 any/30
PV of future benefits 6,838 6,348 5,989
PV of future retiree premiums 56 52 51
PV of net plan obligations 6,782 6,296 5,938
Pension Plan
PV of future benefits 19,714 19,828 19,739
PV of future member contributions 1,780 1,796 1,835
PV of net plan obligations 17,935 18,032 17,904
Effect of Policy Change
a PV of health plan obligations -486 -844
A PV of pension plan obligations 97 -30
Pension plan offset (percent) 20.0 -3.6
Note: Present value of future health and pension benefits, premiums, and member contributions for active general employees
of the state of Pennsylvania covered by the State Employees' Retirement System and working at agencies participating in
the Retired Employees Health Plan. Excludes members with service in class A-3 or A-4. Pension plan offset is the fraction
of savings from the reduction in health plan obligations lost in the form of increased obligations for the pension plan. See
section six and appendix A for a detailed discussion of the methodology.
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Table 7.2. Effect of Restricting Eligibility for Subsidized RHI
Before Normal Retirement to Employees with at least 30 Years of Service,
Discounting at 4, 6, and 8 Percent
Change in Present Value
(millions of dollars)
Health Plan
IJILDiUuL RaLe
4% 6% 8%
A PV of future benefits -804 -490 -323
A PV of future retiree premiums -13 -4 -1
A PV of net plan obligations -792 -486 -321
Pension Plan
A PV of future benefits 223 113 55
A PV of future member contributions 20 16 13
A PV of net plan obligations 203 97 42
Pension Plan Offset (percent) 25.7 20.0 13.0
Note: Change in the present value of future health and pension benefits, premiums, and member contributions for active
general employees of the state of Pennsylvania covered by the State Employees' Retirement System and working at agencies
participating in the Retired Employees Health Plan. Excludes members with service in class A-3 or A-4. Pension plan
offset is the fraction of savings from the reduction in health plan obligations lost in the form of increased obligations for
the pension plan. See section six and appendix A for a detailed discussion of the methodology.
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Chapter 2
A Structural Analysis of Retirement
with Retiree Health Insurance
Abstract
Eligibility for retiree health insurance is a crucial determinant of retirement behavior, but
existing models of the retirement decision typically treat eligibility as a fixed characteristic of
the worker rather than one that evolves over the career. Furthermore, analyses often simplify
the structure of pension plans to make estimation more tractable at the expense of accuracy.
This chapter estimates a structural model of life-cycle labor supply using administrative data
for the Pennsylvania state workforce while maintaining a complete representation of the rich
individual-level variation in health and pension benefits. The estimates are then used to
simulate labor supply behavior under different health and pension policies. Changes in the
eligibility requirements for subsidized retiree health insurance induce dramatic changes in
retirement timing that would be missed in models that do not account for an employer's
eligibility criteria.
This project would not have been possible without the invaluable assistance of the open records team
at the Pennsylvania State Employees' Retirement System. I also thank Jim Poterba, Jon Gruber, Isaiah
Andrews, Aviva Aron-Dine, Dan Barron, and Matt Fiedler. This research was supported by the National
Institute on Aging, Grant Number T32-AG0000186, and by the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. All
mistakes are my own.
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2.1 Introduction
In the United States, people obtain health insurance from a wide range of sources, including
their employer, a spouse's employer, the government, unions or professional associations, and
the private market (Fronstin (2012)). In each case, the price paid for an insurance policy
reflects a complicated set of implicit cross-subsidies.1 Adding a spouse to an employer policy,
for example, can cost much less than an actuarially fair premium. As a result, decisions not
directly related to health insurance are affected by the provision of health insurance. One
decision which is strongly influenced by individuals' desire to maintain health insurance
coverage is that of when to retire (Rust and Phelan (1997), French and Jones (2011), Nyce
et al. (2011), and Leiserson (2013)). Retirement often results in a change in the source of
health insurance coverage, canonically from employer-provided insurance to Medicare.
Understanding the effect of health insurance on retirement behavior has become a criti-
cally important policy issue. Increasing per capita medical expenditures have led to numerous
proposed and enacted policies intended to address concerns about coverage, cost, and qual-
ity. These proposals include both those intended to affect the health insurance of the retired
population, such as increases in the eligibility age for Medicare, and those directed elsewhere
but which will have important subsidiary effects on retirees or retirement behavior, such as
subsidies for the purchase of insurance in the private market that facilitate retirement prior
to eligibility for Medicare.
Using a sample of public sector employees in Pennsylvania whose decision to retire is
strongly influenced by the eligibility rules for the subsidized retiree health insurance offered
by their employer (Leiserson (2013)), this chapter estimates a structural model of the re-
tirement decision that can be used to simulate counterfactual retirement distributions under
alternative health and pension benefit policies. While previous work has documented the
reduced form importance of retiree health insurance (see, e.g., Leiserson (2013), Nyce et al.
(2011), Madrian (1994), and Karoly and Rogowski (1994)), it can be difficult to find reduced
form evidence on policy impacts relevant to potential future policy changes as there is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in the design of health and pension plans across firms. Furthermore,
existing structural work has lacked information about the eligibility requirements for bene-
'While these cross-subsidies can be much less pronounced in the private market, regulations forbidding
pricing on specific characteristics have a similar effect.
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fits within the firm. Such work is therefore unable to inform discussion of plausible policy
options-like those recently implemented in Pennsylvania and under consideration in many
other states-that would change benefits along exactly this dimension.
The estimates suggest that restrictions in eligibility for subsidized retiree health insurance
(RHI) can be expected to induce dramatic shifts in the distribution of retirements. In
contrast, reductions in the generosity of pension benefits may have more modest effects.
This difference in the behavioral response arises because eligibility restrictions for health
insurance typically involve very large reductions in benefits in a small number of years
and thus a dramatic increase in the financial incentive for continued work in those years.
Changes in pension benefits tend to have a much more diffuse impact over a much larger
number of years. Of course, one could design cuts in pension benefits that do not have
this characteristic. Crucially, the simulated retirement distributions produced by the model
capture the interactions between the state's retiree health and pension benefits and indicate
that changes in employee behavior in response to changes in either health or pension benefits
depend substantially on the employee's eligibility for the other benefit.
The key contribution of this analysis is to exploit detailed knowledge of the institutional
regime in Pennsylvania, where different employees become eligible for subsidized retiree
health insurance at different ages, in order to estimate a structural model of retirement be-
havior that can be used to simulate counterfactual retirement distributions under alternative
policy regimes. This exercise contrasts with existing structural analyses of the effect of health
insurance on retirement, which typically assume that eligibility for retiree health benefits is
a fixed characteristic of each employer-employee pair. In addition to the rich variation in eli-
gibility for retiree health insurance at the individual level, a second advantage of the current
setting is the large size of the population covered by a single institutional regime. Because
all individuals used in the analysis work under the same regime, there is no need to map the
rules of a pension plan into a low-dimensional state space and no consequent reduction in
accuracy.
This chapter builds on an extensive literature estimating structural models of the re-
tirement decision. Like much of the early work on pensions (Kotlikoff and Wise (1989),
Stock and Wise (1990)), it uses data for only a single firm where the rules are well known
and can be implemented accurately in the empirical analysis. More recent work incorpo-
rating medical expenses (Rust and Phelan (1997), French and Jones (2011)) has tended to
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use samples drawn from the entire population, allowing for a more general result but also
forcing the authors to abstract from important institutional detail in the estimation for rea-
sons of tractability and therefore sacrificing accuracy. None of the existing structural work
incorporates data on the evolution of individual-level eligibility for retiree health insurance. 2
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section two outlines the model.
Section three describes the data, identification, and estimation. Section four discusses the
fit and the results. Section five presents the results of several policy simulations and section
six concludes.
2.2 Model
I estimate a simple dynamic programming model of the retirement decision in the spirit of
Stock and Wise (1990).
2.2.1 Preferences
At time t, agents maximize the present value of future utility
TS S-7r (s I t) u (Ct, Lt), (2.1)
5=t
where # is the discount factor, 7r (ti I to) the probability of survival from period to to ti,
and u (Ct, Lt) the period utility derived from consumption Ct and leisure Lt. (Periods rep-
resent years of life and will be referred to interchangeably as ages, dates, and periods.) All
agents still alive at T = 100 are assumed to die with certainty at the end of the period.
Survival probabilities are unaffected by any choices or actions taken by the individuals. 3
Period utility exhibits constant relative risk aversion in the consumption-leisure aggregate,
u (Ct, Lt) = (1 - o)~' (CtLi) 1 . Leisure is defined as Lt (et) = 1 - et x (k + vt) , where et
is employment status. The parameters k and vt capture the utility cost of work; k is homo-
2 The model estimated in Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) allows for the evolution of eligibility at the
individual level, but the authors are forced to impute the eligibility rules because the data used in the paper
does not contain the relevant information.
3Survival probabilities are drawn from the RP-2000 tables representing mortality for the population
covered by defined benefit pension plans in the year 2000.
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geneous in the population while vt varies at the individual level and over time.4 The cost
of work reflects a combination of tangible costs (e.g. commuting, meals, and substitution
from home production to services) and intangible costs (e.g. tastes, alternative employment
opportunities, the value of time, and the quality of the current job). The idiosyncratic
component is assumed to follow the form
Vt pvt_1 + Et (2.2)
E= N (0, r).
Putting all of these pieces together results in the utility specification
u (Ct, Lt (et)) 1 (Ct (1 - et x (k + vt))) . (2.3)
The model is used to explain the behavior of a sample of employees selected at age 50. The
cost of work is the key source of heterogeneity in the model. The model must rationalize the
decisions made by different individuals with the same tenure at age 50 to retire at different
ages, even though they are eligible to retire with the same package of benefits at any age.
All characteristics at age 50 are assumed to be unrelated to the individual-specific cost of
work and the value v50 is drawn from the same normal distribution, i.e. v50 ~ N (0, o).
2.2.2 Choices
Agents choose when to retire. Once retired, they may not return to the workforce. However,
since the data are drawn from only a single firm, retirement may involve continued work
elsewhere. This is particularly true for younger employees, for whom the cost of work likely
reflects the value of alternative employment possibilities.
Private savings is forbidden. This simplification reflects several economic and practical
considerations. First, from a practical perspective, introducing a choice of consumption and
assets dramatically increases the computational complexity of the model. In contrast with
4 Since employment status is a binary variable, the value of leisure for an individual takes on one of only
two values: 1 - e x (k + v) if the individual continues working and 1 if the individual retires.
51t is straightforward to allow additional flexibility in the baseline distribution of heterogeneity, but with
few retirements before age 55, the additional parameters introduced are poorly identified. For this reason,
the specification of the model here simply assumes that the baseline distribution of heterogeneity follows the
same distribution as all subsequent innovations.
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previous work, this analysis incorporates a detailed representation of employee service in
the state space, allowing for the precise determination of eligibility for health and pension
benefits. This fine detail is essential for simulating counterfactual distributions of retirement
behavior under alternative policy regimes as it is needed to capture the changes in eligibility,
but it limits what can be done along other dimensions.
Second, the employee data used to estimate the model contains no asset information.
Using asset-related moments to identify the model would require imputation of asset in-
formation from another source. As a result, no information about the correlation between
assets and separation behavior would be available for identification.
Third, introducing a simple savings technology would not necessarily improve the model's
ability to fit the data. If allowed to save, low pension wealth individuals would build up
substantial savings to supplement their retirement consumption. That is, allowing savings
would reduce some of the gap in retirement consumption between those individuals with
large pensions and those with small pensions. However, tabulations from the Health and
Retirement Study indicate that, within age, net worth correlates positively with tenure in
the population of individuals covered by defined benefit pension plans. This reduced-form
correlation is not surprising, but it indicates that a simple model of savings would not
necessarily lead to a more realistic model.
Finally, allowing savings makes it more difficult for the model to explain retirements by
low pension wealth individuals. With access to savings, the wages from an additional year of
work can be spread over an entire retirement of low consumption and therefore high marginal
utility.6 Restricting savings forces the individuals to consume wages immediately and thus
reduces the utility value of continued work.
2.2.3 Cash income
Agents in the model receive cash income from wages, the state's defined benefit pension, and
Social Security.
60f course, the low pension wealth individuals could have large stocks of private savings that they rely
on for retirement consumption, but this is exactly what the reduced-form correlation in the HRS rules out.
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Wages
Wage growth is assumed to follow the actuarial assumptions used by the state's pension
plan. The growth rate in any period is a deterministic function of the employee's service:
wt+1 = (1 + g (servicet)) wt. (2.4)
Growth rates are high at the beginning of the career and decrease over the course of the
career. The assumptions are described in Hay Group (2011). As a very large share of
the state's workforce is unionized and compensation for such employees follows negotiated
salary schedules, deterministic salary growth is a reasonable assumption. Uncertainty in
the outcome of contract negotiations over the course of the career will, of course, generate
deviations from the forecast.
Pensions
Pennsylvania provides a traditional defined benefit pension to its retired employees.7 The
initial benefit at retirement is the product of four pieces: (i) a 2.5 percent accrual factor
specified in the plan statutes, (ii) average earnings over the employee's three highest-earning
years, (iii) the number of years of service for the state, and (iv) an early retirement reduction,
if applicable. Expressed mathematically,
bt = 0.025 x I wt x servicet x cNRA x (1.04) t-NRA, (2.5)
t-3 Ct
where bt denotes the benefit at time t, wt the wage at time t, servicet service at time t, ct the
cost of a $1 annuity for an individual of age t, and NRA the plan's normal retirement age.8
The normal retirement age is the minimum of 60 and the year in which an employee reaches
35 years of service. As expressed in the formula above, the high-three average earnings
7The rules described here are those in effect for employees hired before January 1, 2011, and thus unaf-
fected by the benefit reductions implemented by the state legislature in late 2010, and retiring on or after
July 1, 2001. The estimation sample is restricted to employees retiring in this period. Selection into the
sample based on the policy regime existing prior to July 1, 2001 is ignored. In practice, because most in-
dividuals retire relatively quickly after they become eligible for full benefits, the problems arising from this
abstraction should not be severe.
8This specification implicitly assumes immediate claiming of the pension benefit at the time of retirement.
Doing so will be optimal both in the sense of maximizing the present value of benefits and in the sense of
maximizing the utility value of benefits in nearly all cases.
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incorporates the fact that under the assumed pattern of wage growth, the highest-earning
years will necessarily be the most recent years. Individuals must have five years of service to
be eligible for this benefit before the normal retirement age and three years of service at or
after the normal retirement age. Cost of living adjustments (COLAs) for the pension benefit
are provided on an ad hoc basis by the state legislature. The impact of the COLA structure
on retirement behavior depends primarily on the probability that the state will offer a COLA
in the first few years after retirement. For this reason, the modeling assumes that there is no
COLA. This will slightly understate the level of pension benefits that an employee expects
to receive during retirement, but will capture the relevant incentives affecting retirement
behavior. The model assumes an inflation rate of two percent.
The pension plan offers employees a partial lump-sum at retirement. Between 2006 and
2010, 85 percent of retirees chose to take it. However, because the model rules out private
savings, the choice to take this lump sum is ignored in the implementation. This simplifica-
tion could create a problem if retirees use the accelerated benefits to increase consumption
in the years before the Social Security early retirement age and thus smooth consumption
more effectively. While it is not possible to determine whether individuals are pursuing this
strategy from the data, since so many retirees take this option-including those retiring at
or after 62-smoothing consumption across the Social Security early retirement age is likely
not the primary motivation.
Social Security
The computation of Social Security benefits follows a simplified formula motivated by the
limited data available and the need to maintain a tractable state space. For employees
retiring at or after age 60, average earnings are assumed to equal 75 percent of the current
wage. For each year an employee retires before age 60 one zero is added to the earnings
history. However, the number of zeros introduced is limited to the number of years less than
35 the individual has worked for the state. This approximation to Social Security's average
earnings computation will tend to overestimate the correct value for individuals who join
the state workforce because it offers a better salary than their previous job and will tend
to underestimate the correct value for individuals who had slower salary growth in previous
employment than is assumed in the valuation of the state's pension plan. The value for
average earnings is expressed in 2005 dollars and the bend points for 2005 are applied to
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determine the benefit. The normal retirement age for all individuals is assumed to be 66.
Spousal and disability benefits are ignored.
Taxes
Federal income taxes are computed according to the schedule for a single individual in 2005
with one dependent who claims the standard deduction. Credits are ignored. Social Security
benefits are included in income at a 50 percent rate above $25,000. Additional taxation of
Social Security benefits at higher income levels is ignored. Pennsylvania state income taxes
apply a flat rate to a broad definition of income. However, state pension benefits are exempt.
For modeling purposes, the exemption of state pension benefits is the only exclusion allowed.
While information on marital status is exempt from public records requests, it is reason-
able to believe that most of the individuals in the sample are married. However, computing
taxes under the joint schedule while including income from only one spouse would substan-
tially understate the true tax liability. Since the model ignores the presence of a spouse and
the potential for joint retirement decisions, computing taxes according to the single schedule
provides a reasonable projection of the world onto the model.
2.2.4 Health insurance
Active employees receive health benefits from the state. All retired employees receiving
a pension benefit can purchase coverage through the state at full price. Retired employees
meeting additional age and service criteria receive highly subsidized health insurance policies.
Eligibility for subsidized health insurance requires 15 years of service at or after age 60, or
25 years of service at any age.10 Once employees meet these additional age and service
requirements, they need pay only 0-3 percent of their salary at the time of retirement in
9A complete implementation of the rules determining Social Security benefits would require including
both calendar time and birth year in the state space. Calendar time affects wage indexed values, including
the bend points, and an employee's birth year determines her normal retirement age. However, as this would
increase the computational burden associated with solving the model and the computation of Social Security
benefits will only ever be an approximation due to the incomplete knowledge of the earnings history, I exclude
both calendar time and year of birth from the state space and approximate Social Security benefits based
on the bend points in a single calendar year and an assumed normal retirement age.
10The description of retiree health benefits here applies to all employees retiring prior to July 1, 2008 and
grandfathered employees retiring on or after July 1, 2008. Employees were grandfathered if, by June 30,
2008, they had at least 15 years of service or were at least 59 and had at least 13 years of service. The
estimation sample is restricted to these populations.
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order to receive health coverage in retirement. The contribution rate varies with age and the
date of retirement. Retiree contributions are ignored in the implementation of the model as
including them would require including calendar time in the state space. Since contributions
are small relative to the value of the premium and the potential variation in the value of the
insurance to the individual, this is unlikely to meaningfully affect the results.
Health insurance is treated as additional consumption for the individual. That is, medical
expenses are not directly modeled and there is no insurance against risk resulting from
coverage. This choice is motivated by the fact that relatively few individuals retiring in this
population are uninsured regardless of whether they receive insurance from the state. Instead
they either depart for another job that provides coverage, have access to coverage through a
spouse, purchase coverage from the state, or purchase coverage in the private market. As a
result, treating individuals without access to retiree health coverage as uninsured would be
a mistake."
The value of the health insurance is set to the average premium for a multi-party policy
prior to eligibility for Medicare in 2005. This value will be assumed constant in real terms
in the estimation. While this is clearly inconsistent with the recent and likely future path of
medical expenditures, it is not clear that individual employees have sophisticated projections
of premiums throughout their retirement years (or even necessarily know the actuarial value
of the health benefits they currently receive). For that reason I do not worry about the
details of future premium projections.
Individuals become eligible for Medicare at age 65. The value of Medicare is assumed
to be proportional to the value of comprehensive insurance. The constant of proportional-
ity is given by the ratio of the reduction in premiums for Medicare-eligible retirees to the
premium for comprehensive insurance prior to eligibility for Medicare. This may provide an
underestimate of the value of Medicare as the first dollar of coverage is likely substantially
more valuable to the retiree than the last dollar of coverage.
2.2.5 Recursive problem
Because all retirees are assumed to die at the end of period T, the problem admits a straight-
forward solution via backwards induction. Substituting into the utility specification shown
"Even if it were desirable to model medical conditions directly, the member data available from the
pension plan does not include any medical information so it would not be possible.
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in equations (2.1) and (2.3) yields the value of retirement at age t for an individual with
pension benefit b, Social Security benefit ss, and retiree health coverage status h:
V (b, ss, h) = # F (s I t) 1 (b (1+ i) + ss + 1 (t < 65) hm (2.6)
S)t
+ 1 (t > 65) max (hm, ) ).
The nominal pension benefit b is adjusted for inflation at rate i. Prior to age 65, individ-
uals receive comprehensive health insurance with premium value m if they are eligible for
retiree health benefits. After reaching age 65, they continue to receive comprehensive health
insurance if they are eligible for retiree health benefits but, in addition, ineligible employees
receive Medicare benefits valued at m.
An individual who enters a period employed has the option of remaining on the job or
choosing to retire. The value of entering period t employed for an individual with service s,
wage w, and idiosyncratic cost of work v is therefore
V (s, w, v) = max (1 - (kv))) + r (t± +
b= fb(t,w,s) s'= s+e
ss = f" (t, w, s) w' = (1 + g (s)) w
h = fh (t, s) v' = pV + E.
C = w+b+m-T
The functions fb, fo, and fh map age, wage, and service into the initial pension benefit, Social
Security benefit, and eligibility for retiree health benefits according to the rules described
above. C denotes total consumption, equal to the sum of wages, pension benefits, and health'
insurance, less the computed income taxes. Primes indicate values of the state variable one
year later. Service increments by one if the individual works, wage growth follows equation
(2.4), and labor disutility evolves according to (2.2).
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2.3 Data, identification, and estimation
I estimate the model via the method of simulated moments (MSM), matching the density of
retirements by age and service in the data to those produced by the model.
2.3.1 Member data
I fit the model to data drawn from the member records of the Pennsylvania State Employees'
Retirement System (SERS), which was obtained via a series of public records requests. The
data was first used in Leiserson (2013) and the description here comes from that analysis.
The data cover all members who worked between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2011.12
The records include name, year of birth, sex, summary employment information prior to
2000, detailed information on all jobs held since 2000, a quarterly salary history since 1997,
annual hours since 2000, detailed information on the date and type of retirement, and various
additional fields relating to the administration of the pension system.
The raw data contains records for 213,190 individuals. I exclude from the sample people
who never work in the sample period, were under age 50 at the end of 2011, who had
part-time or intermittent employment, who retire before July 1, 2001, who have service in
special service classes, who have class A-3 or A-4 service, who were affected by restrictions
in eligibility for subsidized retiree health benefits taking effect in 2008, or who elect to
combine service in the state retirement system with service in the public school employees
retirement system." Individuals in special service classes consist primarily of hazardous duty
employees, legislators, and judges. The pension benefits for these individuals follow distinct
rules, including earlier retirement ages and/or different accrual factors. Employees with class
A-3 or A-4 service are affected by major pension legislation enacted in late 2010 and also
follow different eligibility and benefit rules. I further restrict the sample to employees at
agencies participating in the Retired Employees Health Plan (REHP). The resulting sample
contains information on 48,271 people.
The major limitation of the data available for this analysis is that it does not include
month and day of birth. Access to this information has been restricted due to concerns about
1 2The data also include individuals who worked prior to 2000 and had not retired by January 1, 2000, but
they are not used in the analysis.
"I also exclude a small number of individuals with missing or inconsistent data.
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identity theft in the release of employee records. I treat all individuals as if their birthday
is on January 1. Because behavioral responses to changes in eligibility associated with
changes in age appear to occur very rapidly after each birthday, this treatment minimizes
the importance of measurement error.
The initial distribution of service and wages at age 50 used to simulate histories in
the estimation of the model is the empirical distribution in the data. Table 1 shows the
distribution of service and salary for employees at age 50. Salaries for most employees
lie between $20,000 and $60,000. Roughly 40 percent of employees have salaries between
$20,000 and $40,000 and a similar share have salaries between $40,000 and $60,000. Most of
the remaining employees have salaries between $60,000 and $100,000, though a small number
of individuals with very low salaries or higher salaries are present in the data.
Service is distributed much more uniformly. At least 9 percent of the sample has service
in each five year bin between zero and 35 years of service. The most common group is that
with 25-30 years of service, who make up 23 percent of the sample. This group consists
of employees who joined the state workforce in their early 20s and have remained with it
for their entire career. However, 12 percent of the sample of 50-year-old employees joined
the state workforce in the last five years. As would be expected, there is a strong, positive
correlation between the wage at age 50 and service at age 50.
2.3.2 Identification
The parameters of the baseline model are (#, cT, k, p, ao). I identify the model using the
distribution of retirements by age within cohorts defined by service at age 50. Because
individuals are only observed between 2000 and 2011, I introduce an indicator for non-
missing observations into the moment condition to ensure that it can be computed for all
observations. Thus the moment functions are
gaki = 1{i non-missing at age a}
x (1 {retire at age a, member of service cohort k} - Pak), (2.8)
where a denotes age, k denotes the cohort defined by service at age 50, i denotes the individ-
ual, and pak denotes the retirement rate simulated from the model. Let g (0) be the vector of
mean values for each gak and candidate parameter vector 0 = (p3, a, k, p, Ac). I use all com-
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binations of a E [53, 67] and k E {3, 4, 5,15,16, 17,18, 24, 25, 26} in the estimation. These
particular service cohorts are chosen so as to capture the important differences in eligibility.
Service cohorts with 3, 4, and 5 years of service become eligible for subsidized retiree health
insurance at age 62, 61, and 60. All three become eligible for normal retirement at age 60.
Service cohorts with 15, 16, 17, and 18 years of service become eligible for subsidized retiree
health insurance at 60, 59, 58, and 57. Again all three cohorts become eligible for normal
retirement at age 60. Finally, cohorts with 24, 25, and 26 years of service become eligible
for retiree health benefits before age 53, but become eligible for normal retirement at 60, 60,
and 59, respectively.
2.3.3 Estimation
I estimate the model via the method of simulated moments (MSM)." The MSM estimation
procedure selects parameters such that the difference between the simulated moments arising
from the model and their counterparts in the data is as small as possible. Distance is
measured by a generalized method of moments (GMM) objective function. For any candidate
value 0 of the parameter vector, calculating the objective takes five steps:
1. Solve via backwards recursion the dynamic programming problem described in equa-
tions (2.6) and (2.7) conditional on 0.
2. Sample, with replacement, 2.5 million observations from the distribution of wages and
service at age 50 in the data.
3. Use the decision rules associated with the solution to the dynamic programming prob-
lem to simulate retirement behavior for these observations.
4. Evaluate the moments g (0) defined in equation (2.8) using the simulated work histories.
5. Compute the objective, g (0)' Wg (0).
The fitted values are obtained by minimizing this objective. While analytic results for the
variance of this estimator exist, in this application their performance appears poor, most
14 MSM estimation has been extensively applied in the retirement literature (see, e.g., Berkovec and Stern
(1991), Gustman and Steinmeier (2005), French and Jones (2011)). The formal properties were developed
in Pakes and Pollard (1989).
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likely due to a poor approximation to the gradient of the objective function. I therefore
obtain standard errors via bootstrapping.
Because the model is a simple representation of a complicated life-cycle decision, it will
necessarily be misspecified. In misspecified models, the choice of the weighting matrix can
have an important influence on the estimated parameter values. In order to ensure mean-
ingful estimates, I use the identity matrix. This choice means that the estimation will seek
to minimize squared deviations between the simulated retirement densities and the observed
values. The estimation will therefore penalize any given deviation between the observed
retirement density and the simulated retirement density the same, regardless of the age at
which it occurs. This is an intuitively appealing approach as it fits the model based on
the regions where the economically interesting behavior takes place. In contrast, efficient
estimation techniques, which weight the moments according to their variance, place greatest
weight on the moments with the least variance. In this application, low-variance moments
tend to be those combinations of age and service where few individuals retire. Fitting the
model with the greatest emphasis on combinations of age and service where few people retire
seems undesirable.1 5
2.4 Fit and results
The parameter estimates for five variants of the life-cycle model described are shown in
Table 2. In the first specification, values for the discount factor and the coefficient of relative
risk aversion are imposed rather than estimated. In the second, the coefficient of relative
risk aversion is estimated, and in the third, both the discount factor and the coefficient
of relative risk aversion are estimated. All parameters are of the expected sign and of
reasonable magnitude, though the utility cost of work is modest. Values between 0.06 and
0.13 indicate that work is equivalent to a 6-13 percent reduction in consumption. In all three
specifications, the persistence of disutility shocks is high, in excess of 0.80. Innovations in
the cost of work attenuate only modestly over extended periods. The estimated discount
factor of 0.82 is substantially less than one, indicating that utility realized several years in
the future has relatively little weight in determining behavior today, but is consistent with
15 For the purpose of computing the overidentification test statistic, it is, of course, necessary to use the
efficient estimator. In practice, it turns out that the differences between the estimated parameter values
using different weighting matrices are relatively modest.
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previous estimates of the option value model. The parameter estimates are quite precise,
except for the coefficient of relative risk aversion. (The estimated standard errors shown in
the table are preliminary and subject to revision.)
Column four presents the baseline specification. It introduces an exogenous probability
of separation at each age. The estimated value for this parameter is 0.016. As turnover
remains positive even in the years immediately before large pension payoffs, this addition to
the model substantially improves its explanatory power and is consistent with the empirical
facts. It may capture events, such as a medical condition in the family, that induce seemingly
inexplicable retirements because the response is relatively insensitive to financial incentives.
In the baseline specification, the discount factor is 0.80, the coefficient of relative risk aversion
5.3, and the utility cost of labor 0.11.
Compared to estimates of the option value model reported in Stock and Wise (1990),
the coefficient of relative risk aversion estimated here is larger and the utility cost of labor
somewhat smaller. The estimated discount rates are quite similar and the utility innovations
are not directly comparable as a result of differences in the modeling. Fitting the option
value model to data for Missouri teachers, Ni and Podgursky (2011) estimate a much smaller
discount rate (i.e. # closer to 1), lower risk aversion, and greater utility cost of work in a
slightly different specification of the model.
To provide a transparent assessment of the fit, Figure 1 presents the empirical and simu-
lated moments for the 10 service cohorts used to estimate the model. The empirical moments
are computed from the data and the simulated moments are computed from the baseline
specification. Recall that the service cohorts are defined by service at age 50 and the mo-
ments are the retirement densities multiplied by a non-censorship indicator. For example,
the first plot shows the observed density of retirements by age for employees who have three
years of service at age 50 multiplied by the censorship indicator. The second plot does the
same for the cohort with four years of service at age 50. Because the probability of observing
an individual at each age is smoothly decreasing in age, the density's overall shape can be
interpreted as if it were the true density, but the absolute level at older ages will be reduced.
There are two key takeaways from Figure 1. First, comparing the black and gray lines
within each plot allows for an assessment of the model's ability to match the empirical
retirement density for that cohort. While obviously imperfect, the overall quality of the fit
is quite good for a parsimonious model such as the one estimated in this chapter. Second,
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looking across plots, as the shape of the empirical retirement density changes the simulated
density closely tracks these changes.
The height of the y-axis in each plot reflects the number of people in each cohort in
the estimation sample. There are many more 50 year-olds with 26 years of service than 50
year-olds with three years of service and thus the retirement density for the 26-year cohort
exceeds that for the 3-year cohort. As a result, comparing the size of the spikes across plots
is relatively uninteresting. Instead the insight is obtained from comparing their shapes. The
shapes are determined by the features of the retirement benefit programs.
The dominant feature of the empirical retirement density for the cohorts with 3, 4, and
5 years of service is a large increase in the number of retirements at the age of eligibility for
subsidized retiree health insurance, age 62, 61, and 60 respectively, followed by an elevated
level of retirements through age 62, the Social Security early retirement age. The simulated
densities show the same qualitative behavior, but they have difficulty matching the empirical
magnitudes. In addition, the 4 and 5-year cohorts show a larger number of retirements at age
62 than at age 60.16 Because low tenure individuals have relatively little pension wealth, the
simulated work histories produced by the model tend to involve somewhat later retirement
than those in the data. Many of these individuals likely leave for another employment
opportunity, because of resources available via a spouse, or for a similar reason. All of these
potential channels are beyond the scope of the current model.
The cohorts with 15, 16, 17, and 18 years of service become eligible for normal retirement
at age 60 and subsidized retiree health insurance at ages 60, 59, 58, and 57 respectively. The
empirical retirement densities show a sharp increase in retirements at the eligibility age for
subsidized retiree health insurance and an even greater increase at the normal retirement
age. The simulated densities provide an excellent fit to these two features. They slightly
understate the number of retirements exactly at the normal retirement age. In addition,
when the eligibility age for subsidized retiree health insurance occurs in the late 50s and
there is a gap between that age and the normal retirement age, the frequency of retirements
in the data falls off between the two eligibility ages. In contrast, the simulated densities level
off between the two eligibility ages, but do not decrease outright.
16Modeling the ability of retirees to take a partial lump sum to smooth consumption around the Social
Security early retirement age could alleviate this behavior, but would reduce the ability of the model to
explain retirements at the Social Security early retirement age. Understanding exactly when individuals
respond to the early retirement age under this institutional regime is an interesting and open question.
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Finally, the cohorts with 24, 25, and 26 years of service at age 50 are eligible for subsidized
retiree health insurance at all ages shown and become eligible for normal retirement at
ages 60, 60, and 59 respectively. In each case the empirical density shows a large spike in
retirements at the age of eligibility for normal retirement. The simulated densities show a
similar shape; however, they also show a large number of retirements one year before the
normal retirement age that is not present in the data. These are individuals who intended to
work to the normal retirement age, but who are hit with a substantial (positive) innovation
in the utility cost of work at age 59. As a result of the shock, they decide the relatively
modest additional pension benefit associated with one additional year of work is not worth it
and they retire immediately." In addition, the empirical densities show a sharply increasing
density of retirements at age 55. This is particularly pronounced in the 25-year cohort. I am
unaware of any institutional explanation for this behavior. It may simply reflect individuals
using age 55 as a focal age before which they are relatively unwilling to consider retirement.
As would be expected from the visual evidence, a formal overidentification test of the
model using the fitted moments strongly rejects in all specifications. Given the quantity
of data available (nearly 50,000 employees) and the parsimonious nature of the model, this
result is not surprising. The parameters are estimated precisely and the model is surely
an incomplete representation of reality. Despite this test result, the model can still help us
think about behavior under alternative policy regimes. It clearly captures some underlying
economic influences on decision-making as shown in Figure 1.
To provide an additional test of the model's fit and some additional assurance that policy
simulations performed with the model offer useful insights, Figure 2 presents a comparison of
the empirical and simulated moments parallel to that shown in Figure 1 for 10 service cohorts
not used in the estimation of the model. These service cohorts have 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 19,
20, 22, and 23 years of service at age 50. As these moments were not used in the estimation,
there is no reason that the simulated moments must necessarily match the empirical moments
except to the extent that the underlying model is able to capture something about the forces
driving individual behavior. Again, the overall quality of the match is quite good, though
the comparison shows some of the same limitations as were evident in Figure 1. The cohorts
with 6-14 years of service all become eligible for normal retirement and subsidized retiree
1 7 For example, consider an individual who planned to work until the normal retirement age, but whose
spouse receives a negative medical diagnosis when the employee is 59. Quite reasonably, the employee may
decide that the final year of work is not worth it.
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health insurance at age 60 and Social Security at age 62. In each case, the empirical cohorts
show a sharp spike at age 60. In the lower-tenure cohorts, there is an additional spike at age
62 and an elevated but not quite as large number of retirements at age 61. In the 12, 13,
and 14-year cohorts, there is an elevated level of retirements at age 62, but it is substantially
lower than the level at age 60. For the lower-tenure cohorts the simulated densities again
understate the importance of the normal retirement age relative to the Social Security early
retirement age. For the higher-tenure cohorts, the model provides a good fit with the normal
retirement age becoming relatively more important as the employee's level of pension wealth
increases. The 20, 22, and 23-year cohorts become eligible for normal retirement at age 60.
In each case the spike in the simulated density closely matches the spike in the empirical
density. The 20-year cohort also becomes eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance at
age 55. The empirical density shows a somewhat larger spike than the simulated density.
It is quite common in the retirement literature for models to be unable to explain the full
size of the spikes at key eligibility ages if they do not include an ad hoc age-specific effect (see,
e.g. Coile and Gruber (2007)). While the model estimated here does a reasonably good job of
matching behavior at key eligibility ages and tracking those eligibility thresholds when they
occur at different ages for different individuals, it leaves room for improvement. As one way of
examining how much behavior remains to be explained, the final specification shown in Table
2 introduces an ad hoc utility bonus for working at age 59. The estimated value of 0.07 for
the utility bonus reduces the mean cost of work by nearly two-thirds. Introducing this ad hoc
parameter reduces the value of the GMM criterion function by about 40 percent, indicating
that it substantially improves the explanatory power of the model. Figure 3 presents the
same comparison of empirical and simulated moments under this alternative specification.
It offers a modest improvement in fit for the 3, 4, and 5-year cohorts. However, as the
challenge for the model with these cohorts is finding enough individuals willing to leave the
workforce, a utility bonus for continued work is of relatively little use. There is a notable
improvement in fit for each of the remaining cohorts. For the 15 through 18-year cohorts the
simulated and empirical densities match almost exactly. For the 24 through 26-year cohorts,
the understatement of the spike in the hazard at the normal retirement age is reduced and
the elevated level of retirements in the year before the normal retirement age is eliminated.
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2.5 The effect of alternative policy regimes
This section presents simulated retirement distributions for a set of 50-year-old employees
under three alternative policy regimes. Each of the three policies reduces the generosity of
retirement benefits along the lines of current policy discussion. The simulation results are
computed using the parameter estimates for specification four as shown in Table 2.
2.5.1 The effect of eliminating subsidized RHI before age 60
Employees become eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance regardless of age once they
reach 25 years of service. The first alternative policy eliminates subsidized health insurance
prior to age 60. Regardless of service, employees must now work until age 60 to become
eligible for subsidized RHI.
Figure 4A shows the distribution of retirements by age for 10 service cohorts. The service
cohorts are defined by service at age 50. For example, the first plot shows the distribution
of retirements by age for the set of employees who had worked for the state for three years
at age 50. The dashed line in each plot indicates age 60. Figure 4B shows the change in the
distribution of retirements relative to current policy.18 Employees with 3, 4, and 5 years of
service at age 50 become eligible for subsidized retiree health insurance under the alternative
policy at age 62, 61, and 60, respectively. In each case the number of separations occurring
before eligibility is quite low. Then, at the age of initial eligibility for subsidized RHI, the
number of separations jumps dramatically. It jumps further at the Social Security early
retirement age before declining slowly through the late 60s. Since these employees were not
eligible for subsidized RHI prior to age 60 under current policy, their behavior was unaffected
by the change in policy. This is confirmed by the first three plots in Figure 4B. Each of the
remaining cohorts becomes eligible for subsidized RHI under the alternative policy at age 60.
For each cohort, Figure 4A shows a large mass of retirements exactly at age 60. For cohorts
with less service, and therefore less pension wealth, some employees remain on the job until
age 62 when they become eligible for Social Security benefits. However, as service increases
retirements are clustered more and more tightly at age 60. The cohort with 15 years of
18 To avoid unnecessarily convoluted language, the discussion in this section will refer to the pension
and health benefits described in section two as current policy. However, many employees are now (i.e. in
2013) covered by a less generous pension plan and/or subject to more stringent eligibility requirements for
subsidized RI. Recall that these employees are excluded from the estimation sample.
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service would become eligible for subsidized RHI at age 60 under current policy and so, like
the first three cohorts considered, is unaffected by the policy. All of the remaining cohorts
are affected by the policy. The plots of Figure 4B indicate that in each case, the effect of
the more restrictive eligibility requirement is a nearly complete elimination of retirements
prior to the eligibility threshold with the overwhelming majority of the delayed retirements
occurring in the first year of eligibility under the new regime.
These stark findings about the elimination of subsidized RHI reflect the empirical fact
that very few individuals retire before eligibility for subsidized RHI under current law. The
absence of pre-eligibility retirements can be seen in the empirical densities shown in Figures
1-3 and is discussed at great length in Leiserson (2013).
2.5.2 The effect of a flat 20 percent cut in pension benefits
The current pension computation provides an initial benefit at the normal retirement age
equal to 2.5 percent of average earnings for each year of service. The second alternative
policy imposes a flat 20 percent cut in benefits by reducing the initial benefit to 2 percent
of average earnings for each year of service. 9 This policy makes no changes in the eligibility
rules for benefits, but reduces the level of benefits provided at all potential retirement dates.
Figures 5A and 5B present the distribution of retirements by age and the change in the
distribution relative to current policy for the same 10 service cohorts considered previously.
Unlike the change in eligibility for subsidized RHI, this across-the-board cut in pension
benefits affects all cohorts. Figure 5B indicates the reduction in benefits induces a shift
in the distribution towards older ages. By reducing the level of retirement consumption
available to the state's employees, the policy leads to longer careers and delayed retirement.
While the change in eligibility for subsidized RHI shifted a large number of retirements
into the first year of eligibility under the new policy, the effect of the benefit cut is much
more disperse. Retirements over a range of ages are delayed and the delayed retirements
appear over a range of older ages. However, the small number of retirements that occur
before eligibility for subsidized RHI are basically unaffected. A reduction in retirements first
appears at age 62 for the 3-year cohort, at age 61 for the 4-year cohort, and at age 60 for the
19 The pension cuts enacted by the Pennsylvania state legislature in 2010 included this change in the
computation of benefits. New employees could choose to receive benefits under the 2.5 percent formula if
they made contributions to the plan at a higher rate.
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5-year cohort. Each of these ages is the age of eligibility for subsidized RHI. While there is a
small reduction in the number of retirements at age 59 in the 15-year cohort, a quantitatively
significant effect first appears at age 60, when the members of this cohort become eligible for
subsidized RHI. The effect shows up at age 59 in the 16-year cohort, 58 in the 17-year cohort,
and 57 in the 16-year cohort, again tracking eligibility for subsidized RHI. As individuals in
the 24, 25, and 26-year cohorts are eligible for subsidized RHI throughout their 50s, delayed
retirements appear over a broad range of ages. The results emphasize the interaction of the
health and pension benefits in determining retirement behavior. The effect of an across-the-
board cut in pension benefits on retirement depends in an important way on whether the
individuals are eligible for subsidized RHI or not.
2.5.3 The effect of delaying the normal retirement age to 62
The third and final alternative policy increases the normal retirement age from 60 to 62.
Under this alternative policy, employees continue to become eligible for normal retirement
at any age with 35 years of service. 0 This policy reduces pension benefits for all employees
retiring before age 62 by increasing the early retirement reduction, while leaving benefits
unchanged for those retiring at or after 62.
Figure 6A shows the distribution of retirements under this alternative policy and Figure
6B shows the change in the distribution of retirements relative to current policy again for
the same 10 service cohorts. The 3-year cohort is unaffected by the policy. Employees were
not eligible for subsidized RHI until age 62, and the individuals choosing to retire before
that age are not induced to continue working as a result of the reduction in pension benefits.
Employees in the 4 and 5-year cohorts show very small effects of the policy. Many of these
employees were choosing to delay retirement until age 62 because they could not receive
Social Security benefits until that age and the individuals retiring before 62 are relatively
insensitive to the change in the normal retirement age. The cohorts with 15, 16, 17, and
18 years of service show a modest effect of the increase in the normal retirement age. In
each case, a small number of individuals who would have retired after becoming eligible
for subsidized RHI but before age 62 choose to delay their retirement. A similar effect is
20This is a more modest version of a benefit cut imposed by the Pennsylvania state legislature in 2010.
The normal retirement age for new employees was increased to 65 and additional restrictions were placed on
eligibility for long-service employees.
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apparent in the 24-year cohort, but with a longer tail. In all cases, the delayed retirements
overwhelmingly occur at age 62, when employees become eligible for normal retirement.
The 25 and 26-year cohorts are unaffected by the policy as they become eligible for normal
retirement upon reaching 35 years of service at or before age 60.
2.5.4 Qualifications of the simulation results
The model is unable to perfectly fit the data under current policy, and, as discussed in
the previous section, an overidentification test rejects. For these reasons, it is important to
consider how the model's weaknesses may manifest themselves in the quality of the policy
simulations. One weakness of the model is its inability to explain the number of retirements
before eligibility for subsidized RHI among short-service (i.e. low pension wealth) employees.
This weakness suggests that the simulation results for restrictions in eligibility for subsidized
RHI may conclude that too few retirements would occur before the delayed eligibility thresh-
old. It would be reasonable to expect a somewhat higher level of separations in the late 50s
under the new regime.
A second weakness of the model is its tendency to place too much emphasis on the Social
Security early retirement age for short-service employees. Because these employees have
relatively little pension wealth, the assumptions of the model would suggest they should
retire somewhat later.2 2 Incorporating this limitation would suggest that the increase in the
normal retirement age from 60 to 62 might have a somewhat larger effect as some individuals
the model expects to already wait until 62 in order to retire would not be doing so.
2.6 Conclusion
Financial pressures on public sector budgets have motivated an array of policy proposals
relating to the provision of health care and health insurance. Because health care represents
a large share of consumption at older ages, these policies can be expected to have important
implications for individual retirement decisions. This chapter estimates a simple life-cycle
21The delayed retirements for the 24-year cohort show up at age 61 because individuals become eligible
for normal retirement under the 35 years of service provision at that age.22 This weakness could reflect the assumption that individuals do not use the pension plan's partial lump-
sum option to smooth consumption around the Social Security early retirement age. However, since an effect
of the Social Security early retirement age is apparent in the data, no perfect option exists.
99
model of retirement behavior using data for state employees in Pennsylvania. The model
successfully reproduces the three key features of the data: a very low rate of retirement
prior to eligibility for retiree health benefits, a sharp jump in the rate of retirement at the
eligibility threshold for retiree health benefits, and a large mass of retirements at the normal
retirement age.
The fitted model is used to simulate retirement behavior under alternative policy regimes.
Restricting eligibility for retiree health benefits sharply reduces retirements in the years
between the current eligibility threshold and the new eligibility threshold. Motivated by
their desire for health insurance, these employees instead retire in the first year of eligibility
under the new rules. Changes in pension benefits generate smaller responses. A two-year
increase in the normal retirement age shifts the distribution of retirements between the old
and new normal retirement age, but, in contrast to the restriction in eligibility for RHI,
many individuals continue to retire before eligibility for normal retirement. An across-the-
board cut in pension benefits leads to a more disperse shift in the distribution of retirements
towards older ages.
The findings point to the shortcomings of existing models that do not incorporate eligi-
bility requirements for retiree health benefits or their interaction with eligibility for pension
benefits. These institutional features are first-order determinants of retirement behavior.
Evaluating policy changes without precise knowledge of the rules will fail to distinguish be-
tween different policies that can have quite different effects, assuming the chosen method is
even capable of analyzing the reforms at all.
Substantial additional work remains to be done in this area. Overidentification tests reject
the current model, as is essentially always the case in life-cycle estimation. Understanding
the sources of heterogeneity that drive otherwise similar individuals to exit the labor force
at different ages remains a work in progress. In light of the results of this chapter, one
important goal for future work is to construct richer datasets that contain both details of
the institutional regime and information on individual characteristics. Existing work largely
makes unpleasant choices between administrative data that prioritizes the former and survey
data that prioritizes the latter.
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Table 1. Joint Distribution of Annual Earnings at Age 50 (2005$) and Service
for Pennsylvania State Employees
Service at age 50
Earnings at age 50 (thousands of 2005 dollars)
< 20 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-99 100-119 120-139 140-5 b+
334 4,486
0.69 9.29
30 4,001
0.06
8
0.02
8.29
3,248
6.73
723 162
1.5 0.34
1,145
2.37
1,848
3.83
4 2,671 3,045
0.01 5.53 6.31
205
0.42
316
0.65
754
1.56
4 1,864 4,302 1,674
0.01 3.86 8.91 3.47
2 1,677 5,467 3,092
0 3.47 11.33
1 844 2,713
0 1.75 5.62
6.41
723
86
0.18
91
0.19
41
0.08
37
0.08
144 59
0.3 0.12
277
0.57
539
1.12
838
1.74
100
1.5 0.21
383 18,791 19,243 6,926 2,075
0.79 38.93 39.86 14.35
91
0.19
222
0.46
189
0.39
19
0.04
658
4.3 1.36
8
0.02
12
0.02
23
0.05
30
0.06
40
0.08
19
0.04
2
0
134
0.28
4
0.01
5
0.01
12
0.02
9
0.02
9
0.02
5
0.01
0
0
44
0.09
1
0
1
0
3
0.01
8
0.02
0
0
5,845
12.11
5,527
11.45
5,661
11.73
6,889
14.27
8,654
17.93
4 11,293
0.01
0
0
17
0.04
23.39
4,402
9.12
48,271
100
Note: Joint distribution of annual earnings at age 50 (2005$) and service at age 50 in the estimation sample. Estimation sample consists of employees who retired at or after
age 50 under the institutional regime described in section two; maintained stable, full-time employment records with the state leading up to retirement; had never previously
retired from state employment at the time of their retirement; and had never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school
employee in Pennsylvania. For individuals who were already 50 by the end of 1999, earnings are projected backwards to age 50 according to the salary growth assumptions
used to perform actuarial valuations of the pension plan for Pennsylvania state employees.
at Age 50
-t
0-4 years
5-9 years
10-14 years
15-19 years
20-24 years
25-29 years
30-34 years
Total
< 20 20-39 40-59 60-79 80-99 100-119 120-139 140-159 160+ Total
Table 2. Parameter Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
0: discount factor
a: coeff. of relative risk aversion
0.90
(.)
1.00
0.90 0.82 0.80 0.81
(.) (0.010) (0.006) (0.003)
3.65 4.95 5.28 5.23
(.) (0.20) (0.71) (0.55) (0.13)
k: disutility of labor 0.06 0.13 0.11 0.11
(0.0010) (0.0015) (0.0032) (0.0019) (0.0011)
p: persistence of disutility shocks
oE: standard dev. of disutility shocks
p: exogenous separation probability
r: utility bonus for work at age 59
0.93 0.86 0.84 0.81 0.83
(0.0025) (0.0037) (0.0080) (0.0047) (0.0027)
0.16 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0009) (0.0005)
0.016 0.018
(0.0005) (0.0003)
0.07
(0.002)
Note: Method of simulated moments estimates of the behavioral model described in section two with standard errors in
parentheses. Parameter values imposed in the estimation indicated by a standard error of (-). Estimation sample consists of
employees who retired at or after age 50 under the institutional regime described in section two; maintained stable, full-time
employment records with the state leading up to retirement; had never previously retired from state employment at the time
of their retirement; and had never elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public
school employee in Pennsylvania.
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Note: Plots show the empirical moments computed from the data and the simulated moments computed from the fitted model using specification four as shown in Table 2.
Parameter estimates obtained via method of simulated moments estimation. The moments, described in more detail in section three, are empirical retirement densities with
censored observations set to zero. The estimation sample consists of employees who retired at or after age 50 under the institutional regime described in section two; maintained
stable, full-time employment records with the state leading up to retirement; had never previously retired from state employment at the time of their retirement; and had never
elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania.
Figure 2. Simulated and Empirical Retirement Densities by Service at Age 50 in the Baseline Specification,
Select Service Cohorts Not Used in the Estimation of the Structural Model
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censored observations set to zero. The estimation sample consists of employees who retired at or after age 50 under the institutional regime described in section two; maintained
stable, full-time employment records with the state leading up to retirement; had never previously retired from state employment at the time of their retirement; and had never
elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania.
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Figure 3. Simulated and Empirical Retirement Densities by Service at Age 50
in the Specification With an Ad Hoc Bonus for Working at Age 59,
Service Cohorts Used in the Estimation of the Structural Model
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Note: Plots show the empirical moments computed from the data and the simulated moments computed from the fitted model using specification four as shown in Table 2.
Parameter estimates obtained via method of simulated moments estimation. The moments, described in more detail in section three, are empirical retirement densities with
censored observations set to zero. The estimation sample consists of employees who retired at or after age 50 under the institutional regime described in section two; maintained
stable, full-time employment records with the state leading up to retirement; had never previously retired from state employment at the time of their retirement; and had never
elected to determine pension benefits jointly for service as a state employee and as a public school employee in Pennsylvania.
Figure 4. Eliminate Subsidized Retiree Health Insurance Before Age 60
A. Expected Retirement Counts by Age and Service at Age 50
for a 100,000 Person Population
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B. Change in Retirement Counts Relative to Current Law
by Age and Service at Age 50 for a 100,000 Person Population
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Note: Figure 4A presents expected counts of retirements by age and service at age 50 for a 100,000 person population under the
stated policy change. Expected counts are computed using specification four of the fitted model as shown in Table 2. Figure
4B shows the change in the counts under the alternative policy relative to those for current law.
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Figure 5. Reduce Initial Pension Benefit by 20 Percent
A. Expected Retirement Counts by Age and Service at Age 50
for a 100,000 Person Population
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B. Change in Retirement Counts Relative to Current Law
by Age and Service at Age 50 for a 100,000 Person Population
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Figure 5A presents expected counts of retirements by age and service at age 50 for a 100,000 person population under the stated
policy change. Expected counts are computed using specification four of the fitted model as shown in Table 2. Figure 5B shows
the change in the counts under the alternative policy relative to those for current law.
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Figure 6. Increase Normal Retirement Age to 62
A. Expected Retirement Counts by Age and Service at Age 50
for a 100,000 Person Population
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Note: Figure 6A presents expected counts of retirements by age and service at age 50 for a 100,000 person population under the
stated policy change. Expected counts are computed using specification four of the fitted model as shown in Table 2. Figure
6B shows the change in the counts under the alternative policy relative to those for current law.
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Chapter 3
The Design of Public Sector Pension
Benefits
Abstract
Public sector pension plans create complicated incentives in favor of continued work at some
ages and in favor of retirement at others. The strength of these incentives depends on many
factors, including the age of initial employment, the number of years on the job, and the rate
at which earnings grow over time. Because employees differ along all of these dimensions,
the value of the pension benefits earned over the course of a career varies substantially-even
among retirees with the same total earnings. This chapter investigates the incentive effects
and distributional consequences of four stylized plan designs: a final average salary plan,
a final average salary plan with percentage reductions for early retirement, an inflation-
adjusted career average salary plan, and an indexed career-average salary plan with variable
accrual factors. It derives simple formulas for the accrual rate of pension wealth and the
distribution of benefits under each of the four plans and uses these formulas to gain insight
into the incentives and risks they create. Indexed career-average plans with variable accrual
factors offer policymakers an opportunity to redesign their pension plans in a way that
maintains their defined benefit nature while at the same time directly controlling the work
incentives created by the plans, limiting arbitrary redistributive patterns across employees,
and limiting incentives for individuals to manipulate earnings and labor supply in ways that
do not advance public policy objectives.
This work builds on previous joint work with Peter Diamond, Alicia Munnell, and Jean-Pierre Aubry.
See, e.g., Diamond et al. (2010). I also thank Jim Poterba and Jon Gruber for valuable feedback. This
research was supported by the National Institute on Aging, Grant Number T32-AG0000186, and by the
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation. All mistakes are my own.
111
3.1 Introduction
The overwhelming majority of public sector employee pension plans follow a traditional de-
fined benefit (DB) structure. When employees retire, they receive an initial benefit equal
to the product of three pieces: (1) an accrual factor specified in the plan rules, (2) some
notion of average earnings, and (3) the number of years on the job. In contrast, the defined
contribution plans more common in the private sector do not specify a level of benefits af-
ter retirement. Instead, they provide employees with a contribution each year during the
career that employees invest in a menu of financial products determined by the plan. When
employees retire, they can use whatever funds they have accumulated in their investment
account to support retirement consumption. In theory, and as suggested by the two names,
the essential difference between defined benefit pension plans and defined contribution pen-
sion plans is the employee's exposure to risk in asset market returns. In practice, however,
existing defined benefit plans combine insurance against market risk with two additional-
and inessential-features: a complicated set of incentives affecting labor supply decisions
and a new source of risk in the adequacy of retirement savings arising from uncertain future
labor market outcomes.
Traditional DB plan designs provide substantially larger pension benefits to those retirees
whose work history follows particular patterns implicit in the plan provisions. By linking
the level of pension benefits in retirement to the work history in this fashion, the plans
create strong financial incentives for employees to follow these particular patterns of work
and retirement. These incentives affect numerous different decision-making margins. The
decision most frequently studied is that of a current employee considering whether and how
long to remain on the job (Brown (2013), Chalmers et al. (2012), Friedberg (2011), Munnell
et al. (2012a)). The plans also affect the decisions to work overtime, increase responsibilities,
or pursue a promotion. Similarly, they affect whether potential new hires accept job offers
and whether former employees attempt to return to the employer at older ages after several
years elsewhere.
Whether the pension plan encourages work or discourages work at any particular age
depends on numerous demographic, economic, and institutional factors, including the age at
which an employee begins working for a public sector employer, the existence and duration
of any gaps in the work history, and the pattern of earnings growth over the career. Be-
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cause employees differ along all of these dimensions, the incentives created by the pension
plan during the career, and the corresponding value of retirement benefits received after
the conclusion of the career, vary substantially, even for employees with the same lifetime
earnings.
By providing enhanced benefits to employees who follow particular patterns of work and
retirement and thus creating incentives for certain labor supply behavior, traditional DB
plans necessarily provide reduced benefits to those employees who do not follow the specified
patterns. Thus, the mirror image of the labor supply incentives created by the plans is a set
of risks that an employee is unable or unwilling to follow the rewarded patterns. These risks
can arise for reasons beyond employee control, such as poor health events, financial shocks,
government fiscal conditions, and changes in government policy. Or they may arise from
learning about preferences, consumption needs, and other personal economic conditions that
cause an employee to desire to follow a career path different from that which she expected.
As a means of insurance against these risks individuals may accumulate additional personal
savings outside the pension plan. They may also be less inclined to accept the job in the
first place because of the risk.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide simple formulas for the work incentives
and the distribution of benefits generated by four pension designs: a nominal high-three
average pension with actuarial early and delayed retirement, a nominal high-three average
pension with percentage reductions for early retirement, an inflation-adjusted career average
pension with actuarial early retirement, and an indexed career-average pension with variable
accrual factors and actuarial early and delayed retirement. The formulas both develop our
intuition about how and why existing policies affect labor market behavior and employee
welfare and also facilitate the construction of alternative designs that preserve the defined
benefit structure but allow for complete control over the other outcomes of the plan. For
example, the financial incentive for continued employment in pension plans using high-three
formulas, which base the pension benefits off a simple average of the three highest-earning
years of the career, depends on trend inflation rates. If trend inflation is one percent the
incentive for continued employment is lower than if it is three percent. It is not clear why this
dependence on inflation would be a desired feature of a pension plan. Similarly, the financial
incentive for an individual with 10 years of experience to remain on the job depends on
whether that individual started working for the public sector employer at age 35 or at age
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45. Most arguments for retention incentives in pension plans suggest the use of service, not
age.
A second purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear exposition of the incentives as-
sociated with different pension plans so that policymakers can choose to design plans with
particular incentives. A common critique of proposals to replace existing pensions with al-
ternatives that have more neutral work incentives (e.g. cash balance plans) is that such plans
eliminate certain desired labor supply incentives, throwing out the baby with the bathwater.
An oft-cited goal is to provide incentives for more experienced workers to remain on the job.
The fourth class of pension plans examined in this chapter, the indexed career-average with
variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustments for early and delayed retirement, can be
used to construct pension plans that achieve the desired incentives without including the
irrelevant incentives embedded in current designs. It maintains the defined benefit nature of
the pension plans while at the same time directly controlling the work incentives created by
the plans, limiting arbitrary redistributive patterns across employees, and limiting incentives
for individuals to manipulate earnings and labor supply in ways that do not advance public
policy objectives.
The contribution of this analysis relative to previous analyses is the focus on simple
analytic formulas that provide a framework for thinking about incentives in the general class
of public sector DB plans. As state and local government budget pressures continue to
push in the direction of pension cuts, one way of reducing the harm of such cuts on public
sector employees is to redesign the benefits so the plans use a given quantity of resources
to greater effect. In such an environment, a general understanding of pension design will
be crucial. Existing work has derived quantitative estimates of the pension incentives in
particular plans (Costrell and Podgursky (2009), Johnson et al. (2012)), derived estimates
implicitly in pursuit of some other objective (Stock and Wise (1990), Samwick (1998)), or
focused on particular channels through which the pension plans affect behavior (Diamond
et al. (2010) on final pay plans, Munnell et al. (2012b) on vesting).
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section two outlines the pension plans
that will be examined. Section three motivates the measures of incentives and risk that
will be analyzed for each plan. Section four works through each of the incentive and risk
measures in turn and section five concludes.
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3.2 Four defined benefit pension plans
This section introduces the four benefit formulas considered in the present analysis. After
discussing each plan, two additional sections detail the assumptions regarding other plan
features, such as cost of living adjustments and death benefits, that will be common across
plans and the economic and demographic assumptions underlying the illustrative numerical
computations.
3.2.1 Nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed
retirement
The nominal high-three pension benefit at the normal retirement age is the product of
average earnings in the three highest earning years of the career (not adjusted for inflation),
the number of years of service, and an accrual factor specified by the plan. Denoting the
benefit by b, the accrual factor by f, and the wage in period t by wt, an employee who retires
at the normal retirement age at the beginning of year t receives an initial benefit given by
1
b= f x servicet x - (Wt_1 + t-2 + t-3).3
The actuarial adjustment for early or delayed retirement is computed such that the expected
benefit for an employee is the same regardless of the age at which she claims it. The initial
benefit is then
1 aNRA t-NR
b= f x servicet x - (Wti + Wt- 2 + Wt-3) x aNRA (1 + r)t NRA,3 at
where a, is the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, NRA is the normal retirement
age, and r is the discount rate used by the plan.1 In the numerical examples, the normal
retirement age is 60 and the accrual factor is 0.015.
The pure nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed retirement is not used in
any plan. However, the nominal high-three formula (or the similar high-five alternative) is
1Note that in plans with actuarial adjustments for both early and delayed retirement, the normal re-
tirement age is a superfluous parameter. For any alternative value of the normal retirement age NRA',
the original level of benefits can be restored by setting the accrual factor according to the equation
'= f x aNRAaNRA' X (1+ )NRA'-NRA
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the core of most existing public sector plans. Thus, an examination of the simplified formula
is useful in developing intuition for the role of the benefit computation in such plans. The key
distinction between the basic plan analyzed here and the plans actually implemented is that
the basic plan drops the strong incentive to leave government employment after the normal
retirement age generated by some combination of (i) a limit on the maximum replacement
rate and (ii) limited or nonexistent increases in the pension benefit for delayed retirement.
3.2.2 Nominal high-three with percentage early retirement
The nominal high-three formula with percentage early retirement and no adjustment for
delayed retirement is widespread in the public sector. In these plans, the initial benefit is
computed as under the nominal high-three of the last subsection if an employee has met the
eligibility requirements for normal retirement, except no adjustment for delayed retirement
is provided. In addition, for employees who choose to retire before the normal retirement
age, an early retirement reduction is applied to the benefit. The initial benefit is given by
1bt = max (0, 1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x - (Wti + Wt- 2 + Wt-3),3
where e is the early retirement reduction rate and NRA is the normal retirement age.
Note that the early retirement reduction will not be actuarially fair, regardless of the early
reduction rate used by the plan, because it is computed as a constant percentage of the benefit
at the normal retirement age, not a constant percentage of the benefit one year ahead. In
the numerical examples, the normal retirement age is 60, the early retirement reduction is
four percent, and the accrual factor is set such that the expected pension payment under
this plan (net of employee contributions) is equal to the nominal high-three with actuarial
early and delayed retirement (0.017).2
2The equivalence computation assumes that the age of new hires follows a uniform distribution from 18
to 55 and that there is no relationship between the age at hire and the initial wage. Separation assumptions
are described in section 2.6.
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3.2.3 Inflation-adjusted career average with actuarial early
retirement
The inflation-adjusted career average pension replaces the short, fixed-length averaging win-
dow of the high-three pension with an average over the entire career. Plans with longer
averaging periods typically also index the salary history to some measure of inflation or
wage growth. The stylized plan modeled here adjusts for inflation. The initial benefit, if
claimed at the normal retirement age, is therefore
t-1(i ~ " x3(1 )NRA-s
b =f x servicet x .service x (1 + 7r Ws
t-1
= f x (1 + 7r)NRA-s WS,
s=t0
where to is the age at which the employee begins covered employment, 7r is the inflation
rate, and (1 + 7r)NRA-s serves to index the wage history for inflation. Note that, in a career
average pension plan, the service term appearing in the benefit formula cancels with the
service term in the computation of average earnings. The stylized plan provides an actuarial
adjustment for early retirement and no adjustment for delayed retirement. The complete
formula is then
1 1 aNRA + t-NRAb= f x servicet x x Z(1+7r)tsw) x min 1, xt +)
In the numerical examples, the normal retirement age is 60 and the accrual factor is set such
that the expected pension payment under this plan (net of employee contributions) is equal
to the nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed retirement (0.021).
Recent public sector pension legislation has tended to lengthen the averaging period for
earnings used to compute the initial benefit. While the economics of plans using a high-three,
high-five, or high-ten measure of earnings are broadly similar, plans that match the averaging
window to the full career behave quite differently. There is also a close relationship between
career-average plans and cash balance plans, which have attracted increasing attention. 3
3 An inflation-adjusted career average plan using accrual factor f and index x (t) is identical to a cash
balance plan with annual contribution f and interest rate x (t + 1) /x (t) in period t.
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3.2.4 Indexed career-average with variable accrual factors and
actuarial early and delayed retirement
The indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors is a flexible design that uses
a indexed salary history computed over the full career and, in addition, allows the accrual
factor to vary with age and service. The initial benefit, if claimed at the normal retirement
age, is
t_1x (N RA)bt - f (a (s), s) x w, x ( )
s~t x (s)S=t0
where f (a, s) is the accrual factor for age and service combination (a, s) and x (t) is the
value of an arbitrary index used to adjust the wage history at time t. Writing a (s) serves
to emphasize that for an individual employee age and service have a fixed relationship con-
ditional on the starting date. The stylized plan offers actuarial adjustments for early and
delayed retirement though, given the plan designer's ability to select f (a, s) , this additional
structure actually imposes few restrictions on the benefit. The initial benefit at any age is
therefore t-1 x (NRA) aA tNRA
bt =Z f (a(s),s) x w, x x (S) a tNr A
S=to
In the numerical examples, the normal retirement age is 60, the annual change in the index
will be set equal to the nominal interest rate, and the accrual factor will be given by the
logistic function in service f (a, s) = 0.012+0.097/ (1 + exp (- (s - 20))) .7 This specification
of the index and the accrual factors is selected to highlight the potential for pension plans
with variable accrual factors to maintain the essential advantages of defined benefit pensions
while inducing labor supply incentives only as desired. One commonly-stated objective is to
encourage retention of experienced employees. An accrual factor that is constant in age and
increases with service could do so. The logistic function is a simple way of modeling a set of
accrual factors which begin at a base level, increase as an employee accumulates additional
service, and eventually level out for long-tenure employees.5 As before, the level is set such
4For a wide variety of reasons, e.g. heterogeneity in risk aversion, financial sophistication, etc., individuals
may behave as if they have different discount rates. The current analysis will abstract from this consideration,
but in thinking about the application of the results of this analysis to real-world policies, this limitation should
be kept in mind.
5 Note that the pension formula does not integrate the product of the accrual factor and indexed wages
over the career, it simply sums the values evaluated at integer combinations of age and service. Since the
legislation governing pension benefits often specifies different plan features in the form of a tables of values,
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that the expected pension payment under this plan (net of employee contributions) is equal
to the nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed retirement.
The indexed wage history is familiar in the U.S. context from Social Security, in which
the benefit formula adjusts the wage history for aggregate growth in wages. Variable accrual
factors are used in some defined benefit plans; however, in such cases, the initial benefit
is typically the product of the sum of the accrual factors and the average wage, i.e. b =
(E f) (E w) , rather than the sum of the product, b = Z fw, as specified above. This choice
will facilitate the direct control of labor supply incentives under this plan by eliminating the
link between the financial incentive for work in the current period and the wages earned in
prior periods.
3.2.5 Features common to all plan designs
Pension plans typically include an array of ancillary benefits in addition to the standard re-
tirement benefit. The most significant of these are the death and disability benefits. Because
these benefits are claimed by relatively few individuals and are not the focus of this chapter,
they are assumed to take a very simple form. If an individual dies or becomes disabled while
covered by the plan, the plan pays out a death or disability benefit equal to the present
value of the retirement benefit to which the employee would be entitled in the next period.
This assumption simplifies the current analysis by eliminating the need to specify formulas
for each of the alternative benefits and incorporate them into the computations. However,
it is an obvious simplification as, especially in cases where death or disability results from
on-the-job activities, the death and disability benefits can be much more generous. In ad-
dition, such a simplification prevents discussion of the incentive effects associated with the
abuse of disability benefits.
A key determinant of the level of benefits and the riskiness of those benefits is the extent
of inflation protection provided by the plan. The plans described here are assumed to have
a constant percentage cost of living adjustment. In the numerical examples, the percentage
will equal to the inflation rate. This full, automatic COLA is one of several forms used in
existing plans. It is not without loss of generality. The presence of a full COLA in a nominal
plan decreases the incentive to continue working late in the career as, once the employee
using this logistic specification would not be difficult to implement and would not require any reference to
the underlying functional form.
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retires, the benefit will increase in line with inflation. In plans without a COLA, or in which
the COLA is not automatic but applied (or not) on an ad hoc basis by legislative action every
few years, an additional year of work increases the pension benefit through both nominal
and real wage growth.
Most plans offer a variety of payment options which may include a single life annuity, a
joint and survivor annuity, a partial lump sum, and various combinations of these options.
In most plans, these options are constructed such that the individual receives a benefit of
equal actuarial value. However, because individuals may have private information about
their mortality risk, they can exploit the presence of these options to increase the value
of their benefits.' If employees plan their claiming strategies in advance, these options will
simply scale the incentive and distributional measures considered and introduce heterogeneity
across individuals. For simplicity, this analysis assumes a single life annuity for the average
individual.
Public sector employees covered by DB plans typically make mandatory contributions to
the pension plan. In most cases, these contributions are computed as a constant fraction of
covered earnings. For simplicity, all four plans will be assumed to follow this practice in this
analysis. In the numerical computations, the contribution rate will be set to five percent.
3.2.6 Economic and demographic assumptions
This chapter derives analytic formulas for select financial incentives created by defined benefit
pension plans and provides illustrative numerical examples. This section spells out the details
necessary for such calculations.
While all formulas can be derived for general wage processes, the essential insights can
be most clearly obtained assuming a constant rate of wage growth. Therefore the baseline
analysis will assume that wage growth occurs at a constant rate, g. 7 However, as pension
plans can create incentives for spiking, that is, for individuals to dramatically increase their
6At the same time, individuals may choose period certain options that appear to reduce the value of their
benefit.
71n reality, wage growth among employees covered by public sector plans tends to be high and sharply
decreasing in the first few years of the career before then decreasing at a slower rate over the remaining
years of the career. Incorporating non-constant wage growth into the formulas derived in section four merely
obscures the underlying economics of the pension plans. Longitudinal variation in the rate of wage growth
does not drive much interesting behavior in the financial incentives beyond that which is considered in the
spiking analysis discussed next.
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wages at particular points in time, additional analyses will also investigate the importance
of such behavior directly. In the numerical exercises, the nominal rate of salary growth will
be set to four percent.
Present value computations require assumptions about mortality and interest rates. All
computations are performed for a 50-50 gender mix of the RP-2000 mortality tables projected
according to the Scale BB mortality improvement factors for an individual born in 1980.8
The results are not sensitive to these assumptions. Shifting the assumed date of birth earlier
in time decreases the value of benefits overall and shifts the relative value of benefits provided
at different ages but the differential shift is quite modest. Alternative assumptions about
mortality have only a modest effect on the incentive and distributional measures considered
and do not drive interesting variation in those measures within the career or across different
careers.
The choice of interest rate has an important effect on both the level of the incentive
and risk measures and the shape of those measures over the career. The proper selection of
discount rate has been discussed extensively in other work and is beyond the scope of this
chapter (see, e.g., Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009) and Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011)). This
chapter assumes an inflation rate of two percent and a real discount rate of 2.5 percent.
However, one advantage of the derivation of general formulas for each pension plan is that
alternative assumptions can be readily substituted into the formulas presented.
Computing the incentive for job acceptance and the riskiness of pension benefits requires
assumptions about separation patterns. Since two of the plans do not exist and the other
two are merely stylized representations of plans that do exist, it is not possible to select
separation assumptions directly from data on current behavior. For transparency, a very
simple set of separation assumptions is used. The separation rate at age and service combi-
nation (a, s) under the nominal high-three with actuarial adjustment for early and delayed
retirement is max (0.22 - 0.04s, 0.02 + 0.28/ (1 + exp (- (a - 60) /2))). Under the nominal
high-three with percentage early retirement separation rates at older ages jump from 0.02 to
0.30 at 60, and under the inflation-adjusted career-average with actuarial early retirement
separation rates increase according to the smooth function through 59 but jump to 0.30 at
60. Separation rates under the indexed career-average with variable accrual factors are set
equal to the separation rates under the high-three with actuarial adjustment for early and
8 Mortality improvements are set to zero for ages 1-14.
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delayed retirement.
3.3 Quantifying financial incentives and risks
Pension plans link retirement income streams to labor market behavior over an individual's
entire career. Because the pension is a function not only of how much an employee works but
when that work was performed, direct specification of the budget constraints yields few clear
insights. As an alternative, this section develops a series of implicit subsidy rates as they
affect particular decision margins. A corresponding measure of risk reflects the probabilities
that an individual follows any particular path. The decisions considered are (i) whether to
continue employment, (ii) whether to seek additional earnings (e.g. by working overtime or
pursuing a promotion), and (iii) whether to accept a job.
3.3.1 Continued employment
The accrual rate of pension wealth over a one-year period is a widely used summary measure
of pension incentives. The accrual rate measures the increase in the present value of the
pension benefits to which an employee would be entitled if she were to work an additional
year as a percentage of salary. In most DB plan designs, the accrual rate is constant or nearly
constant as salary varies. Because continued work typically requires additional employee
contributions to the pension fund, net measures are often used. This chapter adopts the
convention that accrual rates reflect the deviation between total compensation and quoted
salary.9
Denoting the one-year accrual rate by iizy (t), the probability of survival from period t
to the beginning of period s by p (s I t), the COLA by i, the interest rate by r, the benefit
claimed at time s by b, contributions made in period s by c8, and the wage in period s by
9 The accrual rate could also be measured relative to salary less pension contributions, total compensation,
or salary less contributions plus normal cost. The ideal benchmark would perhaps be productivity or an
employee's outside employment opportunities, but such quantities are generally unobserved.
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ws, the one-year accrual rate is defined as
APV of pension benefits - contributions
wages
1 T  p(s t+1) /1+ 1 i\ T () -st b1+-ic
bt+-l p+s t b -ct .
While the one-year accrual rate provides a concise summary measure of the institutional
features of the pension plan, it is rarely the correct measure for thinking about the impact of
the plan on employee behavior.10 It is relevant only when employees face a choice between
one additional year of work and leaving the job now. Otherwise, workers trade off the
increase in the value of the pension benefit over all years until the intended departure.
Two alternative measures more directly capture these longer-horizon incentives. First,
the k-year accrual measures the increase in the value of the pension benefit less contributions
over the next k years. This longer-horizon accrual rate is given by
APV of pension benefits - PV of contributions
Zkyr (t) =Eable PV of wages
t+k-1
= a (s - 1| t) 1 (s -1)
s=t+1
T T S-1
'S" ulS) (i)u-sbs - >9p (u I t) (1+i) u-tbt - (1 + r)tucuI
X =SU=t U=t
s-1
E (1 + r)twu J
where all notation is as before with the addition of a (s I t) to denote the probability that an
individual alive and able at time t remains alive and able at time s and q (s) to denote the
probability that an alive and able individual dies or becomes disabled at time s. In an abuse of
notation, for purposes of the k-year accrual, set r' (t + k - 1) = 1. This on-the-fly redefinition
allows the definition of the accrual measure to be written as a single sum. In contrast to the
one-year accrual, where the assumption that death or disability during the current period
10The definition of the accrual rate stated here implicitly assumes immediate claiming of the pension
benefit upon leaving a job. While this will be optimal in most cases, under the nominal high-three pension
with percentage early retirement employees who leave public sector employment at sufficiently young ages
should defer their claim. The analysis will assume that individuals claim optimally (defined as claiming to
maximize the present value of the pension benefit).
123
leads to benefits equal to the retirement benefit in the next period eliminates death and
disability from the equation, death and disability do affect the k-year accrual. An individual
considering whether to work for the next k years knows that with some probability she will
be forced to stop working at each intervening year due to death or the onset of disability.
Because the death and disability hazard is small at most ages of interest, the inclusion of
this term will be relatively unimportant for the results.
One horizon of particular interest is the accrual through the normal retirement age, where
k is simply the difference between the normal retirement age and the current age. Because
the level of benefits is often highest at this age, many individuals will choose between leaving
the job in the current period for retirement or another opportunity and remaining on the job
until the normal retirement age. The k-year accrual is the appropriate wedge for individuals
considering this decision.
However, in general there is no reason to privilege the normal retirement age over all other
ages at which an employee might quit. A more general measure that captures incentives for
employees who may have more flexibility in determining their retirement age is the maximum
accrual rate. This measure is defined as
imax (t) = Max {iky, (t) .k
The maximum accrual is the maximum percentage deviation between total compensation
and the quoted compensation, where the maximum is taken over all possible departure
dates. For an employee with a fixed reservation value at which she would depart from the
public sector workforce, this will identify the first age at which the total future value of
compensation fails to surpass it. It will more richly capture the incentives when employees
cross a series of staggered eligibility thresholds. However, for purposes of the current chapter
this measure is of relatively little interest. As a result of the relative simplicity of the plans
considered here, the maximum accrual will largely coincide with the accrual through the
normal retirement age. When the one-year accrual schedule has multiple peaks, when the
interaction of age and service requirements for eligibility leads to variation in the age at
which individuals achieve their maximum benefit, or when caps on replacement rates lead
to sharp reductions in accrual rates before the normal retirement age, the maximum accrual
emerges as an informative measure.
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To develop intuition for the longer-horizon measures, it is useful to observe that the
accrual rate over any k-year period can be written as
t+k-1 (1 + r tU Wuilyr (U
iky, (t) = a (s -11[ t) -r (s - 1) ' -
S=t+1 1 (1 + r)*-" WUs~t+1
That is, the accrual over the next k years is a weighted average of the one-year accrual
rates. The accrual rates are first averaged across the years of each potential career, where
the weights reflect the importance of each year's wage in the present value of the stream of
wage payments over the potential career. They are then averaged over the potential careers
weighted by the probability that death or disability forces individuals to exit from the labor
force early and thus follow one of these alternative careers. This averaging interpretation
allows for a quick mental construction of normal retirement age accruals and maximum
accruals from figures that show only the 1-year accrual rate. For this reason, the derivation
of formulas will focus on the single-year accrual rates. ,
Alternative measures of the incentives for continued work created by the pension system
have been proposed in the literature for a variety of different purposes, including the option
value (Stock and Wise (1990) and Samwick (1998) using a special case), the premium value
(Gustman and Steinmeier (2001/2002)), and the peak value (Coile and Gruber (2007)). The
key conceptual distinctions between the measures of future pension benefits used in this
chapter and those established in the literature are that the Stock and Wise option value
measure includes the value of future wages and does not normalize by earnings, the Samwick
option value measure includes the value of future wages and does not normalize by earnings
or the number of years of work required to claim the the pension benefit, and the peak value
does not normalize by earnings or the years of work required to claim the pension benefit.
Of course it is simple to define analogs of each measure that make each of these adjustments.
The different measures should be viewed as broadly similar.
3.3.2 Additional earnings
Employees may have opportunities to increase earnings at different times in their careers,
whether by working over time, applying for a promotion, or otherwise attempting to increase
125
their salary. Since average earnings are a key input into the computation of initial pension
benefits, the pension plan has an important effect on the financial return to such a decision.
The importance of the pension plan for this margin can be measured in the form of an
implicit subsidy for each dollar of additional earnings at different points in the career. This
analysis considers the implicit subsidy for earnings for an employee at time t who intends to
retire at t'. For purposes of this computation, survival until age t' is assumed. The measure
is defined as
ie (t, t') = change in PV of pension less contributions resulting from additional earnings
T + s--t' t'-1
= p p(s ' b(1 _- E1 (1(+ r)'~c s
S=t' (1 + r)tt r) k.&
where the notation is as above. Assuming mortality probabilities, interest rates, and COLAs
are unaffected by additional earnings, the financial incentive is the difference between the
impact of additional earnings on the initial benefit scaled by the value of a $1 annuity with
COLA at rate i and the impact of additional earnings on contributions.
Because individuals may manipulate earnings in ways other than simply attempting to
increase earnings today, the analysis considers two other thought experiments. The first
investigates the impact of different rates of sustained earnings growth on the level of pension
benefits and the second the impact of receiving a promotion accompanied by a 35 percent
pay increase at different ages. The outcome measure examined under each experiment is the
ratio of the present value of pension benefits less the present value of contributions relative
to the present value of salary as described in the next subsection.
3.3.3 Job acceptance
Individuals choose jobs based in part on the compensation. Because pensions provide a
valuable source of retirement consumption, they affect individuals decisions as to whether to
take the job. The impact on the decision to accept a job can be thought of in two pieces. The
first is the effect of the pension plan on the expected level of total compensation. For this
purpose, the value of the pension is measured as the ratio of the present value of the pension
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benefit less the present value of contributions to the present value of the salary. Consider
an employee who began employment at t and separates at age t'. The realized increase in
compensation relative to quoted salary as a percentage of quoted salary is
P PV of pension benefits - PV of contributions
PV of salary
T + S-t' t'-1
P(s | t') bt, - )7 (1 + r)'-s cS
s=t' s=t
+(1 r)t's ws
s=t
Note that because the net value of pension benefits is normalized by total earnings, a long-
tenure individual with a lower payoff according to this measure may well still receive a larger
pension benefit than a short-service individual with a higher payoff. The benefit in such
cases is smaller only relative to the earnings over the carer.
In general, the pension does not provide the same benefit for employees who follow
different careers. Denoting the probability of employment at the beginning of period s for
an individual whose employment spell begins in period t by e (s I t) and the probability that
an employee separates at age and service combination (a, s) by A (a, s), the ex ante expected
benefit from the pension system is defined as"
PV of pension benefits - PV of contributions
accept (t) = Ecareer [PPV of salary
T s-1
T T ) ( I~) Yb - (1+ r
= e(s I t)A(a,s) 1
S=t (10 + r)t- w,,
U=t
An immediate relationship with normal cost computations is apparent. The effect of the
pension plan on expected lifetime compensation would be the normal cost assuming an
iiAn important complication is that individuals may have private information about their expected future
career path. While this is beyond the scope of the current analysis, to the extent that individuals have
information of this nature it would generate heterogeneity in the expected markup across individuals and
heterogeneity in the riskiness of that markup. The private information could increase or decrease both
measures. An important issue in evaluating the effect of these plans on individual behavior is the extent to
which individuals have private information about their expected future career path and how accurate their
perceptions of the future employment probabilities are.
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entry-age level percent formula if the employee were the only individual in the workforce.
Like the k-year accrual, the ratio of pension value less contributions to quoted salary can be
expressed in terms of the one-year accrual rates:
(1+ r)t'- Wsilyr (s)
P (t, t') = =1
E (1 + r)t'~w
S=t
This will again facilitate intuitive construction of the payoff functions using only information
on the single-year accrual rates.
The second important impact of the pension plan on the decision to accept a job is the risk
that the potential employee will not actually receive the expected benefit. An individual may
take the job thinking she will make it to the normal retirement age or an age that otherwise
maximizes the benefits, but with some probability, she will fail to do so. The expected benefit
does not distinguish between two plans, one that guarantees the markup by providing the
same benefit in all years and another that gives a higher benefit only to those employees who
work for the employer for 20 years or more and no benefit for short-service employees. The
second plan is substantially riskier. A simple measure of this risk is the standard deviation
of the markup:
PV of pension benefits - PV of contributions 2
PV of salary
While this analysis will focus on the risk created by different potential exit dates, other
sources of risk can affect benefits as well. An important risk in nominal final average salary
plans, for example, is the possibility that the employer will institute a wage freeze a few years
before an employee's intended date of retirement. A wage freeze can result in a substantial
reduction in nominal salary at the end of the career and, because many plans provide benefits
based on final salary, in the level of pension benefits as well.
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3.4 Analytic pension formulas
The analysis in this section works through the different incentive and risk measures for each
of the four plan designs.
3.4.1 The financial incentive for continued work
Nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed retirement
The financial incentive for continued work under the nominal high-three formula increases
dramatically with age and modestly with tenure. The end result is a system which encourages
employment by older workers but does little to achieve retention goals for younger workers
regardless of experience. The one-year accrual rate is
aNRAX f X G
yr 3( xNRAt (1 + g x servicetgi) - c, (3.1)
3 (1+ Or)
where aNRA is the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at the normal retirement age (including
COLAs), f is the plan's accrual factor, G = (1 + g)-+ (1+ g) + (1 + g)- and g is the
growth rate of earnings, r is the interest rate, and c is the contribution rate. The financial
incentive for an additional year of work depends on age, service, and the rate of earnings
growth. Because one dollar of earnings today increases average earnings at the normal
retirement age by one dollar, the financial incentive for work is discounted by the interest
rate for each year between the current age and the normal retirement age. Since the current
year's earnings will increase the pension benefit associated with each prior year of service,
the financial incentive increases with the product of nominal earnings growth and service.
The cost of a $1 annuity is obviously a relevant scaling factor because the pension plan
provides an annuity. The accrual factor and the contribution rate are specified in the plan
rules and under the direct control of the relevant policymakers. However, g, G, and r are
economic variables outside their control. 1 2 Thus the choice to use a nominal high-three
pension plan is a choice not only to create financial incentives according to the general
structure imposed by equation (3.1), but also to make them depend on general economic
conditions in a particular way.
12The public sector employer has some control over g and G though this is limited by labor market
equilibrium. This complexity does not affect the central point.
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To illustrate the behavior of this incentive, the accrual rates for three hypothetical careers
differing based on the age of initial employment are shown in Figure 1. The three hypothetical
careers represent individuals whose employment begins at ages 25, 35, and 45. The accrual
rate increases markedly throughout the career. Consider a worker who begins working for
the government at age 25 with a salary of $30,000. At 35 she earns a gross salary of $44,407.
An additional year of work increases the value of her future pension benefits by $8,180,
but contributions of $2,220 are deducted from her paycheck. Thus, on net, the pension
system increases total compensation above quoted salary by $5,959, or 13.4 percent. In
contrast, at age 55 her salary is $97,301 and the value of the pension accrual $54,322. Net
of contributions, the pension system increases compensation by $49,457, or 50.8 percent.
Thus, as the individual advances through her career, the pension adds an increasing amount
of compensation relative to the wage and the differences are quite large.
The curves in Figure 1 combine the effects of both age and tenure as movement along
a curve represents progression through the career. An alternative presentation of the same
information compares across individuals holding one variable constant and letting the other
vary. Figures 2 and 3 provide this perspective for the basic high-three formula. Figure
2 shows the one-year accrual rate by age holding service constant. Each line represents a
different fixed number of years of service. Figure 3 shows the pension compensation relative
to gross wage by service holding age constant. In this figure, each series represents a different
fixed age. As inspection of either equation (3.1) or the figures reveals, the accrual rate
increases exponentially in age but only linearly in service. For older individuals, accruing
pension benefits are worth more because they are provided fewer years into the future. For
long-tenure individuals, the higher wage used in the computation of average earnings applies
to a much larger pension. At 10 years of service, the accrual rate increases from 10.7 percent
at age 30 to 16.8 percent at 40 to 40.8 percent at 60. In contrast, at age 40, the accrual rate
increases from 16.7 percent at 10 years of service to 21.4 percent at 20 years to 26.1 percent
at 30 years.13
In addition to its dependence on economic variables outside the control of policymakers,
the choice of the high-three formula also commits the employer to providing different benefits
to individuals who join the public sector workforce at different ages. Since wage schedules are
MAdmittedly, the practical import of the accrual rate for a 40 year-old with 30 years of service is limited,
but considering such a hypothetical employee helps develop intuition for the behavior of the underlying
formula. Throughout the analysis, formulas that can be evaluated in such scenarios often will be.
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not conditioned on age, this means that total compensation will differ across these individuals
as well. One possible way of relaxing this constraint would be to develop contribution rates
that depend on the age of initial employment. As with all such choices, the central question
is whether the design of the plan is facilitating the achievement of important goals or whether
it is creating undesirable side effects.
As previewed in the last section, an employee at age 40 is unlikely to be choosing be-
tween departure and only one additional year of work. She is more likely to be comparing a
longer period of continued work in the current job against a period of work in an alternative
occupation. This longer horizon smoothes the incentives created by the one-year accrual
according to the averaging formula derived in section three. Figure 4 presents the accrual
rates through the normal retirement age for the nominal high-three pension with actuarial
early and delayed retirement. Since the basic formula is already a smooth function, the
smoothing does not change the qualitative nature of the incentives. However, by incorpo-
rating the value of working until the normal retirement age for younger workers, it reflects
the stronger incentive for young individuals to remain on the job created by the plan than
that suggested by the single year accrual rate. For an employee joining the public sector
workforce at 25, the one-year accrual rate is only 6.2 percent, but the accrual rate through
the normal retirement age is 23.5 percent. And while the one-year accrual rate increases by
720 percent between 25 and 55, the accrual rate through the normal retirement age increases
by only 140 percent.
The maximum accrual rate for the nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed
retirement is dictated by the mortality assumptions and therefore relatively uninteresting. As
individuals age, the one-year accrual rate increases without bound. This explosive behavior
arises because the pension plan provides a benefit actuarially equivalent to an annuity paying
a fixed percentage of salary beginning at the normal retirement age. For each year by which
an employee's age exceeds the normal retirement age, the size of the actuarial adjustment
increases. Were an arbitrarily old employee to exist, the adjustment would be arbitrarily
large. The k-year accrual will therefore always reflect the accrual rate through the age at
which any individuals still alive are assumed to die with certainty (120 in this analysis).
Abstracting from mortality, the maximum accrual rate would be undefined as the k-year
accruals would increase indefinitely.
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Nominal high-three with percentage early retirement
Introducing non-actuarial adjustments for early and delayed retirement leads to much more
complicated expressions for the accrual rate. The one-year accrual for a nominal high-three
pension with percentage early retirement (and no credit for delayed retirement) is
x f x p(~-1It)P() x a. t < t*3 s=t±1 (1+r)st
x max (0, 1 - max (0, e x (NRA- s))) }
xG x (1 + g x servicet+1) - c.
ilyr (t) = x f x at x max (0, 1 - max (0,e x (NRA - t))) x G t > t*. (3.2)
x {1+ _ x (g) ax
X 1I+ e(NRA-t>0)1-max(O,ex(NRA-t))) 1
x servicet4 1} - c
where t* solves the problem
max{ P(S iIO) P!S 1) x a. x max (0, 1 - max (0, e x (NRA - s)))}.
1 (1 + r
As before, p (s I t) is the probability that an individual alive in period t survives to period s,
a. is the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, g is the rate of earnings growth, G collects
terms in g, NRA is the normal retirement age, and c is the contribution rate. Relevant for
this pension but not the nominal high-three with actuarial adjustments for the timing of
retirement are p (s), the mortality probability at age s, e, the early retirement reduction
rate, and i, the COLA rate.
With a non-actuarial adjustment for early retirement, the decision of when to claim
benefits-ignored in the last section-becomes an important one. This formula assumes
optimal claiming, defined as claiming at the age that maximizes the present value of the
pension benefit. The decision rule takes the form of deferring claiming until a threshold
age t* if separating before that age and claiming immediately if separating at or after that
age. This rule is feasible to implement in practice, provided individuals retiring early are
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not liquidity constrained."
The accrual rate prior to the optimal claiming age is identical to that for the pension of
the prior subsection, except that the cost of a $1 annuity at the normal retirement age is
replaced with the expected value of an attempt to claim at the optimal age t*. This expected
value is the value of a $1 annuity claimed at each age before t* weighted by the probability
of death at that age (which results in immediate payment of the death benefit) plus the
value of a $1 annuity claimed at t* weighted by the probability of survival until t*. In years
before the optimal claiming age, the accrual rate will behave in the same way as that for the
nominal high-three with actuarial adjustments: exponential growth in age and linear growth
in service.1"
The accrual rate at and after the optimal claiming age generalizes the basic formula.
Whereas additional service in the simple plan affects the accrual rate only through g, under
the more complex plan its effect is determined by four interacting pieces: (1) the probability
of death, (2) the relative magnitudes of wage growth and the COLA, (3) the value of a $1
annuity at the current age, and (4) the early retirement reduction rate. Because there is no
adjustment for delayed retirement, a large probability of death increases the value of work
as it leads to a guaranteed higher payout in the next period rather than an annuity that
stops after only one period. The second term reflects the fact that an additional year of
work increases the earnings used to compute the initial benefit but sacrifices one year of the
COLA. The third term measures the value of sacrificing the current year's pension benefit
in order to remain on the job and the fourth term measures the value of reducing the early
retirement reduction by one year. (Of course, this fourth term only matters if retiring before
the normal retirement age.)
As with the basic high-three plan, the financial incentive for continued work combines
parameters under the direct control of policymakers (e.g. f and e) with economic variables
outside their control (g and 7r). Thus, when choosing a high-three plan with percentage early
retirement, policymakers have only limited ability to construct the financial incentives for
continued work of their choosing.
Figure 5 illustrates the one-year accrual rate for the same three hypothetical careers
14Since the threshold age is typically sufficiently early that individuals must seek an alternative source of
income (i.e. a spouse or another job) if separating before that age, this seems like a reasonable assumption.
15This description ignores the effect of age on the expected value of a $1 annuity under the optimal claiming
strategy. However, this effect is not quantitatively significant as mortality probabilities are extremely low at
young ages.
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considered in the previous subsection. The accrual rate increases smoothly until the optimal
claiming age, roughly levels out between the optimal claiming age and the normal retirement
age, and then drops sharply at the normal retirement age. After the normal retirement age,
the accrual rate continues to decrease. For an employee whose employment begins at age
25, the accrual rate increases from 2.9 percent in the first year to 12.1 percent at age 35 to
47.6 percent at 55. However, unlike the basic high-three, the accrual rate is approximately
constant between 51 and 59.
Figure 6 shows the one-year accrual rates by age holding service constant and Figure 7
shows the one-year accrual rates by service holding age constant. As with the basic plan,
most of the variation and the overall shape of the accrual schedule is determined by age.
Different levels of service have a more modest linear effect on the accrual rate. Unlike the
basic plan, increasing service can decrease the accrual rate since service merely scales up the
combined effect of the four terms discussed previously. At or after the normal retirement
age, additional work no longer reduces the early retirement reduction. Thus giving up a
year's payment becomes the driving force behind the accrual rate. Greater service increases
the size of the pension and therefore the cost of giving up a year's payment relative to the
additional pension resulting from an additional year of work. Thus, at these older ages,
increasing service decreases the accrual rate and eventually drives it negative.
Figure 8 presents the accrual rate through the normal retirement age. As expected, the
extended horizon smoothes the financial incentive for continued work. The normal retirement
age accrual again indicates that the financial incentive for continued work created by the plan
is much stronger at younger ages than is reflected by the one-year accrual rate. The maximum
accrual (not shown) peaks for longer service employees before the normal retirement age.
For employees with large pensions, the non-actuarial adjustment for early retirement leads
to modestly declining single-year accruals in the late 50s. Thus, while the absolute financial
incentive for continued work provided by the pension remains quite large, the fact that it
decreases suggests that some marginal individuals may begin considering departure in their
late 50s.
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Inflation-adjusted career average with actuarial early retirement
The accrual rate of pension wealth under the inflation-adjusted career average with actuarial
early retirement is given by
f x aNRAX ( +7)NRA-i t < NRA
lyr (t) f x at x 1+ 
_ 
-- 1 (at-I) x )) 
-tc t > NRA.
x k 1"1(t ) 1k 1i 1kat E j Z-
(3.3)
All variables retain their previous meaning. For clarity, the formula is broken into two pieces:
one applicable in the years before the normal retirement age and the other applicable in the
years at or after. In the years prior to the normal retirement age, the formula depends
only on the accrual factor, the value of a $1 annuity at the normal retirement age, the real
interest rate, the age, and the contribution rate. As under the nominal high-three plans,
the accrual factor increases exponentially with age, but the growth rate is reduced from the
nominal interest rate to the real interest rate. The earnings growth rate disappears from
the formula entirely. Because the computation of average earnings now depends on the full
career, an additional year of work at a higher wage does not replace any previous earnings
in the earnings history, it merely increases the total earnings. Relatively fewer variables not
under the control of the policymakers appear in the equation, only the real discount rate
and the value of a $1 annuity.
After the normal retirement age, the formula in equation (3.3) parallels that of equation
(3.2). The accrual factor depends on mortality, the relationship of the inflation rate to the
COLA, and the cost of giving up one year's pension benefit. In the career-average plan, the
appropriate scaling factor is not service itself but a term reflecting the accumulated earnings
in all years relative to the current year.1 6
The one-year accrual rates for each of the three hypothetical careers examined previously
are shown in Figure 9, the accrual rates by age holding service constant in Figure 10, and the
accrual rates by service holding age constant in Figure 11. Prior to the normal retirement age,
the increase in the accrual rate associated with age is dramatically reduced and the variation
in the accrual rate associated with service is eliminated. After the normal retirement age,
the accrual rates drop sharply. This drop is even larger than that in the nominal high-
16 1f salary growth were equal to inflation, this scaling factor would be equal to service.
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three because the salary history is adjusted for inflation. As a result, wage increases are less
valuable. (Only the real increase in wages increases the benefit rather than the entire nominal
increase.) Because the relative value of the increase in the pension benefit resulting from an
additional year of service and the loss of one year's payment resulting from continued work
depends on service, the three accrual rates diverge after the normal retirement age. The
accrual rates for long-tenure employees drop most sharply because long-tenure employees
have the largest pensions. Additional work results in only a small percentage increase in the
value of the initial benefit, while giving up a year's payment represents a substantial loss.
For an employee joining the public sector workforce at 25, the accrual rate increases from
13.3 percent at 25 to 18.5 percent at 25 to 33.5 percent at 55. The accrual rate at age 30,
regardless of service, is 15.7 percent and the accrual rate at age 40, regardless of service, is
21.6 percent. However, at age 60 the accrual rate is sharply decreasing in service, from 15.3
percent at 10 years of service to -42.1 percent at 30 years of service.
Figure 12 presents the accrual rate through the the normal retirement age. As would
be implied by the previous results, the accrual rate is solely a function of age and does not
depend on service, and, because the plan provides actuarial adjustments for early retirement,
it is a single, smoothly increasing function. Since the one-year accrual rate is increasing until
the normal retirement age and drops sharply at that age, the maximum accrual at all ages
before the normal retirement age will be equal to the accrual through the normal retirement
age.
Indexed career-average with variable accrual factors and actuarial early and
delayed retirement
The one-year accrual rate for an indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors
and actuarial adjustments for early and delayed retirement is given by
S.aNRA X (NRA)lyr ( r)NRA-t - x(t) x f(a(t) , t) - c, (3.4)
where x (s) is introduced to reflect the value of an arbitrary index at time t and the constant
accrual factor f used in the previous plan designs is generalized to be a function of age and
service. The analysis will focus on the special case in which the change in the index x is set
equal to the interest rate 1 + r. This then means x(NRA) - r)NRA-t and the one-yearequal x(t) -- dteo-y a
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accrual rate of equation (3.4) becomes
Slyr(t) = aNRA X f (a (t) , t) - c. (3.5)
The accrual rate under this plan takes a very simple form, and, more importantly, is under
the direct control of the policymakers. Other than the cost of a $1 annuity at the normal
retirement age, which simply serves as a scaling factor, the only two terms in this formula,
f (a, s) and c, are specified in the plan rules. By using an indexed career-average pension
with variable accrual factors, policymakers can construct whatever financial incentives for
continued work they so desire. In the numerical computations, a simple s-shaped function
of service, independent of age, is used for the accrual factors so as to model a plan along the
lines of the oft-stated retention goals of defined benefit pension plans.
Figure 13 illustrates the accrual rates for the three hypothetical careers. In each case, the
accrual rate starts out relatively flat, increases in the middle of the career, and then levels
out late in the career. Figures 14 and 15 show these features most clearly. Accrual rates are
constant as age varies conditional on a level of service: 19.7 percent for 10 years, 22.7 for
20 years, and 25.7 for 30 years. In contrast, regardless of age, accrual rates follow the same
s-shaped pattern in service. Figure 16 plots the accrual rate through the normal retirement
age. As the one-year accrual rates are smooth, the qualitative shape of the curves is very
similar. In addition, since the variation in the accrual rates through the career is relatively
modest, the normal retirement age accrual rates are relatively flat. Because the accrual rate
limits to an upper bound in service, the maximum accrual (not shown) will follow a very
similar pattern to the normal retirement age accrual for the youngest cohort re-expressed as
a function of service for any starting age.
3.4.2 The financial incentive for additional earnings
Nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed retirement
The implicit subsidy for additional earnings at age t conditional on survival until and retire-
ment at t' under a nominal high-three pension with actuarial early and delayed retirement
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is
f x aNAT)~ X serviceti3 (1, t') =rNRA-t X 1 (t E {t' - 1, t' - 2, t' - 3}) - c, (3.6)
3 (1 + r)NR-
where f is the accrual factor, aNRA the value of a $1 annuity beginning at the normal retire-
ment age, r the real interest rate, NRA the normal retirement age, and c the contribution
rate. Since additional earnings in any year require additional contributions to the plan, a
negative subsidy (i.e. a tax) is applied to earnings in all years. However, in the final three
years of the career, that is, the years used in the computation of average earnings for the
initial pension benefit, there is a large subsidy for additional earnings. This subsidy scales
with the accrual factor and service and is discounted by the real interest rate for each year
between the current age and the normal retirement age.
Figure 17 presents the implicit subsidy for four hypothetical careers. A modest tax equal
to the contribution rate (five percent) applies in most years, but in the final years of the
career the plan creates a massive subsidy for additional earnings. For an employee who
starts at age 20 this subsidy reaches 386 percent at age 59. For shorter-service employees,
the subsidy is reduced: 288 percent for an employee who starts at 30, 190 percent for an
employee who starts at 40, and 93 percent for an employee who starts at 50.
An alternative perspective on the relationship between pension benefits and earnings is
provided by figures 18 and 19. Figure 18 shows the ratio of pension value less contributions
to lifetime earnings for employees retiring with 20 years of service at age 60. For an employee
with zero nominal earnings growth, this ratio would. be only 13.6 percent while for an em-
ployee with five percent nominal earnings growth it would be 24.1 percent. Since the short
averaging window relies on earnings in only the final three years of the career, employees
whose earnings increase at a faster rate will receive a much larger pension payout relative to
earnings than those whose earnings increase at a slower rate. Similarly, Figure 19 presents
the same ratio by the age at which an employee receives a promotion with a 35 percent
pay increase. Because the pension determines benefits based solely on late career earnings,
the relative benefit provided by the pension plan increases with the age of promotion. The
largest difference in payout is between those individuals who receive the promotion exactly
three years before retirement and those who would have been promoted if they stayed just
one more year (i.e. were offered the promotion at age 60). However, these individuals are
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much more similar in their work history than those who were promoted at younger ages.
Nominal high-three with percentage early retirement
The implicit subsidy under the nominal high-three with percentage early retirement is quali-
tatively very similar to that for the nominal high-three with actuarial early retirement. This
similarity arises because the key driver of the implicit subsidy is the structure of the average
earnings computation, and this is identical in the two plans. The subsidy for this plan is
given by
. (t, t) f x at, x max (0, 1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t'))) x servicet.
3 (1+ r)t-
x 1 (t E {t' - 1, t' - 2, t' - 3}) - c, (3.7)
where all terms are as before with the addition of e to denote the early retirement reduction
rate. While the magnitude of the implicit subsidy for additional earnings is scaled by the
accrual factor f specified by the plan rules, the overall shape of the implicit subsidy is fixed
by the decision to use a high-three formula. Without changing the formula, policymakers
have little ability to eliminate these subsidies.1 7
Figure 20 illustrates the implicit subsidy for four hypothetical careers assuming survival
until and retirement at age 60. In each case, the implicit tax on earnings before age 57 is
5 percent. The maximum subsidy at age 59 is 445 percent for an employee who starts at
age 20, 333 percent for an employee who starts at age 30, and 108 percent for an employee
who starts at age 50. These numbers differ from those in section 4.2.1 only because the
accrual rate for the two plans differs. Were they the same, the values would be identical.
Figures 21 and 22 present the ratio of pension value less contributions to lifetime earnings
for employees with different rates of nominal earnings growth and obtaining a promotion
with a 35 percent pay increase at different ages, respectively. As with the basic high-three
plan, the ratio increases dramatically as the rate of earnings growth increases and as the age
of promotion increases, provided the promotion occurs before age 57.
17 For this reason, many final average salary plans have introduced anti-spiking provisions. These rules do
not reduce the subsidy for the first dollar of additional earnings, but attempt to limit the total increase in
pension value that can be obtained in this fashion by establishing limits on late-career wage increases. For
example, an anti-spiking provision might state that only earnings that do not exceed the previous year's
earnings by more than 20 percent will be used in the determination of an employee's initial pension benefit.
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Inflation-adjusted career average with actuarial early retirement
Pension plans that use a career-average formula for the initial benefit eliminate the massive
implicit subsidy for earnings in the final years of the career. If an employee receives a raise,
her pension still increases, but only in proportion to the effect of the raise on the employee's
lifetime earnings. The implicit subsidy for earnings in period t conditional on survival until
and retirement at t' is
ie (t, t') =f x +rt't x min atI, aNRA X --7) NRAt C) (3.8)
1+r 1+ r)
where the variables retain their previous meanings and 7r is introduced for the inflation
rate. Because increased earnings today result in increased pension benefits in the future
regardless of the current age, a positive implicit subsidy no longer requires that the current
period fall in one of a small number of late-career periods. Because earnings are indexed
only for inflation and the value of the increased pension benefit is always benchmarked by
the normal retirement age, the implicit subsidy increases with age at a rate equal to the
real discount rate. Since there is no adjustment for delayed retirement, the implicit subsidy
decreases after the normal retirement age as individuals forgo years of benefits and thus the
value of the pension decreases. As with the accrual rate for this inflation-adjusted career
average pension, service has no effect on the implicit subsidy for earnings.
Figure 23 plots the implicit subsidy as a function of age for four hypothetical careers.
However, because it does not depend on service, there is no difference in the subsidy across
the four careers. The subsidy at age 30 if 15.7 percent, at age 40 is 21.6 percent, and at age
50 is 29.0 percent. The subsidy at age 57 is only modestly higher at 35.4 percent.
Figures 24 and 25 similarly emphasize the much weaker link between the allocation of
earnings across the different years of the career and the value of the eventual pension benefit
in inflation-adjusted career average plans. The ratio of pension value less contributions to
lifetime earnings only increases from 27.7 percent to 29.0 percent as the rate of nominal
earnings growth increases from zero to five percent. The relationship between earnings
growth and pension value remains positive because the increasing accrual rate over the career
means the pension still places greater weight on the years nearest the normal retirement age
and a higher rate of salary growth means a greater share of total earnings will fall in these
years. However, the longer averaging period relative to the high-three plans means the
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quantitative significance of this link is substantially reduced.
The ratio of pension value less contributions to lifetime earnings has a non-monotone
relationship with the timing of a major promotion. The ratio increases from 23.7 percent for
an individual who is promoted at age 30 to 24.2 percent for an individual who is promoted at
age 45 and then decreases to 23.4 percent for an individual who just misses the promotion.
The non-monotone relationship arises from a simple tension: the discounting applied to
future pension benefits increases the ratio when earnings are clustered at the end of the career,
but the longer averaging window means that clustering earnings at the end of the career
reduces average earnings. More important than the hump-shaped profile, however, is the fact
that the ratio is approximately constant. Large changes in the timing of earnings generate
only very modest changes in the ratio of pension benefits to earnings. Of course, individuals
with higher earnings will receive higher pension benefits, but the ratio is approximately
constant as the timing of earnings varies and thus there is little incentive to shift the timing
of earnings in order to maximize the pension benefit.
Indexed career-average with variable accrual factors and actuarial early and
delayed retirement
The implicit subsidy for additional earnings in the indexed career-average with variable
accrual factors is
aN RA x ( N RA)
Ze (t, t') = aNRA-t X - ( x f (a (t) , t) - c, (3.9)(1 + r)NRt x (t)
where x (t) is the index used to adjust the wage history. In the special case where the index
matches the discount rate the subsidy takes the form
ie (t, t') = aNRA x f (a (t) , t) - c. (3.10)
As with the accrual rate, policymakers have direct control over the subsidy through the
choice of the accrual factor and can achieve whatever implicit subsidy schedule they desire.
One key constraint remains, however, in that the accrual factor determines both the implicit
subsidy for additional earnings and the accrual rate of pension wealth. Thus, it is not
possible to independently control the financial incentive for continued work and the financial
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incentive for additional earnings. Achieving such a goal would require an even richer set of
policy instruments.1 8 As with the accrual rate, indexing the wage history to the real interest
rate eliminates the growth in the implicit subsidy associated with age.
Figure 26 plots the implicit subsidy for four hypothetical careers using the example
schedule of accrual factors. For each career the implicit subsidy increases modestly with
service from 19.7 percent at 10 years to 22.7 percent at 20 years to 25.7 percent at 30
years. Age has no effect on the implicit subsidy if service is held constant. For long-
tenure individuals near the end of the career, the implicit subsidy for additional earnings is
approximately constant. For example, for an employee whose career began at 20 it increases
from 26.4 percent at 57 to 26.5 percent at 59. However, for employees whose service falls
within the range over which the accrual factor increases, the implicit subsidy also increases
modestly late in the career. For an employee whose career began at 40, it increases from
21.5 percent at 57 to 22.3 percent.
Figures 27 and 28 present the ratio of pension value less contributions to lifetime earnings
as a function of the rate of nominal earnings growth and the timing of a promotion. In both
cases the ratio is almost completely constant across a wide range of variation. A small effect
is present because changes in the timing of earnings can change the accrual rate applied to
a particular dollar of earnings. That is, an employee with a higher rate of earnings growth
would earn a larger share of total compensation late in the career when service is higher and
therefore the accrual factor is higher. However, this effect generates a very modest effect
on the ratio. The same channel is operative, again with a small effect, as the timing of a
promotion varies.
3.4.3 The financial incentive for job acceptance
Nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed retirement
The financial incentive for job acceptance depends on the expected level of benefits provided
by the pension plan. A first step in the computation of the expected level of benefits is the
determination of the benefits provided under each possible career path. The realized pension
contribution to compensation under the nominal high-three with actuarial early and delayed
18One way to do this would be to specify a formula for the initial benefit which is the sum of two pieces,
the first based on service and the second based on earnings.
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retirement for a career from t to t' - 1 is
P tt 1 (1xG  t'-NRA servicet' 1 (I+ 9t'tP (t, x f x aNRA X r) x ,x - c, (3.11)3 (-1 1+r
S=t
where f is the accrual factor, a, the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, g the earnings
growth rate, G collects terms in g, r the real discount rate, NRA the normal retirement
age, and c the contribution rate. Inspecting equation (3.11) indicates that this will increase
exponentially with age and vary modestly with service. (If r < g it will increase with service
and if r > g it will decrease with service. If r = g it will be independent of service.) With
only modest differences between r and g, the key determinant of the pension payoff is age.
This is unsurprising, since the accrual rates examined previously for this pension varied
dramatically with age and more modestly with service. As with the accrual rates, some
elements of this formula are under the control of the policymakers, but others are not. Thus
choosing a high-three plan generates an allocation of benefits that will only be partially
designed to achieve the retention, recruitment, and retirement security goals and will be
partially subject to the whims of economic fortune.
Figure 29 plots the ratio of net pension value to earnings as a function of retirement age
for select service levels. The light gray line indicates the ratio holding service constant at 10
years, the dashed black line the ratio for an employee who begins work at age 20, and the
solid black line the ratio holding service constant at 40 years. The difference between the
ratio for different levels of service at any age is quite modest, but the difference across ages
is dramatic. Holding service constant at 10 years, the ratio increases from 2.3 percent at age
30 to 6.5 percent at age 40 to 12.9 percent at age 50 to 22.9 percent at age 60. Under the
basic high-three plan, the generosity of a retiree's pension benefit relative to her earnings
is primarily an indication of the age at which she retired and has little relation to service.
Table 1 presents the ratio by age and service for multiples of five years and confirms the
facts presented in the figure.
The distribution of benefits matters for ex post welfare, but ex ante individuals likely
do not know exactly when they will retire. Thus the expected level of benefits and the
variance in those outcomes are crucial inputs into the initial job acceptance decision. Figure
30 shows the expected compensation markup provided by the pension system as a function
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of the initial age of employment. The value increases with age as individuals who start at
older ages are more likely to work until older ages, when the benefits provided are more
generous. At younger ages, the rate of increase in the expected benefit is slower than the
rate of increase in the realized benefit as individuals are assumed to cluster at traditional
retirement ages and thus a one-year delay in the start date of employment results in a less
than one year delay in the expected retirement age. The high expected payoff to joining the
public sector workforce at older ages under the high-three plan should make public sector
employment extremely attractive to older individuals. In contrast, younger individuals who
know that with some probability they will not actually remain on the job until the older ages
at which the pension pays a generous benefit will find public sector employment much less
attractive. That is, the high-three plan will change the relative attractiveness of the covered
jobs for individuals of different ages. 19
Individuals may also be sensitive to the riskiness of the pension compensation. A guar-
antee that a pension plan will increase quoted compensation by 10 percent is more valuable
to a risk-averse employee than a chance at an even higher pension benefit and otherwise
nothing assuming the expected benefit remains the same. Figure 31 plots the standard devi-
ation of the benefit as a function of the age of initial employment. The standard deviation is
high at young ages and then decreases as individuals approach traditional retirement ages.
Employees who join when young have some probability of leaving quickly if the job is a poor
match-and thus getting very little in the way of benefits relative to their earnings-and
some probability of making it to traditional retirement ages when benefits are more gen-
erous. As the employee ages, both the probability of making it to traditional retirement
ages and the benefit ratio associated with an early exit increase. Thus the variance of the
pension payoff falls. (The uptick in the variance after the traditional retirement ages reflects
the assumed constant hazard after traditional retirement ages and the increasing slope of
the ratio shown in Figure 29. It is neither particularly interesting nor robust to alternative
separation assumptions.)
19 This differential selection could be undone if contribution rates varied with the age of initial employment.
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Nominal high-three with percentage early retirement
The realized pension payoff under the nominal high-three with percentage early retirement
is given by
1 service' (1±+g~tP (t, t') = x f xGx x -- c (3.12)3 t'-1 1 (+ r
p (s -1tr)
S=t
x max P ( 10 (S 1) x a. x max (0, 1 - max (0, e x (NRA - s)))
's=t+1 (1 + r (0
where the notation is as above with the addition of e for the early retirement reduction rate.
Because the accrual rate drops dramatically after the normal retirement age under this plan,
the markup in compensation over quoted salary is maximized at the normal retirement age
and then declines afterward. The qualitative nature of the payoff as expressed in equation
(3.12) is similar to that for the basic high-three in equation (3.11). The only change is that
rather than the cost of a $1 annuity at the normal retirement age, the key scaling factor is the
maximizing choice of the expected value of a claiming strategy that defers claiming until age
t and claims immediately if retiring after that age.2" Like the implicit subsidy for additional
earnings under the high-three pension with percentage early retirement, the dependence
of the relative pension generosity on the characteristics of an employee's work history and
economic conditions is almost entirely determined by the structure of the pension plan.
Policymakers have relatively little ability to modify it. They can scale the entire payoff
up or down by changing the accrual factor f and, through judicious choice of the early
retirement reduction rate e, could modify somewhat the payoffs at different ages, but the
overall generosity will be largely pinned down by age. This finding is not surprising as the
generosity of any plan can be expressed as a weighted average of the accrual rates and the
accrual rates derived in section 4.1.2 were primarily a function of age and the real interest
rate.
As with the basic high-three, the key determinant of the pension payoff is the age at
which the individual retires. The payoff first increases dramatically with age as individuals
move in the direction of the normal retirement age and then decreases once individuals pass
20The optimal value of t in this expression is the same t* from the computation of the accrual rate.
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the normal retirement age. Figure 32 plots the realized payoff as a function of the retirement
age for select service levels. At a single age, the difference in the payoff across service levels
is modest, but the effect of age is dramatic. With 10 years of service the payoff increases
from 4.4 percent at 30 to 9.7 percent at 40 to 17.9 percent at 50 to 27.1 percent at 60 before
falling to 20.2 percent at 70. Table 2 presents the realized markup for a range of ages and
service levels at retirement.
Figures 33 and 34 present the expected pension payoff and the standard deviation of the
pension payoff by the age of initial employment. The expected payoff broadly follows the
pattern set out by the realized payoff. It increases with age until the normal retirement age
and declines thereafter. Older individuals are more likely to make it to the normal retirement
age at which the largest payoffs are received. However, individuals who do not join the public
sector workforce until after the normal retirement age will necessarily get pension benefits
worth less and so the expected value declines. The expected markup increases from 10.0
percent for employees beginning work at age 25 to 14.0 percent for those beginning work at
35 to 24.9 percent for those starting work at 55. As with the basic high-three, the standard
deviation of the payoff decreases with age as the relative generosity of benefits increases
and the gap between the benefit ratio early in the career and benefit ratio at traditional
retirement ages declines. However, in the late 50s the variance begins to increase as the odds
that an employee will remain on the job after the normal retirement age (pursuing a larger
absolute benefit) increases.
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Inflation-adjusted career average with actuarial early retirement
The relative payoff for the inflation-adjusted career average with actuarial early retirement
is given by
1+ g -
f x aNRA X (1+r)NRA-t c t < NRA
tS=t
f x at, x x± -c t >NRA7
where all terms are defined as before. Prior to the normal retirement age, the formula is sim-
ilar to those for the two high-three variants, except the inflation adjustment in the earnings
history reduces the discounting applied from the nominal interest rate to the real interest rate
t'-i s-t
and service is replaced by the sum E 1 , which measures total inflation-adjusted
S=t
career earnings relative to the current year's earnings. After the normal retirement age, the
ratio decreases as there is no credit for delayed retirement. Crucially, as long as there is
real salary growth over the career, both age and service will have important effects on the
measured ratio. That is, the inflation-adjustment simultaneously reduces the importance of
age through its effect on the discounting term and increases the role of service as a result of
the accumulated earnings term.
As with the high-three pension with percentage early retirement, policymakers have
relatively little control over the distribution of benefits under the inflation-adjusted career
average pension. The payoff will increase with age as a function of the real discount rate
and the payoff will vary with service based on real salary growth. Policymakers can merely
scale up or down the level of benefits provided through their choice of the accrual factor f.
Figure 35 illustrates the ratio for select service levels. The payoff increases smoothly with
age until the normal retirement age, but does so much more modestly than under a nominal
high-three plan. After the normal retirement age, the payoff decreases with age as benefits
are forfeited while the employee remains on the job. The effect of service is also clearly
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visible in the figure. Increased service reduces the relative payoff significantly at all ages.
This behavior results from the use of the career averaging window. In the early years of the
career, employees receive lower wages than in the years approaching retirement. Because
they are adjusted in the earnings history only for inflation but not for the real discount rate,
the benefits provided have less weight than the accumulated earnings themselves. Holding
service constant at 10 years, the pension payoff increases from 14.3 percent at 30 to 19.7
percent at 40 to 35.4 percent at 60. Holding age constant at 60, the payoff decreases from
35.4 percent with 10 years of service to 30.8 percent with 20 years of service to 28.8 percent
with 30 years of service.
Figures 36 and 37 present the expected payoff and the standard deviation of the payoff
by the age of initial employment. Both follow the same qualitative patterns as those for the
high-three plans, with the expected payoff increasing with age until the normal retirement
age and then decreasing thereafter and the standard deviation of the payoff decreasing with
age until the early 50s, before increasing thereafter. However, the magnitudes are notably
different. The expected payoff increases from 16.5 percent at 25 to 21.2 percent at 35 to 33.2
percent at 55. These increases are much more modest than those for the high-three plans.
Correspondingly, the standard deviation of the payoff is much smaller; it decreases from 3.8
percent at 25 to a minimum of 2.1 percent at 50 before increasing modestly to 2.4 percent
at 55. That is, the indexed career average provides a much larger benefit to employees who
enter employment at younger ages and the benefit offered is much less risky.
Indexed career-average with variable accrual factors and actuarial early and
delayed retirement
The payoff for the indexed career-average with variable accrual factors is given by
t1-1 1+g) S-t x (NRA) (1 + r)
aNRA X E f(a(s),s) x ) ( ) x (+NRAP1 x(s) (1+r)
S=t
(3.14)
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and, in the special case where the index is equal to the real interest rate,
t'1-1 I )s-t
aNRA X (a s) , s) X (1+
P (t, t') = -. c (3.15)
In contrast with the previous formulas, the payoff is under the (nearly) complete control of
the policymakers. By selecting the schedule of accrual factors appropriately, the employer can
achieve the desired payoffs for each potential career. However, control is not quite complete,
because the average of the accrual factors used in the computation of benefits will depend
on the rate of earnings growth relative to the real interest rate. Thus, two individuals who
join the public sector workforce at the same age and retire at the same age but whose rates
of earnings growth differ will receive modestly different benefits. In the relatively simple
cases where one individual's earnings grow at a faster rate than the other, that individual's
pension payoff will be more heavily influenced by the accrual factors at the older ages and
higher levels of service associated with the end of the career while the other individual's will
depend more on those from early in the career. In the special case where the accrual factor
is constant, this complication is of no importance.
Figure 38 plots the realized pension payoff as a function of the retirement age for se-
lect service levels using the s-shaped accrual schedule discussed previously. Holding service
constant, the realized payoff is is the same for all ages and modestly higher for individuals
with more service. As individuals progress through their career, the realized payoff increases.
Regardless of age, the payoff is 18.9 percent for individuals with 10 years of service, 19.4 per-
cent for individuals with 20 years of service, and 20.6 percent for individuals with 30 years of
service. Table 4 shows the realized payoff for a wide range of age and service combinations,
confirming the basic result.
Figures 39 and 40 show the expected payoff and the standard deviation of that payoff by
the age of initial employment. The expected payoff decreases with age as individuals who
join the public sector workforce at older ages are less likely to work until the higher service
levels that result in an increased accrual factor. The standard deviation decreases with the
starting age as individuals who start young have a chance at reaching the higher levels of
service and receiving a greater relative benefit while individuals who start work at older
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ages do not. Even more importantly, the standard deviation of the payoff is much reduced
at all starting ages and for the older ages is very close to zero. Under this plan, the only
variation in the payoff is that necessitated by the policymakers' decision to create incentives
for long-tenure employees to remain on the job.
3.5 Conclusion
This analysis has investigated the financial incentives for continued employment, additional
earnings, and job acceptance associated with four pension plan designs. Under existing
plan designs, which are broadly- similar to the high-three pension plan with percentage early
retirement, an important role in the determination of the financial incentives is given to
economic variables outside the control of the policymakers, such as trend inflation and the
real interest rate. In addition, the choice of the benefit formula imposes an arbitrary structure
on the incentives that is at odds with many of the stated goals for recruitment, retention, and
retirement security. These include dramatically increasing incentives for continued work and
job acceptance as individuals age, relatively little in the way of incentives for experienced
employees to remain on the job, and substantial risk in the ultimate pension benefits workers
receive.
The inflation-adjusted career-average pension and the indexed career-average pension
with variable accrual factors considered here represent two alternative pension designs that
allow policymakers more direct control over the financial incentives their plans create. In
particular, under the indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors-when the
index is set equal to the real interest rate-policymakers have nearly complete control over
the financial incentives for continued employment, additional earnings, and job acceptance.
Furthermore, the risk associated with future pension benefits can be reduced to only that
necessarily associated with failure to respond to the financial incentives as desired. Risk as-
sociated with elements of the pension plan that do not facilitate any recruitment or retention
goals can be eliminated.
The essential difference between defined benefit and defined contribution plans is the
treatment of asset-market risk. The sharp incentives that existing DB plans create for
particular patterns of work and retirement are unnecessary. By selecting alternative accrual
factors for use within the broad class of indexed career-average plans, policymakers can sever
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the link between defined benefit plans and arbitrary financial incentives. Having done so, the
choice between defined benefit and defined contribution plans can be based on their relative
sensitivity to risky asset market returns. Policymakers can then design plans that generate
reasonable financial incentives for continued work, moderate the incentives for manipulation
of earnings in existing plans, and reduce the riskiness of benefits for employees arising from
the arbitrary distribution of benefits across employees who follow different career paths.
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Figure 1. One-Year Accrual Rate by Age for Three Careers,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula bt = f x servicet x 1 (Wt-i + wt-2 + Wt-3) x aNiA x (1 +r)t -NRA where f is an accrual factor specified by the
plan, a, the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 2. One-Year Accrual Rate by Age at Constant Service,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula be = f x servicet x j (Wt - I + wt -2 + wt -3) x a NiA x (1 + r)t - NRA, where f is an accrual factor specified by the
plan, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 3. One-Year Accrual Rate by Service at Constant Age,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula bt = f x servicet x j (wt_1 + wt-2 + wt-3) x ' ^ x (1 + r)t-NRA, where f is an accrual factor specified by the
plan, a, the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 4. Accrual Rate Through Normal Retirement Age for Three Careers,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The accrual rate through the normal retirement age is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which
an employee is entitled as a result of working until the normal retirement age less the present value of contributions to the
pension plan made during the period divided by the wage (accounting for the probability of death/disability prior to the NRA).
A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = f x servicet x } (wt- 1 + wt -2 + Wt -3) x aN^ x (1 + r)t-NRA, where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan, a, the3~ at.
cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 5. One-Year Accrual Rate by Age for Three Careers,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x j (wt--1 + W -2 + Wt-3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
Figure 6. One-Year Accrual Rate by Age at Constant Service,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
2
0
0.60-
0.40-
0.20-
0.00-
-0.20-
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70
Age
10 years of service - - - - 20 years 30 years
Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x 1 (w-I + wt -2 + wt-3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
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Figure 7. One-Year Accrual Rate by Service at Constant Age,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
0.60-
0.20-
0.00-
0
-0.20-
1 5 0 1'5 2 2 35 40
Service
Age 30 -- Age 40 - - - - Age 50 Age 60
Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x I (ut- I + Wt 2 + wt -3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
Figure 8. Accrual Rate Through Normal Retirement Age for
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early
z
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Note: The accrual rate through the normal retirement age is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which
an employee is entitled as a result of working until the normal retirement age less the present value of contributions to the
pension plan made during the period divided by the wage (accounting for the probability of death/disability prior to the
NRA). A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x j (wt- 1 + Wt-2 + t-3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
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Figure 9. One-Year Accrual Rate by Age for Three Careers,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
1 t1 " (1 + irt)S W, / min 
_ 
1, 1+A X w NRA\,weefisa crato the formula bt = f x servicet x ( service s) x att-NRA), where f is an accrual
factor specified by the plan, ir the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 10. One-Year Accrual Rate by
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With
Age at Constant Service,
Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
to the formula b= f x servicet x Isri E (1+ r)t" w,) xmin 1, A t-NRA), where f is an accrualfactor~ ~ seiidbth(servicet ZStu 1+i)~ )xm i at. I +7F;}±NA
factor specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 11. One-Year Accrual Rate by Service at Constant Age,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitlcd as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
to the formula bt = f x servicet x (serice x taI (1 + 7r)t' ws) x min 1, aNA X w t-NRA), where f is an accrual
factor specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate, a, the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 12. Accrual Rate Through Normal Retirement Age for Three Careers,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: The accrual rate through the normal retirement age is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which
an employee is entitled as a result of working until the normal retirement age less the present value of contributions to the
pension plan made during the period divided by the wage (accounting for the probability of death/disability prior to the NRA).
An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according to the
formula bt = f x servicet x s E (1 + 7r)t-- W") x min 1, aNiA x ( )-NRA), where f is an accrual factor
specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan
parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 13. One-Year Accrual Rate by Age for Three Careers,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula bt = F~_ f (a (s), s) x w, x (NRA) x aNA X (1 + r) t NRA, where f (a, s) is the
s oX(s) at
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 14. One-Year Accrual Rate by Age at Constant Service,
Indexed Career-Average with Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula bt = ZE C f (a (s), s) x ws x x(NRA) X aA x(1 + r)t NRAwhere f (a, s) is thes~oX(s) at
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 15. One-Year Accrual Rate by Service at Constant Age,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
0.40-
0.30-
2 0.20-
0,10-
0
0.00-
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Service
---- Age30- Age40 ---- Age50 Age60
Note: The one-year accrual rate is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which an employee is entitled as
a result of working in the current year less the value of contributions to the pension plan made during the year divided by the
wage. An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula bt = _ f (a (s) , s) x w, x(NRA) x aNA x (1 + r)t-NRA where f (a, s) is thes oX (s) a I
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 16. Accrual Rate Through Normal Retirement Age for Three Careers,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The accrual rate through the normal retirement age is the increase in the present value of the pension benefit to which
an employee is entitled as a result of working until the normal retirement age less the present value of contributions to the
pension plan made during the period divided by the wage (accounting for the probability of death/disability prior to the NRA).
An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides
benefits according to the formula bt = Et -1 f (a (s), s) x w, x x(NRA) a x (1 + r)t-NRA, where f (a, s) is the accrualr~oX(s) a i
factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost of a $1
annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions
are described in the text.
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Figure 17. Implicit Subsidy for Earnings by Start Age,
Employees Intending to Retire at 60,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The implicit subsidy for earnings is the derivative of the difference between the present value of the pension benefit and
the lifetime contributions with respect to current-year earnings. A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for
early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the formula bt = f x servicet x 1 (Wt -1 + Wt -2 + Wt- 3) X N RA X
-NRA(1 + r)t- , where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the
nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 18. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Nominal Earnings Growth Rate,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 20 Years of Service,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula b= f x servicet x " (Wt --I + Wt --2 + Wt- 3) X a 1  x (1 + r)t-NRA, where f is an accrual factor specified by the
plan, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 19. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Age of Promotion With 35% Pay Increase,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 35 Years of Service,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula bt = f x servicet x j (wt_1 + wt-2 + wt-3) x a x (1 + r)t -NRA, where f is an accrual factor specified by the
plan, a, the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 20. Implicit Subsidy for Earnings for Four Careers,
Employees Intending to Retire at 60,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
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Note: The implicit subsidy for earnings is the derivative of the difference between the present value of the pension benefit and the
lifetime contributions with respect to current-year earnings. A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early
retirement provides benefits according to the formula bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f xservicet x j (wt-1 + wt-2 + wt-3),
where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic
and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 21. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Nominal Earnings Growth Rate,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 20 Years of Service,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x j (wt--1 + wt -2 + Wt -3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
Figure 22. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Age of Promotion With 35% Pay Increase,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 35 Years of Service,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x } (wt-1 + wt-2 + t-3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
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Figure 23. Implicit Subsidy for Earnings for Four Careers,
Employees Intending to Retire at 60,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: The implicit subsidy for earnings is the derivative of the difference between the present value of the pension benefit and
the lifetime contributions with respect to current-year earnings. An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial
adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula bt = f x servicet x s x Ert (1 + 7)ts "Ws) x
min 1, aA r ) t-NRA), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan, ir the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1
annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions
are described in the text.
Figure 24. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Nominal Earnings Growth Rate,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 20 Years of Service,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
to the formula bt = f x servicet x s x E I_(1 + s)' ws) x min 1, aNRA X ( +r t-NRA), where f is an accrual
factor specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 25. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Age of Promotion With 35% Pay Increase,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 35 Years of Service,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
to the formula bt - f x servicet x sI X Est 41 (1 + 7r)~ a) x min 1,aNRA x )t-NRA), where f is an accrual
factor specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate, a, the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 26. Implicit Subsidy for Earnings for Four Careers,
Employees Intending to Retire at 60,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: The implicit subsidy for earnings is the derivative of the difference between the present value of the pension benefit and
the lifetime contributions with respect to current-year earnings. An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors
and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the formula bt = F~- f (a (s), s) x w, x
x(NRA) xa A x (1 + r)t-NRA, where f (a, s) is the accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x
is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate.
Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
166
55 60
Figure 27. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Nominal Earnings Growth Rate,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 20 Years of Service,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
>0.L
0.30-
0.20-
0.10-
0.00-
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Nominal earnings growth rate (percent)
5.0
Note: An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula bt = F f (a (s) , s) x w, x ) x a ( x 1r)t-NRA , where f (a, s) is the$=oX(s) at,
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 28. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Age of Promotion With 35% Pay Increase,
Employees Retiring at 60 With 35 Years of Service,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula bt = - f (a (s), s) x w, x x aN RA X (1 + r)t NRA, where f (a, s) is thes~oX(s) at. I rt ,wee a )i h
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 29. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Retirement Age for Select Service Levels,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula be = f x servicet x } (wt-1 + Wt-2 + Wt-3) X aN RA X (1 + r)t-NRA , where f is an accrual factor specified by the3 at
plan, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 30. Expected Ratio
to Lifetime Earnings
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula bt = f x servicet x j (wt- + Wi-2 + Wt -3) X aNiRA X (1 + r)t-NRA, where f is an accrual factor specified by the
plan, a. the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 31. Standard Deviation of Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age of Initial Employment,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the
formula bt = f x servicet x } (wt -1 + Wt -2 + Wt - 3) x aNItA x (1 + r)t-NRA where f is an accrual factor specified by the
plan, a, the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and
demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 32. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Retirement Age for Select Service Levels,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x j (wt -1 + Wt -2 + Wt-3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
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Figure 33. Expected Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age of Initial Employment,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x j (wt-i + wt-2 + wt-3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
Figure 34. Standard Deviation of Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age of Initial Employment,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
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Note: A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits according to the formula
bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x I (wt_1 + wt-2 + wt-3), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan
and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in
the text.
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Figure 35. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Retirement Age for Select Service Levels,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
11+r w xi , AX r t-NRA\to the formula b= f x servicet x (service, x (1 ± ir) Ws) x min 1, a ^)x, where f is an accrual
factor specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 36. Expected Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age of Initial Employment,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
to the formula bj = f x servicef x sevie x Z3 (1 + ir) 5 ~> ws) x min 1, alv~j x --NRA , where f is an accrual
factor specified by the plan, ir the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 37. Standard Deviation of Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age of Initial Employment,
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average With Actuarial Early Retirement
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Note: An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement provides benefits according
to the formula be = f x servicet x servie x (1 + 7r)t' ws) x min 1, aN A X ,t-NRA, where f is an accrual
factor specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount
rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 38. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions to Lifetime Earnings
by Retirement Age for Select Service Levels,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula btE =E- f (a (s), s) x ws
"
^ x (1 + r)t-NRA where f (a, s) is thes~oX(s) at,
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
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Figure 39. Expected Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age of Initial Employment,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula bt = Et--_ f (a (s) , s) x w, x (NRA) a RA X (1 + r)t- NRA where f (a, s) is theSOx (S) a I
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, as the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
Figure 40. Standard Deviation of Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age of Initial Employment,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
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Note: An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement
provides benefits according to the formula b, = E'- f (a (s), s) x w, x x(NRA)  x (1 + r)t-NRA, where f (a, s) is the
accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, a, the cost
of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic
assumptions are described in the text.
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Table 1. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age and Service,
Nominal High-Three With Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
Age
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
Years of Service
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
1.0
2.5 2.3
4.3 4.2 4.1
6.6 6.5 6.3 6.2
9.5
13.2
17.7
23.3
30.4
39.2
9.3
12.9
17.3
22.9
29.9
38.5
9.1
12.6
17.0
22.5
29.4
38.0
8.9
12.4
16.7
22.2
28.9
37.4
8.8
12.2
16.5
21.8
28.5
36.8
11.9
16.2
21.4
28.0
36.3
15.9
21.1
27.6
35.7
20.7
27.2
35.2
Note: A nominal high-three pension with actuarial adjustment for early/delayed retirement provides benefits
according to the formula bt = f x servicet x } (wt1 + wt-2 + wt-3) x ^ x (1 + r)t-NRA, where f is
an accrual factor specified by the plan, as the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal
discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Table 2. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age and Service,
Nominal High-Three With Percentage Reduction for Early Retirement
Years of Service
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
2.6
4.5
6.9
4.4
6.7 6.6
9.9 9.7 9.5 9.3
13.6 13.3 13.1 12.9
18.3 17.9 17.6 17.3
23.6 23.2 22.8 22.4
27.7 27.1 26.7 26.3
24.3 23.8 23.4 23.1
20.6 20.2 19.9 19.5
12.6
17.0
22.1
25.9
22.7
19.2
16.7
21.7
25.5
22.3
18.9
21.3
25.1
21.9
18.6
24.7
21.6
18.3
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Age
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
Note: A nominal high-three pension with percentage reduction for early retirement provides benefits ac-
cording to the formula bt = (1 - max (0, e x (NRA - t))) x f x servicet x j (w-1 + wt-2 + wt-3), wheref is an accrual factor specified by the plan and e the early retirement reduction rate. Plan parameters as
well as economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Table 3. Ratio of Pension
to Lifetime Earnings
Inflation-Adjusted Career Average
Value Less Contributions
by Age and Service,
With Actuarial Early Retirement
Years of Service
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
13.3
15.7
18.5
21.6
25.0
29.0
33.5
38.5
34.0
29.1
14.3
16.8
19.7
22.9
26.6
30.7
35.4
31.2
26.7
15.5
18.2 16.9
21.3 19.7
24.7
28.6
33.0
29.1
24.8
23.0
26.7
30.8
27.1
23.1
18.3
21.4
24.9
28.8
25.3
21.5
19.9
23.2
26.9
23.5
20.0
21.6
25.1
21.9
18.6
23.4
20.4
17.3
Note: An inflation-adjusted career average pension with actuarial adjustment for early retirement
provides benefits according to the formula bt = f x servicet x s x it I (1+ 7r)t -SWS x
min 1, aLA x ), where f is an accrual factor specified by the plan, 7r the inflation rate,
a. the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as
economic and demographic assumptions are described in the text.
Table 4. Ratio of Pension Value Less Contributions
to Lifetime Earnings by Age and Service,
Indexed Career-Average With Variable Accrual Factors
and Actuarial Early/Delayed Retirement
Years of Service
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
18.9
18.9
18.9 19.1
18.9 18.9 19.1 19.4
18.9 18.9 19.1 19.4
18.9 18.9 19.1 19.4
18.9 18.9 19.1 19.4
18.9 18.9 19.1 19.4
18.9 18.9 19.1 19.4
18.9 18.9 19.1 19.4
19.9
19.9
19.9
19.9
20.6
20.6
20.6
21.3
21.3 21.9
19.9 20.6 21.3 21.9
19.9 20.6 21.3 21.9
Note: An indexed career-average pension with variable accrual factors and actuarial adjustment for
early/delayed retirement provides benefits according to the formula bt = E- f (a (s) , s) x W, X x(NRA) x
aNgA x (1 + r)t NRA where f (a, s) is the accrual factor as a function of age and service specified by the
at
plan, x is an index used to adjust the wage history, a. the cost of a $1 annuity beginning at age s, and r the
nominal discount rate. Plan parameters as well as economic and demographic assumptions are described
in the text.
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Age
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
18.9
18.9
Age
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
